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I 
 
Abstract 
Motivated by the insufficient research in understanding the influences of the delayed 
changes in credit ratings, the practical importance of information asymmetry as well 
as the theoretical difficulty of measuring information gap with an appropriate proxy, 
this thesis regards delayed credit rating change (DCRC) as a source of asymmetric 
information and exploits whether and how it affects issuer’s capital structure 
adjustments. It uses Compustat North America quarterly data from 1985 to 2010 
inclusive.  
 
Rating agencies often delay updating credit ratings, leading to an information 
gap between bond issuers and the market. This offers issuers (market insiders) 
opportunities to utilise the delayed credit rating changes as superior information, 
alongside which, factors capturing the associated benefits and costs of the rating 
changes and capital structure adjustments, are addressed to form the three key 
interactive variables in this research: DCRC, capital structure adjustments and firm 
performance.  
 
First considered are the effects of information asymmetry on financing 
adjustment before DCRCs. The evidence shows that issuers often adjust debt and 
equity financing at least one quarter before rating change announcements published 
by rating agencies. Issuers who anticipate rating upgrades in the next quarter do not 
significantly change the net debt issuance. Issuers who anticipate rating downgrades 
increase net debt issuance before rating changes. Secondly, this research is concerned 
with the robustness of DCRC’s effects, which is confirmed by various robustness 
check tests and incorporating DCRC into tests of the existing capital structure 
theories. The result confirms DCRC’s robust effects on firm financing adjustments. 
The last issue addressed is the relation between information asymmetry and gains or 
losses to issuers when utilising the information asymmetry. The results suggest that 
information asymmetry does bring material effects on firm performance. The three 
groups of results form a mechanism of delayed credit rating change’s real effects and 
reveal a fresh explanation for issuer’s financing decision making under asymmetric 
information.  
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1.1 Motivations of the Study 
“There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion. There’s 
the United States and there’s Moody’s1Bond Rating Service. The United 
States can destroy you by dropping bombs, and Moody’s can destroy 
you by downgrading your bonds. And believe me, it’s not clear 
sometimes who’s more powerful.’’2 (Partnoy (1999)) 
 
The Pulitzer Prize winner and the author of The World is Flat 
Thomas Lauren Friedman 
Credit rating is expression of opinion about credit risk of a security issuing body 
published by a rating agency. It is a great invention for transmitting financing 
demanders’ information to the market outsiders and the rating industry has boomed 
in the last century. Given credit rating’s long-standing, profound and powerful 
impact on modern financial markets in the past century, research on quantifying its 
value and its influence have naturally become a focus of academic study. In part, 
this is because the market mechanism has offered credit rating a position on the 
financial market with both information value and endorsement value. Crucially, it is 
clear that the continuing interest and attentions paid by the market players provides 
strong motivation for increased academic study in credit ratings. Given the crucial 
information transmission function of credit rating on the modern financial market, 
hundreds of papers have investigated the influences of credit rating. Analyses 
looking at credit rating from investors’ angles have been published, with various 
market reactions observed following credit rating changes.  
                                                          
1 Moody’s is one of the three largest rating agencies. It also has two peers, namely Standard & Poor’s and Fitch. 
Moody’s is considered as a representative of rating agencies. 
2 The News Hour with Jim Lehrer: Interview with Thomas Lauren Friedman (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 13, 
1996) (transcript on file with author). 
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It is worthwhile noting that the above quotation from the distinguished 
journalist Thomas Lauren Friedman crystallises his belief based on the preciseness 
and timeliness of credit rating. Although delayed announcements in credit rating 
changes have been rationalized through the rating process and demonstrated by 
rating failure episodes3, their influence on the financial market has not received 
sufficient attention in literature.  
Market outsiders, institutional investors and academics’ forecasting on future 
credit ratings with the aim of gaining precise and timely credit information about 
funding hunters has a long history dating back to late 1960’s. For example, Pogue 
and Soldofsky (1969) describe the techniques of forecasting credit ratings by 
utilising publicly available financial information. Various models forecasting credit 
ratings are introduced by Ederington (1985). Academic research on credit rating has 
largely concentrated on evaluating the static ratings and predicting default 
probabilities (for example, Krämer and Güttler (2008)). It has been shown that such 
methods may predict the static rating grades fairly accurately, yet, the changes, 
especially the timing of the changes, are hard to test by current pure mathematical 
techniques and has been barely documented in the literature so far.  
Intrigued by the costs and benefits associated with different credit rating levels, 
financial economists have amassed in accruing considerable knowledge of the link 
between credit rating and financing adjustments in the past five years. Kisgen 
(2006), for example, outlines discrete costs (benefits) associated with firm credit 
rating level differences and finds these costs (benefits) directly affect debt and 
                                                          
3  For instance, the Enron, WorldCom, Lehman Brothers’ cases all clearly show the delay in credit rating 
changes. 
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equity financing decisions. Firms near a credit rating upgrade or downgrade issue 
less debt relative to equity than firms not near a change in rating. However, the link 
between delay in credit rating changes and capital structure has not been formally 
made. 
This thesis carries out a detailed inspection on the impacts of delay in credit 
rating changes on the market. As shown by the working mechanism illustrated in 
Figure 1.1, when delayed credit rating changes (DCRCs, henceforth) exist on the 
market, there are information exchanges between the internal information set, 
signifying issuers and raters in this study, and the external market. Given the 
information gap opened by the delayed changes of credit ratings, it is assumed that 
issuers could and would take advantage of this asymmetric information to gain 
benefits by rebalancing financing costs and benefits and also adjusting their way of 
financing. For instance, a firm which recently acquires a valuable investment 
opportunity, the current rating of the firm may not reflect the potential profits from 
these opportunities, or the improved credit quality resulted from recent financial 
position. Thus, a rating upgrade coming with a time lag would cause a potential loss 
before the announcement is made by the rating agency. Conversely, a delayed 
rating downgrade may bring some opportunities for issuing cheap securities. DCRC 
creates information asymmetry and it may cause real impacts on insiders’ financing 
strategy. 
[Insert Figure 1.1 here] 
The two main imperfections in the financial market are information asymmetry 
and the agency problem, both of which have played a central role in corporate 
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finance literature and practice. Academic research has been investigating the 
influence of information asymmetry on various market issues. Yet, partly due to the 
breadth of issues, previous academic investigation has been severely limited in 
many aspects of measuring information asymmetry. This study, however, makes 
considerable progress in addressing measuring this issue. It emphasizes the time 
delay of rating changes, which creates information asymmetry before the 
announcements are made.  
This thesis first examines DCRC’s significant influence and finds strong 
empirical evidence that market insiders utilise the powerful delayed credit rating 
changes to gain benefits through financing adjustments. Using private information 
to improve capital structure before rating changes might decrease an issuer’s 
financing cost while keeping the rating at a particular level4 which is a significant 
indicator of the borrower’s reputation. This study fills the gap in the literature in 
this area, by investigating rating change’s influences from an insider’s perspective.  
Furthermore, since the general theory of capital structure has not been found 
and experts have suggested that it should not be expected (Myers (2001)), this 
thesis incorporates DCRC hypothesis individually into three dominated capital 
structure theories, the trade-off theory, the pecking-order theory and market timing 
theory, which are based on different assumptions. The study finds that DCRC 
hypothesis is more likely to be incorporated into the theories which are based on 
information asymmetry assumptions. 
                                                          
4 Kisgen (2006) argues that firms put efforts on avoiding downgrades and achieving upgrades due to the 
benefits of high ratings. 
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The second imperfection on the financial market is the agency problem, which 
further extends the study by examining the firm performance changes caused by 
financing adjustments before DCRCs. The agency theory links the two elements in 
a corporate governance context. Motivated by the second imperfection factor, this 
thesis tests the issuer’s real benefits in firm performance, for example, ROA, EPS 
and Tobin’s Q, gained through financing adjustment before DCRC. 
In summary, this thesis aims to fill the gap identified from the literature by 
investigating how the issuer’s DCRC affects firms’ financing, which will help to 
explain role of the information asymmetry driven by credit ratings. The three 
related research questions addressed by this thesis are:  
(1)  do delays in credit rating changes have real influences on issuers’ financing 
adjustments and why?  
(2)  do DCRC hypotheses incorporate with the existing dominated capital structure 
theories? 
(3) whether and how issuers’ adjusted financing capital structure affect the 
improvement in firm performance of these adjusted financing strategies before 
rating changes. 
1.2 Main Findings 
This thesis makes use of a large sample of Compustat North America finance data 
and S&P rating data from 1985 to 2010 inclusive. The evidence gained from this 
data sample shown in the three empirical chapters, Chapter III, IV and V, supports 
the DCRC hypotheses and indicates the DCRC’s effects on financing strategy and 
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firm performances of the issuer’s firm. The most crucial findings are the responses 
of firm issuers to DCRCs which vary among different types of issuers. ‘Good’ 
issuers who anticipate next-period rating upgrades, do not significantly increase or 
decrease net debt issuance, which is defined as the gap of debt issuance and equity 
issuance. ‘Bad’ issuers, who possess private information about the next-period 
rating downgrades, significantly increase net debt issuances by about 1.065% of the 
total asset. Secondly, issuers react differently to changes in long-term and short-
term credit ratings due to different costs and benefits associated with the change of 
ratings and are thus motivated accordingly. Thirdly, issuers in different credit rating 
grades, investment grade and speculative grade, respond to DCRCs on different 
scales. Lower-graded issuers respond more significantly due to the wider 
information gap between them and market outsiders than that between higher-
graded issuers and market outsiders. 
The robustness tests in Chapter IV further confirm DCRC hypotheses. The 
chapter also incorporates DCRC hypotheses into the dominant existing capital 
structure theories and finds that the DCRC dummies are significant in the test of 
pecking order theory and market timing theory. Chapter V finds that DCRC’s 
effects extend to firm performance due to issuer’s agency problem. Changes in 
ROA, EPS and Tobin’s Q, applied as measures of firm performance, have been 
tested around the time of DCRC taking place. The results gained from simultaneous 
equation systems show that ‘bad’ issuers’ firm performances are temporally 
improved by adjusting their net debt issuances one period before DCRCs. 
This research contributes to information asymmetry and corporate financing 
literature in three aspects. Specifically, the existing research does not specify the 
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working mechanism and rationality of the impact of ratings and thus does not 
evaluate the financing adjustments before rating changes from the issuers’ 
perspectives. In fact, measuring information asymmetry with proper proxy variable 
has always been a difficult issue in the relative research areas and most existing 
research has not succeeded in evaluating and applying delay in credit rating 
changes as they are actually anticipated by insiders. Analysing credit ratings change 
as the factor opening the window of information asymmetry and therefore fills a 
gap in credit rating related research area. Secondly, given the DCRC hypothesis 
stands, the existing capital structure theory tests are incorporated by DCRC dummy 
variables. The evidence shows that the DCRC hypothesis could be partly 
incorporated into the existing capital structure theories, especially the ones heavily 
based on assumption of information asymmetry. Last but not least, with various 
simultaneous equation systems and evaluation techniques, the study has been 
further extended to test the agency problem of issuers, by which the relations 
between capital structure and firm performance are addressed and tested.  
To summarize, the findings of these three empirical chapters, together with the 
related theoretical rationale, implicate several information-related factors inherent 
in the credit rating information dissemination process. Although some research 
efforts have been made towards to information asymmetry in the past few decades, 
few of them can adequately provide a thorough measuring proxy of it. The dummy 
variable of DCRC in this study provides an independent and powerful proxy of 
information asymmetry. The values and effects of DCRCs, as well as the 
mechanism under which these effects work, expand the limited focus offered by the 
existing research, which examines the relationship between delays in credit rating 
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changes and firm financing and performances, into an explicit and timely context. It 
further highlights the significant role of rating played as asymmetric information in 
rationalizing the behaviours and performances of issuers when facing the market 
imperfections.  
1.3 Thesis Outline 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II reviews studies into the 
credit rating concept, rating process, the mechanism created delay in credit rating 
changes (DCRC) and the relationship between DCRC and financing adjustments. 
Given the evidence of DCRC in Chapter II, the working mechanism of DCRC is 
introduced and its material influences on issuer’s financing and performance are 
presented in Chapter III. Following DCRC’s influences tested by the OLS 
regression, Chapter IV investigates the robustness of DCRC’s influences. In 
particular, it adopts four robustness check tests: logit model indicating issuer’s 
binary choices between equity and debt before DCRC, tests excluding outliers, MM 
estimation avoiding outliers’ influences in OLS regressions, and mixed model 
testing time and industry effects. Moreover, the chapter incorporates the DCRC 
hypothesis into existing capital structure theories. So far, one under-investigated 
question is ‘do financing adjustments driven by DCRCs really bring real outcomes?’ 
Empirical work in Chapter V investigates this compelling area. This provides a 
crucial element of analysis to confirm the benefit of financing adjustments before 
DCRCs, significantly extending the analysis of head and shoulders patterns. It 
expands on the first two empirical chapters by estimating simultaneous-equation 
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systems, through which it shows the evidence of real outcomes from financing 
adjustments driven by DCRC. 
Each empirical chapter is presented independently. Figure 1.2 illustrates the 
structures of the three relatively independent empirical chapters. Together, these 
three empirical chapters provide new insight into a number of important aspects of 
information asymmetry. The findings are relevant, and of interest to those outside 
the academic community, given the continuing and gradually growing attention 
from market practitioners. Chapter VI provides a summary of conclusions and 
recommendations for future research. 
[Insert Figure 1.2 here] 
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Figure 1.1 The working mechanism of asymmetric information effects 
. 
Note: In the graph above, there is information transfer from issuer to rating agency. The U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) Regulation Fair Disclosure implemented on 
October 23, 2000, which prohibits U.S. public companies from making selective disclosure of non-
public information to financial professionals such as equity research analysts, specifically excludes 
credit rating agencies, which are allowed to continue to receive non-public information from 
companies. Although the agency, for instance, Moody’s argues in Mahoney (2002) that ‘Rating 
agencies routinely request nonpublic data in the course of their surveillance activities. However, 
unlike accounting firms, rating agencies have no authority to demand such data, and indeed many 
firms do not provide requested data. (Indeed, issuers are under no obligation to cooperate with rating 
agencies at all.) Therefore, while it is clearly reasonable to expect rating agencies to do their best to 
discover relevant non-public data in the course of their surveillance activities, they can only work 
with the information which has been disclosed or which management has elected to provide.’  
  
Internal information set 
 
Issuer 
 
Financial 
report 
Rating 
agency 
 
Rating 
External Market 
?% Internal Info 
Quarterly 
Reports 
Delayed 
Rating 
News Expected 
following 
reaction 
Unequal 
Information 
exchange  
Benefit 
Keep certain 
rating with 
lower cost 
Chapter I Introduction  
 
12 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Structure of thesis, hypothesized relations and transmission mechanism 
among delayed credit rating changes, financing strategy and firm performance 
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2.1 Chapter Outline 
This study investigates the relations among delayed credit rating change (DCRC), 
capital structure adjustments and firm performance, and the transmission 
mechanism conducting delay in rating changes to firm performance. The work 
builds on four strands of literatures: credit rating, capital structure, links between 
credit rating and capital structure, and relations between capital structure and firm 
performance.  
This chapter begins with a review of the development of credit rating and the 
credit rating industry, which create profound influences in the modern financial 
market. Meanwhile, the delay of credit rating changes is confirmed and highlighted 
in order to show the information asymmetry between issuers and outsiders created 
by this. DCRC is an essential element in the understanding of the financing 
adjustments and firm performance improvements throughout this study. Having 
provided an overview of the rationale underlying the existence of delayed credit 
rating changes in the financial market, this chapter then presents a brief review of 
the documented capital structure theories. Next, recent studies incorporating credit 
rating into capital structure research are carried out. Last but not least, firm 
performance improvement, in relation to these determinants, is addressed in 
proposal of the research on the relevance of gaining benefits to both DCRC and 
financing adjustment driven by DCRC.  
2.2 Credit Rating 
2.2.1 Credit Rating Industries 
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Lewis Tappan established the first credit rating agency, Mercantile Agency, in New 
York in 1841 (Atherton (1946)). Tappan kept files on firms, reviewed their 
characteristics and their credit-worthiness to help market outsiders to gauge a firm’s 
trustworthiness. By exploiting his abolitionist connections across the country, 
Tappan created a network of correspondents to offer up-to-date, reliable, objective 
and comprehensive credit information. By 1846, the business was well developed 
and opened offices in Boston, Philadelphia and Baltimore. The first rating guide 
was published in 1859 by Robert Dun. A similar mercantile rating agency, formed 
in 1849 by John Bradstreet, published a ratings book in 1857 (Cantor and Packer 
(1994))5. In 1860, the lawyer and financial analyst Henry Varnum Poor published 
the ‘History of Railroads and Canals of the United States’ and he later published 
annual updated versions of his book with his son. 
In 1909 John Moody rated the first railroad bond and extended his ratings to 
utility and industrial bonds. This compelled the ratings agencies increasingly to 
move towards assigning ratings to securities. Fitch Publishing Company was 
founded in 1922. Standard Statistics, founded in the same year as Fitch, and Poor’s 
Publishing Company, which issued its first ratings in 1916, merged to form 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P, henceforth) in 19416. By then, all three major ratings 
agencies of today’s market were all established. Along with these three largest 
raters, information about other rating agencies is listed in Table 2.1. 
[Insert Table 2.1 here] 
                                                          
5 In 1933, the two agencies were consolidated to form today’s popularly known Dun & Bradstreet, which 
became the owner of Moody’s in 1962 but spin off in 2000.  
6 The company’s ratings services could be traced back to 1860. 
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It has been more than 100 years since John Moody provided the first corporate 
rating for a railway bond in 1909. Now credit ratings stand in a prominent position 
in financial markets. From the report issued by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in January 2003, it is obvious that the significance of credit ratings to 
issuers has been emphasized over time. It is noteworthy that the rating agency’s 
opinion might impact an issuer’s access to capital, cost of capital and the structure 
of financial transactions. In today’s financing market, nearly all large corporate 
bond issues are rated by at least one rating agency. 
Since capital flows between international financial markets, credit ratings are 
in use in the financial markets of most developed economies and several emerging 
markets (Dale and Thomas (1991)). Nowadays, the credit rating of the corporations 
has been widely considered as one of the most important indicators reflecting the 
probability of the default. The Economist concluded that credit rating agencies ‘are 
among the most powerful voices in today’s capital markets’ (Kisgen (2006)).  
2.2.2 Standard & Poor’s Ratings 
Since this thesis mainly adopts Standard & Poor’s rating data, this section 
introduces rating process and S&P credit ratings, which are evaluated based on 
information furnished by the obligors or gained by S&P from other sources they 
consider reliable7 (Standard & Poor’s corporate ratings criteria (2008)). 
The rating process is not limited to an examination of various financial 
measures, but includes quantitative, qualitative and legal analyses. According to the 
                                                          
7 ‘Although we look at information we receive with a critical eye, we do not perform any kind of audit (of 
financial statements or transactions) in connection with any credit rating—and may, on occasion, rely on 
unaudited financial information.’ (Standard &Poor’s corporate ratings criteria (2008)) 
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description in Standard & Poor’s corporate ratings criteria published in 2008, S&P 
assembles a team of analysts with appropriate expertise to review public 
information and internal company files, including operating and financial plans, 
management policies, pertinent to the rating and assesses projected performance 
when a firm requests the ratings service. A lead analyst is responsible for 
conducting the analysis and coordinating the rating process. A number of rating 
committee meetings is convened. The committee discusses the head analyst’s 
recommendation and the facts and expectations supporting the rating 
recommendation at the meetings. Finally, the voting members of the committee 
vote on the recommendation. The issuer is subsequently notified of the rating and 
the major considerations supporting the assignment of the rating. The issuer can 
appeal against the notified rating before it is disclosed to the public by supplying 
new information8 (Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2001)), though it is not guaranteed that 
the new information will convince the rating committee to alter their final decision. 
Once a final rating is assigned, it is conveyed to the public via S&P RatingsDirect, 
S&P.com, and the news media, together with the rationale and other commentary. 
In the U.S., Standard & Poor’s assigns and publishes its ratings irrespective of 
issuer request, if their financing is a public deal. After the assigned rating is 
announced, the rater adds the issue to their surveillance system. The rating process 
of S&P is described in Figure 2.1. 
[Insert Figure 2.1 here] 
                                                          
8 Moody’s policy is to simultaneously announce a final rating to the issuer and to the public, rather than giving 
the chance for appeal.  
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S&P issuer credit rating provides an opinion of the obligor’s overall capacity 
and willingness to meet its financial obligations as they become due. As a result of 
the surveillance process, the significant change in issuers’ conditions requires 
reconsideration of the outstanding rating. The rating committee will put the rating 
under review and recommend a new rating. The process is exactly the same as the 
rating of a new issue. 
The rating agency makes a distinction, in its rating system and symbols, 
between long-term and short-term credits, for which rating agencies maintain 
separate and well-established rating scales. S&P long-term credit ratings, assigned 
to long-term obligations (normally more than one year), are divided into several 
categories: ranging from ‘AAA’, reflecting the strongest credit quality, to ‘D’, 
reflecting the lowest. Except for ‘AAA’ and ‘D’, the rest of the ratings are modified 
by the addition of a plus or minus sign to show relative standing within the major 
rating categories. S&P short-term ratings, assigned to short-term obligations (less 
than one year), range from ‘A-1’, for the highest-quality obligations, to ‘D’, for the 
lowest. The ‘A-1’ rating is modified by a plus sign to distinguish the strongest 
credits in that major category. 
2.2.3 Credit Rating in Financial Markets 
As the complexity of financial markets and the diversity of borrowers has been 
growing over time, investors and regulators have increased their reliance on the 
opinions of the credit rating agencies (Crouhy et al. (2001)). Rating agencies enjoy 
privileged access to issuers’ financial situation and consequently ratings should 
potentially convey new information to market participants. Large number of 
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previous studies discussed the information content of credit ratings, which might 
lead to changes of security prices and financing costs. 
In the literature on the information value of credit rating, pricing-relevant 
information value is the principal area that has been explored. Bond rating as public 
information was theoretically considered to be reflected in security price.9 Thus 
intuitively, security price fluctuation should happen around rating changes. The 
main early studies include Katz (1974), Hettenhouse and Sartoris (1976), Grier and 
Katz (1976), Pinches and Singleton (1978), Griffin and Sanvicente (1982), and 
Ingram, Brooks and Copeland (1983), which all put their efforts on investigating 
security-price reactions to rating changes, yet it seems those discussions have not 
come to be conclusive.  
In particular, studies in this area originated from investigating the efficiency of 
the bond market driven by earlier discussion on market efficiency. Specialising the 
research question, the focus was put on the price adjustments associated with rating 
changes. Early empirical tests started exclusively with measuring the rating 
change’s impact on bond yield to maturity and discovered that bond price 
adjustment following rating changes seemed not significant according to empirical 
test results. For instance, Katz (1974) claims that it was surprising that ‘no 
anticipation exists prior to a public announcement of reclassification’ and that firms 
react 6-10 weeks later to the announcement of rating changes. It indicates that ‘little 
institutional research is being done to determine the proper credit level of bonds, 
and that bond investors appear to rely primarily on the pronouncements of the 
rating agencies as determinants of bond value’. Hettenhouse and Sartoris (1976) 
                                                          
9 Capital market efficiency requires that prices fully reflect all available information. 
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discovered little anticipation before downgrades but no reaction to upgrades. Grier 
and Katz (1976) introduce the impact of rating changes on utility bonds and 
indicate that industrial bonds are generally more volatile on reacting to the rating’s 
re-classification than are utility bonds.  
After noticing that ratings can be a market signal containing information, 
experts started to converse the focus on stock prices. Pinches and Singleton (1978) 
extended the rating impact to stock markets but found ‘the information content of 
bond rating changes is very small’ and thus argued the stock market seems efficient 
in processing the information from both bond rating upgrade and downgrade. 
Griffin and Sanvicente (1982) examined the adjustments in common stock price of 
firms whose bond rating is about to be reclassified or currently under 
reclassification and found the common stock price appeared to adjust with rating 
announcement although they couldn’t make out a competing explanation at then. 
The municipal bond market was studied by Ingram et al. (1983) and found that the 
valuation changes in the municipal bond market occur simultaneously with rating 
changes.  
More common significant security price changes, along with the credit rating 
reclassifications have been indicated through the results of empirical tests in a large 
body of related literature since 1990s. Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) 
concludes overall that both bond and stock prices are significantly affected by 
announcements of the credit Watchlist and actual rating changes from Moody's and 
Standard and Poor's but show asymmetric results for real upgrade and downgrade 
as well as investment grade and speculative grade. Goh and Ederington (1993) 
discuss the impact of bond rating downgrades on stockholders and claim 
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downgrades to stockholders are ‘bad news’ containing negative information only 
when they are accompanied by deteriorating financial expectations but not when 
downgrades are caused by leverage changes. Kliger and Sarig (2000) find that ‘the 
effect of the fine-rating information on bond prices is monotonic in firm leverage’. 
Steiner and Heinke (2001) utilised a sample of international bonds to investigate 
price impacts of both downgrades and reviews for downgrade. ‘Significant bond 
price reactions are observed 90 days before announcements of downgrades and 
negative watchlistings while upgrades and positive watchlistings do not cause 
announcement effects.’   
Recent studies also show the interest in specialized market related to credit 
ratings. Similar asymmetric price effect was found by Ammer and Clinton (2004) 
on the pricing of asset-backed securities. They find that negative reaction on returns 
and widening spreads tend to happen together with rating downgrades, which 
suggests that ‘ABS market participants appear to rely somewhat more on rating 
agencies as a source of negative credit news’. Pukthuanthong-Le, Elayan & Rose 
(2007) investigate the impact of sovereign credit ratings, which are affected by a 
borrowing country’s macro-factors, including economic political and social 
variables. 
Apart from ratings’ information value, rating also contains endorsement value 
since some regulations are tied to ratings. Along with the increased significance of 
credit ratings, policy makers refer to the ratings when they draft financial 
regulations and this drives the so called endorsement value of ratings, namely 
institutional and regulatory constraints which may cause ratings to put an impact on 
asset prices. On one hand, it is an obvious incentive for rating agencies to market 
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itself by arguing that their rating is entry trigger in markets. S&P argues one of the 
key benefits of having ratings is that ratings often provide the issuers with an ‘entry’ 
ticket in public debt markets, broadening the issuers’ financing opportunities 
(Dallas (1997)). Mahoney (2002) and Cantor and Mann (2007) from Moody’s state 
the trade-off between rating accuracy and stability.  
There are evidences in the previous studies which show the endorsement value 
of bond ratings, i.e. different impacts on highly-rated bonds and lowly-rated bonds. 
Kliger and Sarig (2000) suggest that the impact of rating announcements is greater 
on firms with high leverage (which are typically rated speculative-grade) than those 
with low leverage (which are typically rated investment-grade). Steiner and Heinke 
(2001) ‘indicates that the announcement effects can in part be explained by price 
pressure effects due to regulatory constraints rather than original information 
content of rating changes’. Kisgen and Strahan (2011) show that ratings-based 
regulations of bond investment affect the cost of debt, which further supports the 
existence of endorsement value of credit ratings. 
Except for the voice from rating agencies, some literature has gathered the 
current existing rating-related regulations and explained the rationale for policy 
makers to consider credit ratings. For example, many mutual funds, pension funds 
and institutional investors are not allowed to invest in low-quality bonds below 
certain levels. Cantor and Packer (1997) have provided a list of the historical events 
selecting uses of ratings by regulators in the U.S. Dating back to as early as 1936, 
banks were prohibited from holding speculative grade bonds by the regulator. The 
regulations blocking public funds invested in lower-rated issues are being enhanced 
in the following years. For instance, the Congressional Promulgation of the 
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Financial Institution Recovery and Reform Act of 1989 prohibited savings & loan 
institutions from investing in below-investment-grade bonds and specified pension 
fund to be invested in highly-rated issues, which are those of investment grade. The 
regulation body, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, has recognized the 
significantly increased importance of credit ratings to investors and other market 
participants in recent years, which impact an issuer’s access to and cost of capital, 
the structure of financial transactions, and the ability of fiduciaries and others to 
make particular investments. The Commission ‘had commenced a review of the use 
of credit ratings in federal securities laws, the process of determining which credit 
ratings should be used for regulatory purposes, and the level of oversight to apply 
to recognized rating agencies.’ Micu, Remolona and Wooldridge (2006) point out 
that many financial contracts link payment conditions to credit ratings and give an 
example that ‘some debt contracts specify that a downgrade entitles creditors to 
demand immediate repayment and other contracts that a downgrade triggers a 
higher coupon.’ 
2.2.4 The Fact of Delayed Credit Rating Changes 
The timeliness of the ratings has been suspected recent years, namely whether the 
ratings can be considered as effective signals to reflect default risk to issuers and 
investors, especially after the tardy reactions of agencies in the cases such as Enron 
and WorldCom. Report of Securities and Exchange Commission in 2003 
emphasized the investigations of the fact of delayed credit rating changes during 
Enron scandal from the government’s angle. The US Senate Hearings (2002): ‘‘On 
March 20, 2002, the Senate Committee held a hearing – entitled ‘Rating the Raters: 
Enron and the Credit Rating Agencies’. The hearing sought to elicit information on 
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why the credit rating agencies continued to rate Enron a good credit risk until four 
days before the firm declared bankruptcy [...].’’, and the US Senate Staff Report 
(2002): ‘‘[...] in the case of Enron, credit rating agencies displayed a lack of 
diligence in their coverage and assessment of Enron.’’  
Firstly, the evidence of delay in ratings is shown through the rating process 
described by Kliger and Sarig (2000). Since the information gathered by the rating 
agencies is usually from the historical data and the annual reports, the ratings will 
only reflect the historical financial situation of the corporations and therefore there 
will be a time lag for the ratings. However, when it enters to the supervising step, 
an alternative reason is that rating agencies don’t change the credit ratings very 
frequently in order to keep continuity and stability. Boot, Milbourn and Schmeits 
(2006) argue that rating agencies grant issuers time to recover before disclosing real 
rating actions. However, raters argue they are doing long-term evaluation and this 
will benefit the stability of the financial system.  
In fact, the concern about inefficient rating started more than three decades ago 
when rating agencies’ obvious failures occurred. The bond rating agencies have 
been under increased scrutiny since failing to predict accurately and to warn 
investors of impending firm-related financial difficulties such as the Penn-Central 
bankruptcy10. Pinches and Singleton (1978), conclude the lag period was around 
15-18 months if there are no company-specific events, creating the term ‘rate 
changing lag’ and introduced the definition as  
                                                          
10 The Pennsylvania and New York Central Transportation Company, almost always called Penn Central, was 
an American railroad company that operated from 1968 until 1976. The American financial system was 
seriously shocked about its bankruptcy when after only two years of merger.  
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‘the difference between the time investor's actions signify their 
recognition of significant changes in the prospects of the firm (as 
evidenced by abnormal residuals) and the time the rating agency 
changes the firm's bond rating’ 
 
The definition is defined from investor’s angle rather than from the issuers. 
Although rating agencies have been trying to improve the quality of credit 
ratings, they are still not a very precise signal. In recent few years, Moody’s issued 
several short reports clarifying their rating policy and process. They dispute the 
views of investors concerned about the stability of ratings in particular, investors 
believe that ratings should emphasise medium to long-term fundamentals. Mahoney 
(2002) from Moody’s states that the investors ‘feel that market opinion (as 
expressed in stock prices and credit spreads) is volatile, and that incorporating it 
into bond ratings would produce a pro-cyclical feedback process leading to even 
greater volatility and further disruption of the capital formation process’. Micu et al. 
(2006) summarises that ratings would not be revised if the impact of events on 
credit quality is expected to be temporary, uncertain or reversible, such as a 
slowdown in economic growth, a prospective merger or a decline in profit margins. 
‘Rating changes are frequently driven by stale information.’ Boot et al. (2006) 
argues rating agencies grant issuers time to recover before disclosing real rating 
action.  
Secondly, as stated in Partnoy (2006), credit rating agencies are not like other 
gatekeepers mainly because they face conflicts of interests that are potentially more 
serious than those of other gatekeepers. Being paid directly by issuers, they have 
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potential incentives to postpone the announcements of downgrades. Furthermore, 
the fact that credit rating agencies rate new complex debt products in recent years, 
particularly structured finance such as credit derivatives, shows that they could 
choose the rating business lines which generate higher revenues and profits. 
Partnoy (2006) believes that the agencies could become more like ‘gate openers’ 
rather than gatekeepers.  
Thirdly, bad news does not reach the market as quickly as good news. The 
issuers in good positions have an incentive to let agencies get more internal 
information to move to a higher grade11 . In contrast, bond issuers pay to the 
agencies to get benefit from the ratings. If they are in a bad financial position, they 
will try to not disclose the information to the agencies to avoid the potential rating 
downgrade. Also, the agencies cannot force the issuers to disclose the non-public 
information, thus having to spend more time and resources to get accurate 
information. All the above potential reasons cause the time lag of credit ratings.  
In summary, the primary causes of the rating inveracity may come from three 
major aspects: one is the agencies’ limited access to important information which is 
not in the public domain12; second is the conflicts of interests faced by the rating 
agencies; last but not least is that even if agencies got some private information, 
they do not change the credit ratings very frequently but update them after a period 
of observation and conversation with the market participants, by which they keep 
the continuity and stability of the rating and thus their professional reputation in the 
financing market.  
                                                          
11 The managerial behavior is called the discretionary disclosure hypothesis (Bae, Lim and Wei (2006)). 
12  For example, in Jan 2008, Raymond W. McDaniel Jr., the chief executive of Moody’s said on World 
Economic Forum that “information quality” given to Moody’s, “both the completeness and veracity, was 
deteriorating” as the subprime mortgage market grew. 
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2.3 Capital Structure 
Capital structure decisions are quite complex processes and theories in the area are 
difficult to be generalised due to the question’s diversity and complexity 
(Margaritis and Psillaki (2010)). Myers (2001) argues that ‘Yet even 40 years after 
the Modigliani and Miller research, our understanding of these firm’s financing 
choices is limited’.  
A company’s mixed financing of debt and equity is termed its capital structure. 
The financial manager’s responsibility or objective is to maximize the firms’ value 
as well as the wealth of the shareholders. Management thus addresses the concept 
‘optimal mix’ of financing, and identifies a ratio which minimizes the cost of 
capital, so that the firm’s value can be maximized. A firm’s cost of capital is 
measured by the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), which relates the cost 
of both equity and debt. The Modigliani–Miller Theorem (M&M, henceforth) (1958) 
began the modern theory of capital structure. It states that the value of a firm is 
unaffected by how that firm is financed when the market is perfect. Yet, capital 
structure does matter for practitioners of corporate finance, namely in the real world 
a company’s value is affected by the capital structure it employs because of the 
existence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency costs and asymmetric information.  
Taxes are the major factor considered in the Trade-off Theory. Higher taxes on 
dividends encourage more debt (Modigliani and Miller (1963) and Miller and 
Scholes (1978) in Baker and Wurgler (2002)). Higher non-debt tax shields motivate 
less debt (DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) in Baker and Wurgler (2002)). The Trade-
off Theory also considers the cost of financial distress positively associated with 
Chapter II Literature Review   
 
28 
 
high debt ratio, which may stop firm pursue profitable investment opportunities 
(Miller (1977)). Firm managers thus have to choose the debt ratio at a suitable level.  
Information asymmetry frequently exists on the current financial market. Three 
main points, highlighted by Myers and Majluf (1984), can answer for the feature of 
information distribution. Firstly, gathering and verifying the information may be 
costly, and thus may hold back investors’ access to such information although a 
publicly listed firm is legally obliged to supply sufficient verifiable information to 
reveal its true condition to the market quarterly or annually. Secondly, there should 
always be delays in the information disclosure process. Thirdly, even if there are no 
(or fairly low) costs incurred and no need to guard proprietary information, outside 
investors may still be subject to information disadvantage. This is because the 
organizational knowledge possessed by managers allows them to report their firm’s 
information with the way they assume is favourable to them. This knowledge is 
unattainable and undetectable for outside investors. The inevitable, uneven 
information distribution may result in potential gains, generated by an information 
advantage, to firms making capital structure plans. 
Agency problem is another imperfection driving the adjustments in capital 
structure. There are mainly two types of agency cost which may help to explain its 
relevance to capital structure. First is the asset substitution effect. Management has 
an increased incentive to undertake risky (even negative NPV) projects as D/E 
increases. The motivation behind it is the shareholders’ upside gains when the 
project is successful. Even if the project is unsuccessful, debt holders get the 
downside. There is a chance of firm value’s decrease and a wealth transfer from 
debt holders to share holders if the projects are undertaken. Second is the under 
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investment problem (or debt overhang problem). If debt is risky (e.g., in a growth 
company), the gain from the project will accrue to debt holders rather than 
shareholders. Thus, management is motivated to reject positive NPV projects, even 
though there is a potential to increase firm value.  
By extrapolating upon the classical Modigliani–Miller Theorem, literature in 
the past several decades has developed several schools of thought in theorizing and 
rationalizing the study of capital structure based on setting up various assumptions. 
As summarized in Harris and Raviv (1991), which is based on over 150 published 
and unpublished papers from the mid-to-late 1970’s, four categories of 
determinates of capital structure have been identified: 
(i) Agency costs: ameliorate conflicts of interest among various groups with 
claims to the firm’s resources, including managers (the agency approach); 
(ii) Asymmetric information: convey private information to capital markets or 
mitigate adverse selection effects (the asymmetric information approach); 
(iii) Product/Input market interactions influence: the nature of products or 
competition in the product/input market;  
(iv) Corporate control considerations: affect the outcome of corporate control 
contests. 
A fairly small number of ‘general principles’ are evident despite many factors 
emerged from the theory and many issues discussed based on specific assumptions. 
The most dominant capital structure theories so far are: the Trade-off Theory and 
the Pecking Order Theory. However, the empirical relevance of the two classical 
financing theories seems to be controversial and has often been questioned. For 
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instance, Miller (1977) suggested that if the Trade-off Theory were factual, then 
firms should have had much higher debt levels than researchers observe in reality. 
Myers (1984) raises a modified pecking order theory which recognizes both 
asymmetric information and the cost of financial distress, but is ‘grossly 
oversimplified and under qualified’. Fama and French (2002) criticized both the 
Trade-off theory and the Pecking Order Theory after testing the dividend payout 
ratio. Myers (2001) discusses three prevalent capital structure theories: the Trade-
off Theory, the Pecking Order Theory and the Free Cash Flow Theory, but 
considers them conditional theories which only work in particular situations and 
mentions that deeper and less conditional theory on capital structure may exist.   
Credit rating, as a crucial factor transmitting information in the modern 
financial market, stimulates the study connecting itself to asymmetric information. 
As discussed above, information asymmetry, as one of the most popularly 
discussed imperfections on the financial market, is a crucial factor affecting capital 
structure. The credit rating has made concrete information effect on capital 
structure from its delays in this study.   
2.4 Credit Ratings and Capital Structure 
2.4.1 The Original Links 
Credit rating is a significant indicator of the borrower’s reputation in the financial 
market and may change security prices, issuer’s financing cost as well as effectively 
providing issuer an entry ticket to public debt capital. Thus its change has real 
consequences to issuers. Figure 2.2 shows firm’s leverage by credit ratings with the 
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data adopted in this research, which indicates the relations between credit ratings 
and leverages. The leverage is negatively related to ratings in general: the higher the 
rating, the lower the leverage. The firms without a credit rating on average have 
lower leverages, which indicates the rating’s importance to the firm’s financing 
access. 
[Insert Figure 2.2 here] 
The history of indicating the connection between credit rating and capital 
structure goes back to Grier and Katz (1976), which states factors such as the 
expected future earnings, the debt-equity ratio and the liquidity of the firm are 
considered undoubtedly in the procedures used by various agencies to determine 
the ratings even if the procedures are confidential. The early study Diamond (1991) 
starts a theoretical model analyzing the maturity structure of debt financing given 
borrowers hold private information about their future credit rating. Fons, Cantor 
and Mahoney (2002) from Moody’s conclude that the rating system remains very 
important position to the thinking and behaviour of investor and issuer after 
Moody’s serious communication with market participants.  
Growing interest in research in the area linking credit rating with corporate 
financing policy emerged in the recent decade, for instance, Faulkender and 
Petersen (2006), Kisgen (2006), Kisgen (2009), Tang (2009) and Sufi (2009). 
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) find that firms which have access to the public 
bond markets, as measured by having a debt rating, have significantly more 
leverage. Kisgen (2006) defines firms near a change in rating as those being rated 
with either a plus or minus, with which it examines to what extent credit ratings 
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directly affect capital structure decisions. It argues credit rating changes drive 
discrete costs/benefits which vary in different rating levels thus influening debt and 
equity financing decisions. Kisgen (2009) shows that firms reduce leverage 
following rating downgrades. Tang (2009) studies firms’ financing and investment 
decisions following Moody’s credit rating refinement in 1982. Sufi (2009) suggests 
that third-party certification by rating agencies increases the availability of debt 
financing for firms. 
However, literature has mainly discussed how firms respond to rating changes 
after the news announced by raters rather than how firms react to the changes when 
they are delayed and the delay could be foreseen by firms earlier. There is little 
research or empirical evidence shown on the precise mechanism driving the 
relations between ratings and capital structure, in particular, addressing financing 
adjustments before credit rating changes due to its delay and the private information 
caused by the delay. 
2.4.2 The Significance of DCRCs for Financing Decisions 
As discussed in section 2.2.4, issuers know their financial related information prior 
to the market. Combining the agency’s rating criterion, the issuer is able to predict 
future rating changes as soon as they realise their updated financial situation. Yet, 
the rating agency13 would not know the issuer’s internal information at the same 
time the issuer knew, thus they are not able to update the rating. Even if the raters 
received superior information from the issuer before it is publicly disclosed, they 
would normally change the rating only when they can confirm a long-term trend. 
                                                          
13 In this thesis, the terms of ‘rating agency’ and ‘rater’ mean the same.  
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These facts naturally address the question ‘would the delay in credit rating change 
open a window for information asymmetry’? 
In reality, the existence of information asymmetry and its influence are hardly 
diminished even in a relatively efficient market. Firstly, the costs in obtaining and 
verifying a firm’s private information may be significant. Although firms are 
legally obliged to supply sufficient verifiable information to reveal its true 
condition, the policies are never able to regulate all the details that firms have to 
disclose to the public. Secondly, outsiders may still find themselves suffering from 
an information disadvantage even if there are no costs incurred and no need to dig 
for proprietary information. This is because the professional knowledge possessed 
by firm managers allows them to interpret the information and report it in a 
favourable manner. This is almost unperceivable to outsiders. This inevitable, 
uneven information distribution in the market may result in potential gains to the 
insiders. 
Information asymmetry has always lain at the heart of determinates of capital 
structure studies. Over 40% of the theoretical models enrol information asymmetry 
in the theory summary of Harris and Raviv (1991). Despite the increasing focus on 
it, existing theories fail to give firm’s financing behaviour a conclusive theoretical 
explanation after enormous research done to capital structure mentioned 
asymmetric information. This is mainly due to the difficulty in finding appropriate 
proxies for changes in the levels of information asymmetry (Tang (2009)). For 
instance, the difference in information has been emphasized in the context of the 
pecking-order theory, yet further research has been obstructed by finding a good 
measure of information asymmetry.  
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The time gap between issuer’s realization of future rating change and real 
rating change are termed as the delayed credit rating changes (DCRC) in this study, 
which leads to the information gap between issuers and the external market, thus 
provides opportunity to the former to maximize their benefits by adjusting their 
capital structure before the real rating action taken by raters.  
Delayed credit rating change, as the proxy of asymmetric information, has three 
crucial features in this study, which were not applied in the previous literature. 
Firstly, DCRC is considered as the asymmetric information before it takes place and 
thus its information effect is not that following the rating’s announcement as used in 
the previous literature (Kliger and Sarig (2000), and Tang (2009)). Secondly, it is 
reasonable to assume timing of rating changes cannot be anticipated by outsiders 
since high frequency data is adopted for the tests in the research. Thirdly, it might 
not be exogenous as assumed in previous studies, but is more likely to be 
endogenous.  
The specific characteristics of DCRC will be decisive on understanding its 
influence on issuer’s financing. For example, the first feature of DCRC distincts its 
influence on the market from rating’s effect found in the previous studies. 
Specifically, delayed rating upgrades are considered as bad news while delayed 
downgrades are generally good news to issuers. The third feature indicates that 
issuers and rating agencies have the potential to communicate and collaborate 
during the process of rating news disclosure and issuers may choose the technique 
to disclose their updated financial information to the market through rating agencies 
as well as their direct communication with the market. 
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Issuers weight the financing costs and benefits associated with credit rating 
changes to decide the debt-equity choice and to achieve better payoffs. Based on the 
features of DCRCs, the benefits of debt include the tax deductibility (Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1973)), reduction of agency problem through decreased free-cash-
flow (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jensen (1986), and Fama and French (2005)) 
and a relatively cheaper price for ‘bad’ issuers before downgrades. The costs of 
debt consist of the cost of financial distress (Scott (1976)), debt overhang (Myers 
(1977)), agency conflicts and that debt would be more costly for ‘good’ issuers 
before upgrades. The benefits of equity include more transparent communication 
with the market and keeping the firm’s flexibility. The costs of equity are 
transaction costs and the adverse selection costs created by an issuer’s superior 
information about the value of the firm’s equity (Myers (1984)). The latter is 
mainly reflected as the significant price drop after its issuance on the market. The 
trade-off between debt and equity will finally lead to an issuer’s financing decisions.  
Issuers’ considerations on deciding capital structure is mainly to adjust 
outsider’s evaluation precision on their firm value through direct communications 
or indirect signalling (Ang and Cheng (2011)), or to decrease their financing costs, 
or to keep ratings at certain levels (Kisgen (2006)). ‘Good’ issuers may therefore 
intend to convey to the market their updated knowledge of their firms which is 
better than the market’s expectation. In contrast, ‘bad’ issuers, who try to hold back 
bad news in order to avoid its negative impact on firm value, financing costs and 
capital accessibility (Kothari, Shu and Wysocki (2009)), would prefer to behave 
either like ‘good’ or ‘others’ issuer.  
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In short, the choice of debt and equity by ‘good’ and ‘bad’ issuers in response 
to DCRCs are expected to be significantly different. The ‘good’ issuers intend to 
keep ratings at a certain level and confirm the upgrade news being disclosed in the 
next period. This is due to the so-called ‘credit passport’ effect when many financial 
contracts link payment conditions to credit ratings. Policy makers also draft 
financial regulations by referring to credit ratings, giving rise to an endorsement 
value of ratings14. In contrast, the ‘bad’ issuers have financial incentives to take 
advantage of cheaper debts before downgrades. As analysed above, the ‘good’ 
issuers may take higher cost of debt but lower cost of equity. The higher cost of 
debt comes from the undervalued ratings, associated with which issuers have to pay 
more when they issue debt. ‘Good’ issuers’ lower costs of equity are due to 
insignificant drops in equity price after equity issue announcement (Ang and Cheng 
(2011))15. The ‘bad’ issuers may face the opposite situations. 
2.5 Financing , Governance and Performance 
2.5.1 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is an indispensable element linking corporate financing and 
firm performance. In fact, capital structure is employed as a corporate governance 
device, which preserves the governance efficiency and ensures the governance 
system creates firm value (La Rocca (2007)). The relevant study has increased 
dramatically during the last few decades. Understanding the concept of corporate 
governance helps researchers to gain an overall picture of a firm’s internal and 
                                                          
14  Sarbanes-Oxley Act sums up the benefits of keeping ratings at a level (U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (2003)). 
15 The test results of price change in response to previous rating changes also show that significant price drop is 
only significant to ‘bad’ issuers but not ‘good’ issuers. 
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external functioning mechanism. However, as summarized in Gillan (2006), the 
definition of corporate governance differs depending on one’s view of the financial 
world. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as the approaches 
whereby suppliers of finance to the corporations assure themselves of getting a 
satisfactory return on their investment. Taking a broad perspective, Zingales (1998) 
views governance systems as the complex set of constraints that shape the ex post 
bargaining over the quasi-rents generated by a firm. Gillan and Starks (1998) define 
corporate governance as the system of laws, rules, and factors that control 
operations at a company. Irrespective of the particular definitions above, 
researchers often categorize corporate governance mechanisms into one of two 
groups: those internal to firms and those external to firms.  
Figure 2.3 delicately captures the essence of the relationship between internal 
and external governances. The figure clearly illustrates one of the core issuers of 
firm performance management: how does a firm finance their business? The left-
hand-side of the diagram comprises the basis of internal governance. The 
management, acting as shareholders’ agents, decides in which assets to invest and 
how to finance those investments. The Board of Directors, at the apex of internal 
control systems, is charged with advising and monitoring management and has the 
responsibility to hire, fire and compensate the senior management team (Jensen 
(1993)). The right-hand side of the diagram introduces elements of external 
governance arising from a firm’s need to raise capital. Further, it highlights that in 
publicly traded firms, a separation exists between capital providers and capital 
managers, which creates the demand for corporate governance structures. Combing 
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all the factors in the figure, managers finally make the decision on firm’s financing 
strategy.   
[Insert Figure 2.3 here] 
2.5.2 Capital Structure and Firm Performance 
An extensive literature is dedicated to study capital structure and its influence on 
corporate performance (See the surveys by Harris and Raviv (1991) and Myers 
(2001)). Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) point out that the relations between firm 
financing and firm governance are mainly addressed by agency problem, the 
conflicts of interest between owners-managers and shareholders as well as those 
between controlling and minority shareholders, which has been well documented in 
the corporate governance literature throughout the past few decades (for example, 
Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), 
and Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006)). 
The importance of the agency cost is emphasized by the seminal paper Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) showing that the agency problem arises from the separation of 
ownership and control of firms. The agency problem theory is based on the 
assumption that the interests of the company’s managers and its shareholders are 
not perfectly aligned: a manager, as the agent of the firm and its shareholders, tends 
to maximize their own utility rather than the value of the firm when managers have 
incentives to take excessive risks as part of risk shifting investment strategies.  
To this end, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) summarise the reasons for the rise of 
interest conflict between managers and shareholders over financing policy. Firstly, 
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shareholders are much more diversified than managers who besides having stock 
and stock options on the firm have their human capital tied to the firm (Fama 
(1980)). Secondly, as suggested by Jensen (1986), a larger level of debt pre-
commits the manager to work harder to generate and pay off the firm’s cash flows 
to outside investors. Thirdly, Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) both argue 
that managers may increase leverage beyond the ‘optimal capital structure’ in order 
to increase the voting power of their equity stakes, and reduce the likelihood of a 
takeover and its resulting possible loss of job-tenure. 
The free cash flow problem, noted by Jensen (1986) examining the US oil 
industry, comes from the incentives of a firm’s manager to invest beyond the 
optimal size. Managers, whose compensation is positively related to the growth in 
sales (see, Murphy (1985)), may finance projects earning low returns with the 
consequence that the firm might not be funded by the equity or bond markets. Thus 
high debt ratios may be adopted as a disciplinary device to reduce managerial cash 
flow waste through the threat of liquidation, causing personal loss to managers in 
terms of salaries, reputation and perquisites (Grossman and Hart (1983) and 
Williams (1987)) or creating pressure to generate cash flows to service debt (Jensen 
(1986)). Furthermore, Ofek (1993) claims that the existence of debt in external 
financing may help to preserve a firm’s going-concern value. Novaes and Zingales 
(1999) (in Bhagat and Bolton (2008)) suggest that the optimal choice of debt from 
the viewpoint of shareholders generally differs from manager’s optimal choice. In 
these situations, debt is likely to affect the value of the firm positively.  
Whereas debt may reduce the agency costs of outsider equity, on firm 
performance, debt has the opposite effect since agency costs can also appear due to 
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conflicts between debt holders and equity investors (shareholders), which may 
impart a negative effect on the value of the firm. Jensen (1989) and Ofek (1993) 
find that highly-leveraged firms will responds operationally and financially faster to 
a decline in firm performance than a less-leveraged firm since the former may face 
to default even if the decline is subtle. These conflicts arise when the leverage 
becomes relatively high and therefore induces a risk of default, which may create 
what Myers (1977) referred to as an ‘underinvestment’ or ‘debt overhang’ problem. 
Building on Myers (1977) and Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990) develops a model in 
which debt financing is shown to mitigate overinvestment problems but aggravate 
the underinvestment problem. Overall, the previous studies predict that debt will 
have both a positive and a negative effect on firm performance. This study expects 
the increase in leverage on firm performance to be positive. 
Other literature about financing strategy and firm performance include 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990), which report that 67% of firms suffering a decline 
in performance, profitability and cut dividends and it is further extended by Ofek 
(1993), which tests whether a firm’s level of debt before performance decline is 
related to its dividend decision. Jensen (1989) and Wruck (1990) claim the link 
between firm leverage and performance through possible default and financial 
distress. They propose that firms, which are with the motivation of avoiding default, 
are forced to make crucial decisions earlier due to their increased debt levels 
impose discipline on a firm. Jensen (1989) argues that a more highly leveraged 
(MHL) firm responds faster to a decline in firm value than one which is less 
leveraged, ‘because the value of a MHL firm can decrease less before it is forced 
into bankruptcy’ (Altman (1971) in Whiting and Gilkison (2000)). Berger and 
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Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) document that the choice of capital structure may help 
mitigate the agency costs.  
The literature adopts a number of various measures of firm performance from 
angles of different market participants, such as (1) financial ratios from balance 
sheet and income statements (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Gorton and Rosen 
(1995), Mehran (1995), and Ang, Lauterbach and Schreiber (2002)), (2) earnings 
per share (e.g., Stickel (1992), Jain and Kini (1994), and Johnson, Ryan and Tian 
(2009)), and (3) Tobin’s Q, which mixes market values with accounting values (e.g., 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), McConnell 
and Servaes (1995), Mehran (1995), Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999)). This 
thesis mainly measures firm performances by three indicators: return on assets 
(ROA), earnings per share (EPS) and Tobin’s Q. 
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Figure 2.3 Corporate governance and the balance sheet model of firms 
 
 
Source: Figure 1 in Gillan (2006), which adapts the figure from PowerPoint slides accompanying 
Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe (2005). 
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3.1 Introduction 
The importance of credit ratings is phenomenally prevalent in financial markets. 
This is not only because of the fact that ratings effectively provide an entry ticket 
for issuers to enter into the debt market (see, Dallas (1997), and Cantor and Mann 
(2007)), but also that changes in rating often lead to adjustments in security prices 
(Hand et al. (1992)), the financing costs of issuers as well as the existing credit and 
debt agreements of the firm. For instance, Kliger and Sarig (2000) show that firms’ 
debt value increases (decreases) and equity value falls (rises) when Moody’s 
announces better (worse) than expected ratings. In addition, policy makers often 
draft financial regulations with references to credit ratings, giving rise to an 
endorsement value of ratings16. Any information pointing toward a future change in 
rating for a firm, therefore, is crucial for the stakeholders of the firm, and hence 
may affect firm managers’ financing decisions. Graham and Harvey (2001), for 
example, report that 57.1% of CFOs in the sample see credit ratings as the second 
highest concern when they determine firm capital structure.  
This chapter contributes to the capital structure literature by investigating firms’ 
financing activities before a change in rating is publicly revealed. It provides 
evidence on the ways by which firms adjust their debt and equity financing based 
on the asymmetric information of different anticipation on credit rating changes 
between insiders (the issuers) and outsiders (the market).  
The study in this chapter is motivated by recent survey evidence and significant 
corporate events confirming that rating agencies do not change ratings in a timely 
                                                          
16 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act sums up the benefits of keeping ratings at a certain level (U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (2002)). 
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manner that reflects the up-to-date financial condition of a firm. This timeliness 
issue came under the public spotlight particularly surrounding the Enron, 
WorldCom and Lehman Brothers episodes. The Association for Financial 
Professionals (AFP) conducted a survey in 2002 that reported ‘Most respondents do 
not believe changes in their company’s finances are promptly reflected in the 
ratings’.17 
The difference between the time when the information of the firm emerges 
internally, which is available only to firm managers but not to the public, and the 
revelation time for a change in rating by agencies, creates a window for information 
asymmetry. This is because the managers have first-hand information about the 
firm’s financial circumstances, operating performance, growth opportunities and 
future prospects, while investors may not have easy access to such up-to-date 
information.  
Further, in order to revise their assessment on the firm’s credit quality, 
investors rely on publicly available information including the revelation of rating 
changes by rating agencies. Investors often receive only the information on the level 
of ratings, but not the fully specific details underlying rating agencies’ decisions 
(Kliger and Sarig (2000)). In contrast, firm managers have a knowledge advantage 
about the firm, and based on their understandings about agencies’ ratings criteria, 
they are able to predict rating changes for the firm in the near future with greater 
                                                          
17 Empirical studies have offered some explanations for the observed delay in rating changes. Boot et al. (2006), 
among others, report that rating agencies may grant issuers time to recover before taking rating actions. Micu et 
al. (2006) provide evidence that rating agencies who pursue rating accuracy and stability to maintain their 
professional reputations do not revise credit ratings if the expected impact on credit quality of an event is 
considered as being temporary, uncertain or reversible. 
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precision than investors. 18  The voluntary corporate disclosures summarised by 
Healy and Palepu (2001) and the level of information asymmetry endogenously 
chosen by firms (Ang and Cheng (2011)) may also greatly improve issuers’ 
predictions of future rating changes. An information asymmetry in expected future 
rating changes thus arises between investors and firm managers. 
Such an information asymmetry may allow managers to exploit the advantages 
of their insider information on anticipated changes in credit ratings. One of the 
actions they may take is to undertake capital structure transactions. For example, 
Myers (2001), among others, describes how information asymmetry creates 
chances for ‘financing tactics’ and ‘financing strategies’. 
The study in this chapter considers the information asymmetry between 
corporate bond issuers and investors and investigates its influences on issuers’ 
financing activities.19 This research differs from previous research in its focus on 
the information asymmetry induced by the ‘delayed’ arrival of a change in rating 
during which firm managers may foresee the future rating based on their 
information advantages but investors may not. It analyses whether managers exploit 
such information asymmetry by making corporate financing adjustments. None of 
the extant literature has investigated this research question. 
Prior studies have examined the influence of rating changes on the subsequent 
capital structure decisions in different contexts. An early study Diamond (1991) 
                                                          
18 It is reasonable to assume that rating changes cannot be anticipated by outsiders since high frequency data is 
adopted in this research. 
19 Tang (2009) points out that empirical studies often use proxies of information asymmetry with corporate 
characteristics  such as market-to-book ratio, tangibility and ownership as well as institutional analyst forecasts, 
but that these factors’ explanatory power on corporate behaviors is weakened due to the high correlation 
between these variables and firms’ unobservable investment opportunities. 
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starts a theoretical model analysing debt maturity structure given borrowers hold 
private information about their future credit rating. Kisgen (2006) defines firms 
being rated with either a plus or minus at the beginning of a financial year as near a 
change in rating, and documents that these firms are more conservative in raising 
extra debt in the year. Kisgen (2009) shows that firms reduce leverage only 
following rating downgrades, but not upgrades. Tang (2009) studies firms’ 
financing and investment decisions following Moody’s rating refinement in 1982, 
which is considered as an exogenous rating refinement event.  
This study defines the delayed credit ratings change (DCRC, henceforth) as a 
change in rating (upgrade or downgrade) of a firm to be revealed by ratings 
agencies in the following quarter. It derives indicators for delayed rating change 
based on realised ratings in the next quarter as a proxy for insiders’ expectation of 
ratings in the current quarter. The approach in the framework of this study, differs 
from Kisgen (2006), in assuming that firm managers can foresee such changes 
based on their superior knowledge about the firm, while investors cannot20. This 
study defines three types of issuers: (i) ‘good’ issuers who expect their ratings to be 
upgraded in the next quarter, (ii) ‘bad’ issuers who expect their ratings to be 
downgraded in the next quarter, and (iii) ‘others’ who do not expect rating changes 
in the next quarter, used as a baseline in the test.  
The quarterly financial data of companies in North America and Standard & 
Poor’s ratings data are collected from Compustat for the period between Q1 1985 
and Q4 2010. The tests evaluating DCRC’s effects on financing regress the current 
                                                          
20 Pinches and Singleton (1978) create the term ‘rate changing lag', which is defined as ‘the difference between 
the time investor's actions signify their recognition of significant changes in the prospects of the firm (as 
evidenced by abnormal residuals) and the time the rating agency changes the firm's bond rating’. The ‘delayed 
rating change' in this study focuses on the time gap between issuers' actions and agencies' rating changes. 
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debt issue and equity issue on the rating indicators of upgrades and downgrades in 
the next quarter as well as a set of conventional control variables of firms’ 
financials.  
The main finding of this chapter is that DCRCs significantly affect issuers’ 
capital structure decisions at least one period before the rating change taking place. 
Adjusting financing before rating changes is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
financing adjustment is due to information asymmetry before rating announcements 
are made. It finds that ‘good’ issuers moderately increase equity issuance by 0.901% 
(as the percentage of total asset in the last period) while ‘bad’ issuers significantly 
increase debt issuance by 1.809%. As a result, issuers take significant actions in 
adjusting their net debt issue in response to expected rating downgrades in the near 
future, but do not do so in response to expected rating upgrades. Specifically, 
issuers increase net debt issuance by 1.065% when they anticipate downgrades in 
the next quarter, but not respond to future upgrades.21 Moreover, ‘good’ issuers take 
actions of financing adjustment one quarter before rating changes, while ‘bad’ 
issuers do so at least two quarters before rating changes. 
Secondly, the evidence shows that issuers respond differently when they face 
changes in various credit ratings. In response to changes in long-term rating, ‘good’ 
issuers moderately increase equity issue by 0.894% (as the percentage of total asset 
in the last period) while ‘bad’ issuers significantly increase debt issue by 2.406%. 
Issuers facing a downgrade in short-term rating seek to save the rating by 
decreasing long-term debt one quarter before DCRCs. 
                                                          
21 This evidence shows that financial and utility firms do not change their financing mix accordingly. It is 
consistent with the notion that the capital structure of financial firms is substantially influenced by regulators. 
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Thirdly, the responses of firms to DCRCs vary across rating categories. In 
particular, speculative-grade issuers show greater responses than investment-grade 
firms in adjusting net debt issuance, and typically have a wider information gap 
between outsiders and themselves. Overall, the findings in this study suggest that 
firms make financing decisions before the anticipated rating changes in order to 
benefit from the information asymmetry of DCRCs. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the 
assumptions and develops the hypotheses. Section 3.3 presents the data and 
methodology. Section 3.4 describes the results. Section 3.5 discusses and concludes. 
3.2 Hypotheses Development 
3.2.1 Assumptions 
According to the discussion in Section 3.1, it is reasonable to set out the 
assumptions below, which are the bases of the tests in this chapter evaluating 
DCRC’s influences on issuers’ capital structure strategy: 
(i) credit ratings contain pricing-relevant information on shares and bonds, and 
thus affect issuers’ overall financing costs;   
(ii) announcements of credit rating changes are delayed to at least one period after 
the change of issuers’ financial conditions; 
(iii) issuers and raters are assumed to have the same expectations on future rating 
changes22, which helps issuers to predict future rating changes at least one 
period before DCRC is released to the public23. 
                                                          
22 Kliger and Sarig (2000) argue that instead of revealing information to public which might benefit competitors, 
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3.2.2 Hypotheses 
As the mechanism and timeline in Figure 3.1 illustrates issuers may take action to 
exploit the asymmetric information driven by delayed rating changes. Consider the 
example of a firm that has recently acquired a valuable investment opportunity or 
has better than expected financial conditions: the current rating of the firm does not 
reflect its improved credit quality. Thus, a rating upgrade coming late would not 
benefit the firm before it is announced by the rating agency. In contrast, a firm 
which faces negative future prospects holds back unfavourable information from 
outsiders. The current rating of the firm may over value its credit quality. A delayed 
rating downgrade may grant opportunities for the firm to conduct financing at a 
relatively cheaper cost. 
[Insert Figure 3.1 here] 
All the three types of issuers (‘good’, ‘bad’ and ‘others’ defined in Section 3.1) 
face the delayed information arrival of a change in rating; hence the information 
asymmetry between them and their investors. This study expects that the actions in 
debt and equity issuances chosen to exploit the information asymmetry on DCRC 
are significantly different for different types of issuers. Issuers balance the 
associated costs and benefits of debt and equity to decide the financing choice.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
issuers provide raters with detailed insider information during the rating process. Kisgen (2006) states, ‘Rating 
agencies may receive significant company information that is not public’. The documented close information 
communication between issuers and raters support the assumption (iii). S&P ‘may allow for an appeal if the 
issuer can provide new and significant information to support it’ also supports the point that issuers and raters 
share the same information set as well as the same view of future rating changes. 
23 ‘The manager’s information advantage over outsider investors is large’ Myers (2001). The study in this 
chapter assumes that issuers are able to predict their future rating change at least one period before it is 
announced given two conditions: they have their firm’s quality and finance information earlier than outsiders 
and issuers can reach the rating criteria easily through rating agency’s public website (eg. S&P lists their criteria 
on www.standardandpoors.com/CriteriaTOC). 
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For ‘good’ issuers, it is relatively more costly to go for debt financing before 
upgrades than to wait until the news of an upgrade is disclosed by the rator. Before 
rating changes, ‘good’ issuers give priority to securing the anticipated rating 
upgrade being realised at the earliest possible juncture, and significantly avoid 
increasing debt financing, which might trigger off negative influence on the arrival 
of upgrade. This is because many financial contracts link payment conditions to 
credit ratings (Micu et al. (2006)) (the so-called ‘credit passport’ effect). Debt 
financing becomes cheaper for ‘good’ issuers’ after an upgrade is realized. 
Moreover, this is consistent with the survey evidence of Graham and Harvey (2001) 
that issuers only aim at ‘soft’ leverage targets. The Trade-off Theory suggesting 
firms target a rigid leverage ratio would not play an active role in ‘good’ issuers’ 
financing strategy when the cost of debt outweighs other factors. 
The benefits of equity include more transparent communication with the market 
and keeping firms’ flexibility. From the view point of communication with the 
market, since rating upgrades usually take longer to occur than downgrades24, ‘good’ 
issuers are more keen to convey to the market their firms’ updated credit quality, 
which is better than the market’s evaluation. Equity financing as a format of direct 
communication mitigates the information asymmetry. This is because investors 
cannot obtain insider information but can learn from insiders’ observable actions 
(Koku (1995)). This leads to the first hypothesis in this chapter: 
Hypothesis 3.1: ‘Good’ issuers prefer to issue equity than debt before a credit 
ratings upgrade. 
                                                          
24 According to the AFP survey (2002), 57% of the respondents who represent companies that have experienced 
a rating upgrade report that upgrades took place six months after the improvement of their financials, while 73% 
of respondents believe that downgrades occur within six months after deteriorations in the company’s financials. 
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The delayed downgrade, conversely, allows ‘bad’ issuers to take advantage of 
relatively cheaper debt before a downgrade. In general, debt financing benefits 
issuers by lowering the weighted average cost of capital (Lally (2004)). Ross (1977), 
Narayanan (1988) and Noe (1988) also document that firm’s value is positively 
associated with debt-to-equity ratio. Myers (1984) suggests that firms borrow up to 
the triggering point of financial distress. The benefits of debt include the tax 
deductibility (Kraus and Litzenberger (1973)), reduction of agency problem through 
decreased free-cash-flow (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jensen (1986) and Fama 
and French (2005)). The costs of debt include the cost of financial distress (Scott 
(1976)), debt overhang (Myers (1977)), and agency conflicts. Korteweg (2010) 
provides recent evidence for the net benefits to leverage. Specifically for ‘bad’ 
issuers, debt is cheaper before a downgrade is released; therefore taking advantage 
of cheap debt before downgrades is sensible. 
Although equity financing has been considered relatively more flexible than 
debt financing, it may involve significant drops in the share price on issue 
announcements (Asquith and Mullins (1986)). Fama and French (2005) offer an 
explanation for such price drops based on adverse selection whereby investors are 
aware of information asymmetry and thus believe that a firm’s stock is overvalued 
when the firm undertakes seasoned equity offerings. ‘Bad’ issuers tend to hold back 
the unfavourable information and communicate less with market, which thus may 
cause significant a fall in stock price when new issuances are announced. From the 
discussion above, the second hypothesis arrives: 
Hypothesis 3.2: ‘Bad’ issuers prefer to issue debt than equity before a credit 
ratings downgrade. 
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Finally, combining the statement above about equity financing, ‘good’ issuers 
and ‘bad’ issuers can face different benefits and costs. ‘Good’ issuers can lower the 
cost of equity financing due to the insignificant drop of stock price after issue 
announcements (Ang and Cheng (2011)). ‘Bad’ issuers who intend to hold back 
information from the market, find if attempting to offer seasoned shares, that share 
prices are likely to go down (Brealey, Myers and Allen (2006, p. 492)). As a result 
they do not significantly increase equity financing before downgrades. This leads to 
the third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3.3: ‘Good’ issuers’ stock price does not significantly drop down while 
‘bad’ issuers’ stock price drops significantly after equity financing. 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 Empirical Design 
It is assumed that issuers and rating agencies share and exchange information on 
firm financials and the likelihood of future rating changes.25 In this study, news of a 
change in released by ratings agencies is always assumed to happen in the quarter 
t+1. The issuers’ expectation about future ratings for firm i at period t+1 is 
provided by  , which is defined as the dummy indicators of realized rating 
changes at time t+1 according to the assumption (iii) that issuers share the same 
information set with rating agencies: 
                                                          
25 Kliger and Sarig (2000) argue that instead of reveling information to public which might benefit competitors, 
issuers provide raters with detailed insider information during the rating process. Kisgen (2006) states ‘Rating 
agencies may receive significant company information that is not public’. ‘It is reasonable to believe that 
market players in closer touch with a firm and its business are those who possess better information about that 
firm and trade on it’ (Bharath, Pasquariello and Wu (2009)).  
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  	
    (3.1a) 
  	
    (3.1b) 
where  and  are the ratings of the issuer i at quarters t and t+1, respectively. 
The dummy variable indicates ‘good’ issuers if    
, who expect their ratings 
to be upgraded in the next quarter. It indicates ‘bad’ issuers if   
, who 
expect their ratings to be downgraded in the next quarter. The dummy variables 
indicate ‘others’ who do not expect rating changes in the next quarter, used as a 
baseline in the test when both   and  are zero. 
The information gaps between insiders’ and outsiders’ expectations of firm i’s 
next period rating change are defined as     and     for 
rating upgrades and downgrades respectively.  , a probability, denotes an 
outsider’s expectations which is the market’s assessment about the probability of 
the rating change of firm i at time t+1 based on the publicly available information at 
time t.   and   are the market’s expected probabilities on future upgrades 
and downgrades of firm i at time t+1, respectively.  
To investigate the impacts of the information gap between insiders and 
outsiders, in specific, the information asymmetry driven by DCRCs, the current 
security (debt or equity) issue is designed to regress against the information gaps in 
the next period and control firm level factors which may affect capital structure:  
   ! "      "  #    " $%&'()* " + (3.2) 
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where  is the financing adjustment indicator of firm i at time t.   and  # 
indicate current-quarter capital structure adjustments in response to the information 
gaps between insiders and outsiders concerning next-quarter rating upgrades and 
downgrades, respectively. The vector &'()* contains conventional control variables 
in the literature and the vector $% includes the coefficients on the control variables26. 
3.3.2 Data and Sample  
Data is collected from quarterly firm financials and monthly Standard & Poor (S&P) 
rating data from Compustat North America, which comprises more than 30,000 
active and inactive publicly listed firms in the U.S. and Canada. To prepare data for 
the empirical tests, quarterly rating change indicators are derived from monthly 
rating indicators to combine with the quarterly financial data. Since the newly 
created quarterly rating change dummies only consider whether there is a rating 
change taking place, rather than the number of rating changes during the quarter, 
values of monthly rating change indicators are summed up by quarters and the 
quarterly rating indicators are defined as ‘1’ if the sum of the monthly value greater 
than 0, otherwise ‘0’. This indicates that the value of the quarterly rating dummy in 
the quarter is equal to ‘1’ when rating changes take place in any month of the 
quarter, while it is equal to ‘0’ when rating changes do not happen in any month of 
the quarter. The sample covers all firms with quarterly financial data and at least 
one rating record during the sample period: Q1 1985 (when the rating data begins in 
Compustat) to Q4 2010. The firm-quarter observations with negative equity 
(leverage greater than one) are excluded. 
                                                          
26 The control variable vector ,) is a px1 vertical vector and the coefficient vector $% on ,)  is a 1xp 
horizontal vector, which guarantees the dot multiplication between the control variable vector and its coefficient 
vector work. The rule applies in the rest of the equations in the thesis. (p denotes the number of elements of the 
vectors).  
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The final sample for empirical tests further excludes utility companies (SIC 
4000-4999) and financial companies (SIC 6000-6999) as with conventional 
treatments27. Myers (2001) points out that these companies have a narrower menu 
of financing choices and cannot adjust their capital structures at a relatively low 
cost. In addition, regulations related to the disclosure policy of financial firms are 
usually stricter than non-financial firms, and hence reduce the advantage given by 
superior information of financial firms, which in turn, de-motivate firm’s actions in 
financing adjustments. The tests for the sample of financial firms and utility firms 
are reported in Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 respectively, which show insignificant 
coefficient estimates on rating changes, and hence do not alter the overall 
conclusions of this chapter. 
3.3.3 Dependent Variables 
The study examines the effects on debt issuance, equity issuance and net debt 
issuance as the percentage of lagged total asset, which are defined as follows: 
-  ./0./12  : debt issuance, where 3  is long-term debt issuance 
(Compustat DLTISY) 28  minus long-term debt reduction 
(Compustat DLTRY) plus changes in current debt (Compustat 
DLCCHY) for firm i in quarter t, and 4)  is total assets 
(Compustat ATQ) of firm i in quarter t-1. 
                                                          
27 Ratings systems are usually applied to non-financial corporations, as special approaches are employed for 
banks and other financial institutions (Crouhy et al. (2001)). 
28 The last letter ‘Y’ in DLTISY indicates that the variable is year-to-date. All the other codes of variables which 
contain ‘Y’ as the end of the code mean the same. Quarterly values of observations for all variables comprised 
of year-to-date data are derived based on the year-to-date data. 
Chapter III Credit Rating Changes, Information Asymmetry, and Firm Financing  
 
59 
 
5  6./0./12  : equity issuance, where  7  is the sale of common and 
preferred stock (Compustat SSTKY) minus purchases of common 
and preferred stock (Compustat PRSTKCY) for firm i in quarter t. 
8  ./)6./0./12  : net debt issuance (as in Kisgen (2006)) is the difference 
between  - and 5. 
A closer look into details of debt issuance and examination of the effects of 
short-term and long-term debt respectively, -  is broken down into 9- 
and :-: 
 9-  ;./0./12  , where 93  is the change in current debt (Compustat 
DLCCHY) for firm i in quarter t. 
:-  <./0./12  , where :3  is long-term debt issuance (Compustat 
DLTISY) minus long-term debt reduction (Compustat DLTRY) for 
firm i in quarter t. 
3.3.4 Indicators for Upgrade and Downgrade  
In order to indicate ratings upgrade and downgrade for firm i in quarter t+1, two 
sets of dummy variables are constructed. Each set consists of four dummy variables 
associated with the S&P ratings of long-term debt, short-term debt, subordinated 
debt and common stock. They are, respectively, Domestic Long-Term Issuer Credit 
Rating (Compustat SPLTICRM), Domestic Short-Term Issuer Credit Rating 
(SPSTICRM), Subordinated Debt Rating (SPSDRM) and Common Stock Ranking 
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(SPCSRM)29.  
:=3  9=3  9>? @8-75A  : dummy variables 
for ratings upgrade. They are equal to 1 if the individual ratings of 
SPLTICRM, SPSTICRM, SPSDRM and SPCSRM of firm i, 
respectively, are upgraded in quarter t+1. 
:=3  9=3  9>? @8-75A  : 
dummy variables for ratings downgrade. They are equal to 1 if the 
individual ratings SPLTICRM, SPSTICRM, SPSDRM and 
SPCSRM of firm i, respectively, are downgraded in quarter t+1. 
It is plausible that firm managers are not only concerned about a change in one 
of the above three ratings, but also about the overall outcome of the firm’s future 
ratings due to the potential interacted changes among them (Crabbe and Post 
(1994)). The study thus further constructs two dummy variables to indicate the 
overall rating upgrade and downgrade30.  
BC"
> =  1 if the individual ratings of firm i in quarter t+1 satisfy 
two conditions: (i) at least one of the individual ratings showing 
upgrade, and (ii) more individual ratings showing upgrade than 
downgrade. 
                                                          
29 This indicator provides investors a predicted direction of future market risk. It provides ‘investors with a 
measure of risk, a ranking change may signify a change in risk’ (Felton, Liu and Hearth (1994)). However, it is 
not a rating for fixed income securities such as bonds. It thus has different features with the other three rating 
indicators. Therefore it is excluded from overall rating change indicators defined below but its individual 
influence on firm financing is reported with the other three rating indicators when testing individual rating 
effects.   
30
 The long-term debt rating change takes more than 80% of the overall rating changes. The results of tests 
conducted in this chapter also show that long-term rating changes are the main factor that managers would 
consider when making financial adjustments. 
The image part with relationship ID rId25 was not found in the file.
The image part with relationship ID rId26 was not found in the file. The image part with relationship ID rId27 was not found in the file.
The image part with relationship ID rId28 was not found in the file.
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BC"
3  
  if the individual ratings of firm i in quarter t+1 satisfy two 
conditions: (i) at least one of the individual ratings showing 
downgrade, and (ii) more individual  ratings showing 
downgrade than upgrade. 
3.3.5 Control Variables 
Control variables, conventionally considered in capital structure studies31, include 
Leverage, Size, Price, Liquidity, Profit, Dividends, Earnings, Growth, Tangibility 
and NDTS (non-debt tax shields) to separate their influences from DCRCs on firms’ 
financing decisions.  
:D@EF ratio of the sum of short-term debt (Sd) (Compustat DLCQ) and 
long-term debt (Ld) (Compustat DLTTQ) to the sum of short-term 
debt, long-term debt, and stockholders' equity (Compust LSEQ 
minus LTQ) for firm i in quarter t. 
: logarithm of sales (Compustat SALEQ) for firm i in quarter t. 
G : logarithm of the quarterly close price in the quarter (Compustat 
PRCCQ) for firm i in quarter t. 
:5-A: ratio of cash and cash equivalent (Compustat CHEQ) to total 
assets (Compustat ATQ)  for firm i in quarter t32. 
                                                          
31 Kisgen (2006) shows significant negative relation between Leverage and debt issuance. Titman and Wessels 
(1988) show that firm Size, indicated by logarithm of sales, is one of the crucial determinants of capital 
structure. Marsh (1982) shows that changes in security Prices alter debt/equity ratios. Wald (1999), Myers 
(2001), and Fama and French (2002) demonstrate that Profit is an important factor that impacts capital structure. 
Market-to-book ratio (defined as Growth in this study) and Tangibility are variables affecting leverage ratio in 
Rajan and Zingales (1995). Dividends (Barclay, Smith and Watts (1995) and Titman and Wessels (1988)) and 
Earnings (Titman and Wessels (1988)) policy tightly relate to debt issuance and equity sale. Liquidity (see Kim, 
Mauer and Sherman (1998)) is included to control for possible impacts on leverage from firm’s cash/liquidity 
positions and NDTS (non-debt tax shields), which is considered as an impact of optimal leverage level 
(DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) and Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984)) and may have negative influence on 
leverage. 
32 Cash flow can show a negative balance if firm have issued checks for more funds than it has in cash account, 
which would cause negative Liquidity. 
The image part with relationship ID rId29 was not found in the file.
The image part with relationship ID rId30  
was not found in the file.
Chapter III Credit Rating Changes, Information Asymmetry, and Firm Financing  
 
62 
 
H : ratio of EBITDA33 to total assets (Compustat ATQ) for 
firm i in quarter t.  
3D-8- : ratio of cash dividends (Compustat DVY) to total assets 
(Compustat ATQ) for firm i in quarter t.  
7@88E : ratio of retained earnings (Compustat REQ) to total assets 
(Compustat ATQ) for firm i in quarter t.  
I : ratio of total debt book value plus quarterly close price 
(Compustat PRCCQ) multiplied by outstanding common stock 
shares (Compustat CSHOQ) to total assets (Compustat ATQ) for 
firm i in quarter t. 
=@8EJKA : ratio of property plant and equipment (Net) (Compustat 
PPENTQ) to total assets (Compustat ATQ) for firm i in quarter t. 
L3=9 : ratio of deferred taxes and investment tax credit (Compustat 
TXDITCQ) to total assets (Compustat ATQ) for firm i in quarter t. 
3.3.6 Regression Models  
To simplify the regression (3.2), the assumption below is made and added to the 
assumption list in Section 3.2.1 as the assumption (iv): outsiders (the market) 
cannot forecast future rating changes. The assumption reflected in the mathematical 
equation as  
  @8-  M@KK  (3.3) 
Derive Equation (3.4) by substituting Equation (3.3) into Equation (3.2),  
                                                          
33 7?=34  is the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization for firm i at time t, which 
calculated as the sum of Pretax Income (Compustat PIQ), Inertest Expense (Compustat TIEQ) and Depreciation 
and Amortization (Compustat DPQ). 
The image part with relationship ID rId31 was not found in the  
file.
The image part with relationship ID rId32 was not found in the file.
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   !"  "  # " $%&'()* " + (3.4) 
To investigate issuers behaviours around DCRCs, the study extends the 
regressions of security net issues normalised by total asset on rating changes and 
control variables in the quarters of t-1, t, t+2, t+3 given that the rating changes take 
place in quarter t+1. The research does not list and explain the result at time t+1 
since it is difficult to distinguish the timing of financing adjustment and rating 
changes at the same quarter of rating changes. The test result thus may show 
imprecise information. 
The model estimation starts by using the rating indicators based on overall 
rating indicators BC  and BC ,  respectively: 
-N  O!"OBC " O#BC " P%&'(Q)* " +N (3.5a) 
5N  R!"RBC " R#BC " S%&'(Q)* " +N (3.5b) 
8N  T!"TBC " T#BC " U%&'(Q)* " +N (3.5c) 
V =  (-1, 0, 2, 3)  
where (β1 and R) and (β2 and R#) are the responses of debt and equity adjustments 
to rating upgrades and downgrades in quarter t+1, respectively. For instance, O 
means comparing with no rating change in the period of t+1, the adjustment of debt 
issuance as a percentage of total assets. These coefficients are the responses in 
capital structure adjustments at quarter t+τ (for two quarters before rating changes τ 
= -1, 0; for two quarters after rating changes τ = 2, 3). The vector &'(Q)* contains 
the control variables.  
According to Hypothesis 3.1, ‘good’ issuers prefer equity to debt financing 
before upgrades, and thus O is expected to be insignificantly different from zero 
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while R is expected to be significantly positive when τ = 0. In contrast, Hypothesis 
3.2 states that ‘bad’ issuers prefer debt to equity before DCRC to take advantage of 
overvalued debt, and hence predicts significantly positive O and insignificant R# 
when τ = 0.   
Next, substitute the rating indicators   and   with the four individual 
rating indicators: 
-N  W! " W:=3 " W#:=3 "WX9=3 " WY9=3  
"WZ9>? " W[9>? " W\75A " W]75A " ^%&'(Q)* " N (3.6a) 
5N  _! " _:=3 " _#:=3 "_X9=3 " _Y9=3  
"_Z9>? " _[9>? " _\75A " _]75A " `%&'(Q)* " N 
 
(3.6b) 
 
 
 8N  a! "a:=3 " a#:=3 "aX9=3 " aY9=3  
"aZ9>? " a[9>? " a\75A " a]75A "b%&'(Q)* " N (3.6c) 
V =  (-1, 0, 2, 3) 
 
where &'(Q)* is the control variable vector and the horizontal vectors ^% `% and 
b%  (c =9,10,…,18) are the sets of coefficients on the control variables. 
As indicated in the equation, the capital structure adjustments 
happened at quarter t+τ (for two quarters before rating changes τ = -1, 0; for two 
quarters after rating changes τ = 2, 3), one period before the realised rating change 
announcements take places at quarter t+1.   
The OLS is applied in the tests for the rest of this chapter since it gives a 
baseline result. Quarterly tests and individual industry tests do not show significant 
differences by time and industry. Various robustness checks and mixed estimation 
The image part with relationship ID rId33 was not found in the file.
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are conducted in Chapter IV, whose results are in accordance with the assumption 
that no time and industry individual differences when issuers utilize DCRC as 
information asymmetry driven factor.  
3.3.7 Summary Statistics 
This study assumes that ‘outsiders’ (the market) cannot forecast future rating 
changes in quarter t+1 based on publicly available information at time t. The data in 
the sample supports this assumption. There are 3267 overall rating upgrades and 
5142 overall downgrades in the sample. Panel A of Figure 3.2, displaying the 
overall rating changes as a percentage of all observations in each quarter, shows 
that the percentages of overall upgrades and overall downgrades are very small in 
all four quarters. It is worth noting that the proportion of upgrades is generally 
smaller than the proportion of downgrades. Overall, 97.55% of the observations 
over four quarters are ‘no rating changes’. 0.95% and 1.50% are upgrades and 
downgrades, respectively. This implies that by more than 97% of the time the 
market would be right to assume no change in credit ratings, and thus supports the 
rationality of the assumption (iv).  
[Insert Figure 3.2 here] 
The other three panels of Figure 3.2 show that the main feature of overall rating 
changes captures that of the long-term credit rating changes. On average, 97.77% of 
the observations of long-term credit rating changes over four quarters are ‘no rating 
changes’, while merely 0.81% of the observations are upgrades and 1.42% are 
downgrades. Upgrades and downgrades for the short-term credit rating are 0.13% 
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and 0.31% of the total observations, respectively, while those for the subordinate 
debt ratings are 0.19% and 0.18% correspondingly. 
Panel A of Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics for the sample containing 
343,096 firm-quarters. Firms on average issue more equity (normalized by total 
assets) of 0.033 than debt (normalized by total assets) of 0.01. The net debt issue is 
negative at -0.04. The short-term debt and long-term debt are on average both 0.005 
but the former is more volatile (with the standard deviation of 1.292) than the latter 
(with the standard deviation of 0.405). Figure 3.3 plots the prevalent issuance of 
long-term debts, particularly in the decade of 2001-2010, illustrating the tendency 
of firms relying more on long-term debt than short-term debt financing over the 
years.  
[Insert Table 3.1 and Figure 3.3 here] 
The average firm has a Leverage ratio of 0.278, a Size of 3.660, a Price of 
1.984 and a Growth (Market-to-Book ratio) of 2.229. Other control variables are all 
normalized by firms’ total assets. The average firm holds 17.8% of its total asset 
value as cash and cash equivalent (short-term investments) and distributes 0.2% of 
its total asset value as dividends one quarter ahead of rating changes. Firms on 
average have negative Profit (-0.009) and negative retained Earnings (-1.642). The 
average firm holds approximately 28.6% of its book value of assets in fixed assets 
and has a ratio of 1.9% deferred taxes and investment tax credit to total assets. 
Panel B of Table 3.1 reports the averages of the control variables by firm-
quarter’s debt and equity financing choices. The second column in the table 
presents the percentages of firm-quarter observations of the four financing methods 
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to total observations, showing that firms are more likely to use one form of 
financing and that equity issuance is much more frequently used than debt financing. 
This is in line with the sample of Fama and French (2005). Panel C of Table 3.1 
reports the statistics of ‘good’ issuers and ‘bad’ issuers separately.  
The control variables have the expected relationships with financing choices as 
identified in the literature. For example, the average firm size of ‘debt only’ issuers 
is the highest among all four financing groups, consistent with the notion that large 
companies tend to borrow more than small firms or that they simply have broader 
sources to borrow from (see, Myers (2001), and Frank and Goyal (2003)). Higher 
stock price motivates firms to issue equity, which is consistent with the Market 
Timing Theory (Baker and Wurgler (2002), and Dittmar and Thakor (2007)). Firms 
which have higher profitability prefer debt to equity as external funds, which is 
consistent with dynamic trade-off models (e.g. Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989), 
Leland (1994) and Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001)). Firms that tend to pay 
dividends are larger firms that have easier access to public debt markets (Aivazian, 
Booth and Cleary (2006)). The result in Panel B also demonstrates that high growth 
firms tend to finance with equity (see, e.g. Myers (1984)). Companies with 
relatively safe and tangible assets tend to borrow more than companies with risky 
and intangible assets since intangible assets are more likely to sustain losses when 
faced with financial distress (see, Myers (1984), and Frank and Goyal (2003)).  
Panel D of Table 3.1 presents correlations among control variables. None of the 
correlation coefficients in the matrix are greater than 0.65, which releases the 
pressure from the consideration of multicollinearity in the following tests. These 
relations are consistent with the expectations in literature. 
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3.3.8 Preliminary Evidence on Links between Leverage and Rating Changes 
Figure 3.4 illustrates rating-leverage features throughout the sample. It plots the 
leverage ratios of firms according to rating change status, showing the average 
leverage ratio across all firms, the average leverage ratios of firms one quarter 
preceding their rating changes, and the average leverage ratios of firms in the 
quarter of their rating changes. 
[Insert Figure 3.4 here] 
Compared with the average leverage ratio of firms that experience rating 
changes, the average leverage ratio across all firms throughout the sample period is 
relatively low at 27.8%. The weighted average leverage ratios (WAL below in this 
paragraph) are both at around 46% two quarters before rating upgrades and 
downgrades. However, it is noticed that both WALs, round upgrades and 
downgrades, are 40% higher than the overall average leverage ratio. The WAL one 
quarter before rating upgrades goes down slightly to 45.4%, but in the one quarter 
before downgrades it goes up to 47.9%. In the quarter of rating changes 
announcements, the leverage of firms upgraded drops down further to 44.3% and 
that of downgraded firms moves in the opposite direction, climbing to 50.8%. The 
WAL of upgraded firms moves down 1% to 43.0% after the change and that of 
downgraded firms to 49.7%. However, the WALs of rating changed firms all 
increase significantly two quarters after rating change announcements. The reason 
for this could be that rating upgrades probably improve the funding raising 
environment for ‘good’ firms, while stock value decreases create high leverage for 
‘bad’ firms, albeit this may not be the sole reason. This preliminary result shows the 
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evidence that delayed credit rating news does affect the issuer’s leverage ratios, 
caused either by the adjustments of financing policy or change of debt-equity values. 
The formal tests are conducted in Section 3.4. 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Firm Financing Adjustments around Changes in Overall Ratings 
The empirical analysis first examines whether firms significantly change net debt 
issuance one period before rating changes, as in equations (3.5a)-(3.5c). Panel B of 
Table 3.2 reports the regression results for one quarter before rating changes. 
Column 1 and 2 in the panel show that ‘good’ issuers issue more equity 5 (the 
coefficient is 0.901% with a t-statistic of 2.57) than debt - (the coefficient is 
0.527% with a t-statistic of 1.78), in line with the prediction of Hypothesis 3.1. As 
with the prediction of Hypothesis 3.2 for ‘bad’ issuers, the coefficient on - is 
1.809% (t = 7.76) and that on 5 is 0.550% (t = 1.93), indicating that these 
issuers sharply increase debt issuance while equity is issued moderately. Column 3, 
Panel B of Table 3.2 shows the results of further examination of whether firms 
significantly change net debt issuance one period before rating changes. The results 
show that in response to an anticipated rating upgrade, issuers do not significantly 
change the net debt issue, indicating that ‘good’ issuers keep their net debt issue 
unchanged. In contrast, in response to an anticipated downgrade, issuers 
significantly increase net debt issue by around 1.065% (t-statistic = 1.96). This, 
again, indicates that ‘bad’ issuers embark on issuing more net debt before the rating 
downgrade. 
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[Insert Table 3.2 here] 
Coefficient estimates on control variables, listed in Panel B of Table 3.2, are 
consistent with literature in both direction and statistical significance. For example, 
the negative coefficient -0.02733 (t = -9.71) on leverage indicates that Leverage in 
the previous quarter brings significantly negative effects on net debt issuance in the 
current quarter, i.e., firms with higher leverage issue less debt than equity. Size, an 
explicit measure of financial distress (Kisgen (2006)), is positively and significantly 
related to the net debt issue. Larger firms generally have fewer concerns about 
financial distress and can afford transaction costs and thus issue more debt. Price is 
negatively and significantly related to net debt issue, which is in line with the 
market timing theory, that issuers prefer equity to debt when Price is high. The net 
debt issue decreases 0.698% when the quarterly close price increases 1 unit. The 
negative coefficient (-0.01878) on Liquidity indicates that firms with cash and 
short-term investment opportunities choose equity issue rather than debt issue. 
Profitable firms have more internal financing available (Myers (2001)). Profit thus 
negatively correlates to external debt (-0.0031) and equity (-0.16245), resulting in 
the significant positive coefficient on net debt issue. Retained earnings, measuring 
the amount of internal fund, shows a positive and significant coefficient of 0.00087 
on net debt issue. Firms with retained earnings tend to finance projects internally 
(Dittmar and Thakor (2007)). The positive coefficient on net debt issue is due to a 
more decreased level of equity issue (-0.00125) than that of debt issue (-0.00013). 
Firms holding valuable growth opportunities, as proxied by the market-to-book 
ratio in Rajan and Zingales (1995), tend to use a greater amount of equity finance 
than debt and so borrow less overall (Myers (1984), Barclay, Smith and Watts 
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(1995), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Barclay and Smith (1999)). Tangibility is 
positively related to both debt and equity issues; in response to a 1 unit increase of 
Tangibility the increase range to debt issue is higher than that to equity issue, which 
results in its positive relation to net debt issuance. NDTS is negatively related to 
both debt (-0.02605) (DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), and Bradley, Jarrell and Kim 
(1984)) and equity issuances (-0.03018), but its influence on net debt issue is not 
significant. The credit rating change dummy variables provide additional 
explanatory potential beyond these control variable effects.  
The analysis above is repeated and the test of debt-equity financing adjustment 
applied to the period of two quarters before the delayed rating changes. Column1 
and 2, Panel A of Table 3.2 show the results when the dependant variables are debt 
issuance -N  and equity issuance 5N  respectively. The coefficients O 
and R  signifying ‘good’ issuers’ financing adjustments are both insignificant34 , 
indicating that they do not significantly change debt and equity financing in 
response to rating upgrades after two quarters. In contrast, in response to delayed 
downgrades, the coefficients O# and R# are both significant35 and the latter is more 
significant than the former, which suggest that ‘bad’ issuers intend to moderately 
use both debt and equity financing but rely slightly more on equity than debt. 
Column 3 of Panel A suggests that both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ issuers do not 
significantly adjust their net debt issuance two quarters before rating changes. 
                                                          
34 As reported in Panel A of Table 3.2, O is -0.00080 with a t-statistic of -0.17 and R is 0.00626 with a t-
statistic of 1.10.  The difference between the two coefficients is -0.00706 with a t-statistic of -0.95, which is not 
significant. It is in accordance with the significance of the estimation of T, the coefficient on net debt issuance. 
35 As reported in Panel A of Table 3.2, O# is 0.00760 with a t-statistic of 1.95 and R# is 0.00987 with a t-statistic 
of 2.06.  Although they are both significant, the difference between the two coefficients is -0.00227 with a t-
statistic of  -0.36 and thus  is not significant.   
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Panel C and D of Table 3.2 show issuers’ financing behaviours after rating 
changes are announced by rating agencies. In the first quarter after rating changes, 
‘good’ issuers significantly increase debt issuance. ‘Bad’ issuers issue both debt and 
equity significantly at the 1% confidence level. In contrast with the continuing 
significant debt issuance, their equity issuance is significantly (t-statistic=2.51) 
amplified after downgrade compared with that in the quarter before downgrade (t-
statistic=1.93). In the second quarter after rating changes, ‘good’ issuers issue less 
debt than in the last quarter but significantly increase equity issuance. ‘Bad’ issuers 
increase both debt and equity issuances, but on a lesser scale than those in the last 
quarter.  
Summarizing the features of issuers’ debt and equity financing shown in the 
four panels of Table 3.2, issuers behave differently throughout the four periods 
around DCRCs in response to upgrades and downgrades. ‘Good’ issuers start 
making financing adjustments one quarter before upgrades while ‘bad’ issuers do 
so two quarters before downgrades, though they only increase debt and equity 
issuances in low magnitudes two quarters in advance. Secondly, ‘good’ issuers 
significantly increase debt issuance only in the first quarter after rating upgrades 
while ‘bad’ issuers start doing so in the quarter before rating downgrades. Thirdly, 
‘good’ issuers issue significant equity while ‘bad’ issuers do so at a significant level 
only in the quarters after DCRCs, which may be due to the higher cost of ‘bad’ 
issuers’ equity issuance. This could be attributed to their significant stock price 
drop triggered by the equity announcement of firms with high information 
asymmetry, which is further confirmed in the test of Hypothesis 3.3 conducted in 
Section 3.4.5. 
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The results imply that ‘good’ issuers issue equity one quarter before upgrades, 
which may be their way of communicating with the market. However, they could 
only enjoy cheaper cost of borrowing after rating upgrades (Tang (2009)). On the 
contrary, ‘bad’ issuers increase their debt issuance more significantly in quarter t 
than in quarter t-1 but decrease equity issuance, which might be due to the 
relatively cheaper debt but more expensive equity in the quarter. Yet, ‘bad’ issuers 
seem to balance debt and equity financing after DCRC. This is derived from the 
coefficient on net debt issuance which is not significant at 1%. The evidence that 
‘bad’ issuers’ significant increase of equity issuance after downgrades in order to 
avoid significant increase of net debt issuance is documented in Kisgen (2009), 
which suggests that firms, trying to avoid further downgrade or to regain the 
previous rating, are more likely to increase equity financing but less likely to adopt 
debt financing.  
‘Bad’ issuers still issue debt in the following two quarters after downgrades 
(consistent with the patterns in Tang (2009)), which may be due to issuers’ debt 
maturity adjustment behaviour (Diamond (1991)), issuers’ increased usage of 
various bonds simultaneously 36  or the change in investment policy or asset 
composition following downgrades (Rauh and Sufi (2010)). Further evidence about 
‘bad’ issuers’ behaviour is shown and discussed in the next section. 37 
3.4.2 Short-term Debt and Long-term Debt 
                                                          
36 Rauh and Sufi (2010) argue that firms simultaneously increase dependence on both secured bank debt and 
subordinated bonds rather than switch from arm’s length debt to bank debt when credit quality deteriorates. 
This is distinct from findings in previous literatures. This study does not consider debt heterogeneity in this 
research, thus do not investigate what type of debt ‘bad’ issuers would issue. However, Rauh and Sufi (2010) 
give the support on debt issue after credit-quality deteriorates. 
37 The results of balanced data are listed in Appendix 1 and 2, which shows the similar results with unbalanced 
dataset. It also indicates the robustness of the tests in the section. 
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Issuers may change debt structures when they face upgrades and downgrades (e.g., 
Rauh and Sufi (2010)). This section scrutinises the use of long-term debt and short-
term debt financing to understand the way it is employed by issuers when they face 
rating changes. To this end, the dependent variable in the regression (3.5a) is 
substituted by the ratio of current period short-term debt issue to previous period 
total assets 9-, and the ratio of current period long-term debt issue to previous 
period total assets :-. The regressions thus become: 
9-N  O!; " O;BC " O#;BC " P%c&'(Q)* " + (3.7a) 
:-N  O!< " O<BC " O#<BC " P%d&'(Q)* " + (3.7b) 
V =  (-1, 0, 2, 3)  
Panel B of Table 3.3 shows that both coefficients O; in regression (3.7a) and 
O< in regression (3.7b) are insignificant. The results indicate that ‘good’ issuers do 
not significantly issue either extra short-term or long-term debt before long-term 
credit rating upgrades. The coefficient estimate O#;  in regression (3.7a) is 
statistically significantly positive at 0.00377 with t-statistic of 3.00 and the estimate 
of O#< in regression (3.7b) is 0.01725 with t-statistic of 10.30. These results indicate 
that ‘bad’ issuers issue both short-term and long-term debt before a downgrade in 
long-term credit rating, providing further evidence to support the Hypothesis 3.2.  
[Insert Table 3.3 here] 
As shown in Panel C of Table 3.3, the coefficient O; in regression (3.7a) is 
0.00301 with t-statistic of 1.82 while O<  in regression (3.7b) is 0.00435 with t-
statistic of 2.11, indicating that ‘good’ issuers moderately issue both short-term debt 
and long-term debt after upgrade news is announced. In contrast, the coefficient O#; 
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in regression (3.7a) is statistically insignificant while O#<  in regression (3.7b) is 
0.02109 with t-statistic of 12.42, indicating that ‘bad’ issuers stop using short-term 
debt after announcements of downgrades but continue to rely on long-term debt.  
 Panel A and D of Table 3.3 show that only O#<in regression (3.7b) are both 
significant at 1% with t-statistics both at 5.29, indicating that ‘bad’ issuers issue 
long-term debt at the same significance level in two-quarter before rating 
downgrade and two-quarter after rating downgrade. None of the three coefficients 
on the other rating indicators, O; and O#; in regression (3.7a) and O< in regression 
(3.7b), is statistically significant. This suggests that ‘good’ issuers do not issue debt 
in any maturities and ‘bad’ issuers do not issue short-term debt in the two quarters. 
The findings show that ‘bad’ issuers issue both short-term and long-term debt 
before long-term credit rating downgrades, however, the use of short-term debt 
ceases to exist after long-term rating downgrades, suggesting that ‘bad’ issuers take 
advantage of the overvalued short-term debt before downgrades. The significant 
drop in short-term debt issuance may be because ‘bad’ issuers lose access to short-
term debt after downgrades (Rauh and Sufi (2010)) or due to a higher cost of short-
term debt after downgrades. The possible reason of issuer’s continued preference 
for long-term debt issuance is likely that it is cheaper than short-term debt (Brick 
and Ravid (1985)).38 Issuers who issue long-term debt also imply that they are 
unwilling to refinance in the future. ‘Bad’ issuers with unfavourable private rating 
information are always willing to pay the rate on long-term debt to avoid the 
                                                          
38 The model in Brick and Ravid (1985) suggests that ‘the cost of capital and shareholder risk is lower with 
long-term financing than with short-term financing’. The chapter argues that ‘tax benefit of financial leverage is 
accelerated and maximised with the use of long-term financing’ ‘when there is a gain from leverage and when 
the term structure of interest rates is upward sloping’.  
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expected costs of refinancing the debt (Berger, Espinosa Vega, Frame and Miller 
(2005)).  
3.4.3 Firm Financing around Changes in Individual Ratings 
Due to the diverse features of the four individual rating indicators39, this section 
examines the effects of each of them. For instance, there are several differences in a 
firm’s responses to short-term and long-term distresses (Ofek (1993)). Table 3.4 
reports the results of the regressions (3.6a)-(3.6c) for the four quarters around 
DCRCs. Table 3.5 further shows the applications of short-term debt and long-term 
debt.  
[Insert Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 here] 
Among the four individual rating change indicators, S&P Domestic Long-Term 
Issuer Credit Rating seems to contribute most to the complex behaviours of issuers. 
It is assigned to rate issuers’ or obligors’ overall ability to repay its long-term debt 
obligations. Changes in delayed S&P Domestic Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating 
affect both debt and equity issuances as shown in the panels of Table 3.4. It 
significantly impacts on issuers’ net debt issuance at the 1% level only one quarter 
before their announcements. The value for the coefficient W of equation (3.6a) is 
insignificant, while W# is 2.205% with t-statistic of 8.36. This suggests that ‘good’ 
issuers do not significantly change debt issuance in response to next-quarter 
upgrades but ‘bad’ issuers increase debt issue before downgrade. _  in equation 
(3.6b) has positive significance at 0.895% with t-statistic of 2.30 while _# is 
insignificant. The result implies that ‘good’ issuers prefer equity to debt financing 
                                                          
39  The S&P common stock ranking, which is not involved in deriving overall rating changes, is introduced here 
and its change has been tested in this section. 
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while ‘bad’ issuers prefer debt to equity. This is consistent with the implications of 
the influences of rating indicators overall, and thus are in accordance with 
Hypothesis 3.1 and 3.2. Panel B of Table 3.5 shows that ‘bad’ issuers use both 
short-term debt and long-term debt one quarter before downgrade, which is 
significantly distinguished from their sole usage of long-term debt two quarters 
before downgrade.  
Panel C of Table 3.4 lists the results in the first quarter after DCRCs. The 
insignificant W and _ and the significant W# and _# in the panel indicate that ‘good’ 
issuers do not adjust their financing, while ‘bad’ issuers continue issue debt and 
significantly start issuing equity at 5% in the first quarter after delayed changes in 
long-term credit ratings. Observing Panel C of Table 3.4 and 3.5 together, the 
estimates of coefficients indicate that ‘good’ issuers adopt short-term debt40 while 
‘bad’ issuers stop increasing short-term debt issuance, only increasing long-term 
debt in this period. In the next quarter, the significant W# and _ suggest that ‘good’ 
issuers start to increase equity and ‘bad’ issues continue significant long-term debt 
issuance and equity issuance, however, the latter is only significant at the 10% 
confidence level.  
Combining the results in the four quarters around changes in S&P Domestic 
Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating, the most crucial feature of ‘good’ issuers’ 
behaviour is the sudden increase of equity issuance before the delayed upgrades and 
the temporary increase of short-term debt issuance after upgrades. The most 
significant characteristic of ‘bad’ issuers is the temporary increase of short-term 
                                                          
40 This is not consistent with the impacts of overall rating in the same period. In the test for overall rating 
changes, ‘good’ issuers mainly increase long-term debt after upgrades, rather than short-term debt in the test for 
S&P Domestic Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating. It is very likely driven by the significant increase of long-term 
debt after subordinated debt rating upgrades. 
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debt financing before the delayed downgrades and continued usage of long-term 
debt in the quarters around downgrades.  
Short-term credit ratings are generally assigned to short-term (less than one 
year) obligations in the relevant market (Chapman (2006)) 41 . Since short-term 
obligations are generally offered by large corporations with the highest credit 
quality, any downgrades could cause serious problems (Stojanovic and Vaughan 
(1998)) such as significant negative stock returns and leading investors to a more 
negative assessment of firms’ future cash flows (Nayar and Rozeff (1994)). The 
rating also reflects firms’ reputation for selecting safe investments. Changes in 
short-term credit ratings almost always lead to changes in long-term bond ratings, 
but the reverse is not true (Crabbe and Post (1994)). S&P’s ratings definitions in 
(2011) officially point out that they are used to indicate the creditworthiness of an 
obligor with respect to long-term obligations.  
The evidence of the test results shows that changes in delayed S&P Domestic 
Short-Term Issuer Credit Rating only affect debt issuance but not equity issuance. 
In addition, its influence on debt issuance only exists in the quarter before DCRC 
and is only significant for ‘bad’ issuers. WY is -1.378% with a t-statistic of -2.74, 
suggests that ‘bad’ issuers decrease debt issuance one quarter before downgrade. 
Panel B of Table 3.5 shows that ‘bad’ issuers mainly decrease long-term debt 
before downgrades. This could be caused by their intention to avoid the downgrade 
in short-term credit rating and to avoid investors’ upward revision of the probability 
                                                          
41 S&P considers the short-term obligations mainly as commercial paper and line of credit. This study mainly 
focuses on non-financial firms, thus exclude financial firms, such as banks. S&P short-term credit rating in the 
data sample thus is mainly assigned to commercial paper. 
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of bankruptcy when the amount of long-term debt is higher (Nayar and Rozeff 
(1994)). 
S&P Subordinated Debt Rating Compustat data is only available until 1st 
September 1998, before which S&P adopted their previous rating method to rate 
particular type of debt. Generally riskier than senior debt, subordinated debt could 
be an indirect market proxy for issuers’ riskiness (Blum (2002)). Evidence shows 
that changes in anticipated S&P Subordinated Debt Rating positively affect both 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ issuers on their debt issuances but not equity issuances and the 
effect only exists one quarter before DCRC. WZ in equation (3.6a) is 2.837% with a 
t-statistic of 3.93 and W[ is 2.139% with a t-statistic of 2.93. Panel B of Table 3.5 
shows that the significant financing adjustment is mainly due to the increase on 
long-term debt issuance. The evidence shows that the issuers’ behaviours in 
response to delayed changes in S&P Subordinated Debt Rating are quite puzzling 
when considering the results in the four panels of Table 3.5 jointly.  
S&P Common Stock Ranking, commonly referred to as Quality Ranking, 
reflects the long-term growth and stability of a company’s earnings and dividends 
(Santicchia (2005)) and thus is widely used as a measure of market risk. Changes in 
S&P Common Stock Ranking, which is not integrated into overall rating change 
dummies in this study, show significant impacts on both debt and equity financing 
around DCRCs. Its influences on debt issuances are significant at the 1% 
confidence level only one quarter before DCRC as shown in the panels of Table 3.4. 
_\ is insignificant while _] is negatively significant with t-statistic of -2.76, which 
suggests that ‘bad’ issuers, differ from ‘good’ issuers, tend to sell shares at a higher 
price before downgrades. This is likely to be due to the movement of the market 
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value of equity with S&P’s quality rankings, which is almost monotonic (Chung 
(2000)). The coefficients on 75A  and 75A  are reported in the panels 
of Table 3.5 when debt issuance is broken down into short-term debt and long-term 
debt issuances. The results show that ‘good’ issuers start decreasing long-term debt 
issue two quarters before DCRC while slightly increasing long-term debt one 
quarter after upgrade. This may be due to ‘good’ issuers’ improved financial 
conditions and the intention of refinancing after upgrade. ‘Bad’ issuers temporarily 
decrease short-term debt issuance one quarter before downgrade but stop adjusting 
it after the downgrade. In the meanwhile, they start decreasing long-term debt and 
this, however, lasts till at least two quarters after the downgrade. The decrease of 
long-term issue around downgrades is likely to be caused by issuers’ motivation to 
allay investors’ concerns about the probability of bankruptcy.  
In summary, the result in this section shows that issuers respond to individual 
rating indicators in various ways variously due to the ratings’ different 
characteristics. S&P Domestic Short-Term Issuer Credit Rating and S&P 
Subordinated Debt Rating do not further trigger issuers’ financing adjustments after 
DCRCs. However, the S&P Domestic Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating further 
motivates ‘bad’ issuers to issue both debt and equity but not ‘good’ issuers. ‘Bad’ 
issuers tend to decrease debt issue after S&P Common Stock Ranking downgrade, 
and both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ issuers moderately decrease equity issues after its 
upgrades. The results in the two periods show that S&P Domestic Long-term Debt 
Rating is the main factor representing overall rating changes, which means that 
long-term obligation is the main aspect that managers would consider when making 
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the financing adjustment decisions. The coefficients on control variables are very 
similar to those of regressions (3.5a) - (3.5c) reported in the section 3.4.1. 
3.4.4 Investment-Grade Firms and Speculative-Grade Firms 
The tests for two rating subsamples, S&P investment-grade firms (above BBB 
inclusive) and S&P speculative-grade firms (below BBB), are conducted in this 
section to examine whether firms in the two groups have different sensitivities to 
DCRCs. Panel A of Table 3.6 reports the DCRCs’ effect on security issues one 
quarter before DCRCs for the two subsamples42. The two subsamples are divided 
according to the indicator of S&P Domestic Long-term debt rating at time t+1 (the 
quarter rating changes are announced). The investment-grade firms, regardless of 
‘good’ or ‘bad’ issuers, do not adjust their net debt issuance 8  one quarter 
before rating changes. The speculative-grade firms do not significantly adjust net 
debt issuance in response to future upgrades but increase net debt issuance by 1.133% 
(t= 2.24) in the face of an anticipated future downgrades. 
 [Insert Table 3.6 here] 
The coefficients on debt issuance -  share the same features in the two 
sub-groups: ‘Good’ issuers do not significantly issue debt (coefficients for both are 
not significant at the 1% level) while ‘bad’ issuers issue more debt one period 
before downgrades. ‘Bad’ issuers in the investment-grade group increase debt 
issuance by 0.860% while those in the speculative-grade group increase debt issue 
by 1.527%. The coefficients on equity issuance 5  vary. For the investment-
                                                          
42The rating grades information is available on S&P’s website: http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/ 
definitions-and-faqs/en/us. 
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grade group, the coefficients on upgrades and downgrades are 0.896% and 0.944% 
respectively and are both significant at the 10% level, indicating that both higher-
rated ‘good’ and ‘bad’ issuers issue small amounts of equity before DCRCs. For the 
speculative-grade group, the coefficient on upgrade is 0.512% and significant with 
a t-statistic of 3.27 but that on downgrade is not significant. This result suggests 
that lower-rated ‘good’ issuers increase equity issue by 0.512%, while lower-rated 
‘bad’ issuers do not appear to adjust equity issue before rating downgrades.  
Compared with investment-grade issuers, the more significant financing 
adjustment of speculative-grade issuers may be due to the greater information gap 
between lower-rated issuers and outsiders than the gap between higher-rated issuers 
and outsiders. Graham and Harvey’s (2001) survey finds that speculative firms 
prefer to send a positive signal via equity issuance. ‘Good’ issuers in the 
speculative-grade group may signal their positive prospects with equity issue. Also, 
the issue of liquidity is more pronounced severe in speculative-grade firms than that 
in investment-grade firms, suggesting that the former would be more concerned by 
rating change effects than the latter (Kisgen (2006)). In summary, DCRCs’ heavier 
impacts on speculative-grade issuers’ financing indicate that they are considered 
more crucial by lower-rated issuers than by higher-rated issuers. 
3.4.5 Price Responses to Debt-Equity Financing Adjustment 
Some early studies found the evidence that the stock price reacts negatively to the 
announcements of equity issues. For example, some early studies show that 
announcements of seasoned issues of common stock generally result in stock price 
declines (Asquith and Mullins (1986)) and immediately reveal issuers’ pessimism. 
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Earnings per share may be diluted and recent stock prices may drop when issuing 
equity (Graham and Harvey (2001)). Pushing the issue of debt-equity adjustment 
before DCRCs further, one of the benefits of equity financing as mentioned in the 
literature is that equity price only drops where the information asymmetry is great 
(Dierkens (1991)). This means that ‘good’ issuers may not wait after their future 
rating upgrades due to their consistent price around rating change periods. However, 
the evidence is not as obvious as the benefits of debt financing. To show the 
evidence of ‘good’ issuers’ lower cost when they issue equity, the regression (3.8) 
is run to test the price responses to the financing adjustments at and after the periods 
when rating changes take places. It tests Hypothesis 3.3 and examines the price 
reaction to equity issue announcements in three periods (in the period of rating 
changes and two periods after rating changes) to show evidence of ‘good’ issuers’ 
lower cost when they issue equity.  
eGN  f!"fBC " f#BC " g%&'(Q)* " + (3.8) 
(V =1,2,3)  
where eGN  GN  GN). It is the Price change between the 
period  " V and  " V  
 for firm i, where Price is defined as the logarithm of the 
close price in Section 3.3.5. All the other variables in this equation are kept the 
same with those in the previous tests using overall rating change indicators. 
Hypothesis 3.3 predicts that f is insignificant and f# is significant and negative. 
Table 3.7 shows the results. 
[Insert Table 3.7 here] 
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Firstly, the coefficient f is not significant while the estimate of f# is 7.925% 
and significant at the 1% level in the quarter of rating changes, suggesting ‘good’ 
issuers’ stock prices do not drop while ‘bad’ issuers’ prices drop right after the 
rating downgrades. Secondly, the regression results are consistent in the three 
periods. The coefficients are negative but insignificant in response to upgrades 
while coefficients are all statistically significantly negative at the 1% confidence 
level. The result suggests that ‘good’ issuers’ stock prices do not drop significantly 
while ‘bad’ issuers’ stock prices continuously and significantly drop after three 
quarters after the rating changes. In addition, the coefficients of rating downgrades 
are -0.07925, -0.02669 and -0.01418 in the three periods respectively and are all 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting the extents of ‘bad’ issuers’ price drops are 
decreasing. The results are robust when control the sample as the firm-quarter 
which has a positive equity issue one period before the rating change 
announcements43.  
The results strongly support Hypothesis 3.3. This is also consistent with studies 
from the literature, for instance, Ang and Cheng (2011) verify that ‘firms with high 
information asymmetry suffer from negative market revaluation’. Moreover, 
Hypothesis 3.3 further confirms Hypothesis 3.1 and 3.2 that ‘good’ firms prefer 
equity while ‘bad’ firms prefer debt when information asymmetry exists since a 
firm is more likely to issue equity if the cost of producing information is lower 
(Fulghieri and Lukin (2001)). 
                                                          
43 When the test sample is filtered by excluding observations which do not have equity issuance in the quarter 
before rating changes, the stock prices of ‘good’ issuers do not drop significantly in the following three quarters 
after equity issuance and rating upgrades. The prices of ‘bad’ issuers drop significantly at 1% confidence level 
in the first quarter (V =1) and at 10% confidence level in the second quarter (V =2). Comprehensive results of 
this test sample are available on request. 
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3.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
This study proposes newly driven source of information asymmetry and its 
mechanism of affecting firms’ financing. This chapter investigates the impact of the 
delayed arrival of credit rating changes, creating information asymmetry between 
insiders and investors, on the change in financing of corporate bond issuers. It is 
assumed that both issuers and rating agencies are insiders, whose knowledge and 
predictions on next-period rating change announcements are more precise than 
outsiders. They know firm’s future rating changes earlier and more precisely than 
outsiders, especially investors and other market participants. This superior 
information may allow issuers to adjust their financing before the news of rating 
changes appears. The results from analysing companies in North America and 
S&P’s ratings for the period between Q1 1985 and Q4 2010 suggest that firms take 
advantage of this information asymmetry and change capital structure in many ways. 
Two types of issuers show different behaviours when facing delayed rating 
changes. ‘Good’ issuers convey their currently underestimated ratings and financial 
situation through issuing extra shares within a reasonable range. Most importantly, 
they tend to confirm upgrades in the next period by not significantly using debt 
financing. ‘Bad’ issuers try to hold back news of future rating downgrades by 
issuing debt and issuing moderate equity.  
The result supports the prediction that the information gap between issuers and 
outsiders driven by DCRCs contains value, and affects issuers’ capital structure in 
many aspects. Firstly, firms change leverage ratios one-quarter before rating 
changes. Secondly, firms’ anticipated rating level affects their reactions to DCRCs. 
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Thirdly, not all types of rating indicators function on issuers’ financing choices. 
S&P Domestic Long-term debt rating shows the most significant influence among 
the four S&P rating indicators. Fourthly, speculative-grade issuers will generally 
sustain greater impacts by DCRCs than investment-grade issuers. 
The newly considered driving force of asymmetric information, via the delay in 
rating changes on issuers’ financing adjustment behaviour before DCRCs, enriches 
our understanding of firms’ financing decisions and the material effects of 
information asymmetry. The results hold when controlling the conventional 
leverage factors.  
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Figure 3.1 The timeline of issuers’ financing actions before rating changes  
The graph displays the timeline and the uncertainty of the actions of issuers and market and 
thus indicates the transmission mechanism. The rating changes take place at Time t+1. 
Timeline 
Time t-1 
No significant financing 
adjustment 
Time t 
Debt-Equity financing 
adjustment  
Time t+1 
Rating changes 
take place 
Rating change types 
(Upgrade or Downgrade) 
revealed to insiders 
(issuers), who have 
private information about 
their firms’ prospects. 
Insiders start to adjust 
their financing by 
utilising their private 
information. ‘Good’ 
issuers and ‘bad’ issuers 
have significantly 
different financing 
preference. 
Firms’ credit ratings 
are upgraded, 
downgraded or 
remain the same in 
this time period. 
 
 
Issuer’s benefit and cost of financing adjustment before Time t+1  
‘Good’ issuer 
 
 
Debt 
 
Cost Higher coupon rate; cheaper after upgrade realized 
Benefit  
Equity 
 
Cost 
Little due to its consistent equity price before and 
after rating changes 
Benefit Transparent communicate with the market and keep firms’ flexibility 
    
 
‘Bad’ issuer 
 
  Debt 
 
Cost 
Cheaper coupon rate; higher after downgrade 
realized; Financial distress; Debt overhang 
Benefit Tax deductibility 
Equity 
Cost Equity price drop 
Benefit Flexible than debt financing 
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Figure 3.2 Rating changes summarized by quarters Q1 1985 --- Q4 2010 
This figure depicts the three types of rating changes (upgrades, downgrades and no 
rating changes) as a percentage of all observations in each quarter throughout the data 
sample Q1 1985 to Q4 2010. The blue columns represent the percentages of rating 
upgrades. The red columns represent the percentages of downgrades. The green 
columns represent the percentages of no rating changes. The four panels present the 
overall rating indicator, long-term credit rating indicator (LTD), short-term credit 
rating indicator (STD) and subordinate debt rating indicator (SUB), respectively. 
Panel A Statistics of the overall rating indicator 
 
 
Panel B Statistics of the long-term credit rating indicator 
 
 
  
0.83% 0.98% 1.16% 0.83%1.43% 1.42% 1.27% 1.88%
97.73% 97.60% 97.57% 97.29%
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30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
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100%
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
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0.78% 0.91% 0.74% 0.78%1.38% 1.32% 1.22% 1.78%
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100%
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Figure 3.2 (continued) 
Panel C Statistics of the short-term credit rating indicator 
 
 
Panel D Statistics of the subordinate debt rating indicator 
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100%
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Figure 3.3 Short-term debt and long-term debt issuance by years 1985 --- 2010 
This figure depicts the values of short-term debt and long-term debt issuance as the percentages 
of total debt issuance throughout the data sample 1985 to 2010.  
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Figure 3.4 Sample statistics---Ratings and average leverage relations Q1 1985 --- 
Q4 2010 
This figure shows the rating-leverage features throughout the periods around rating change 
announcements. Rating change takes place at time t+1. The blue columns represent the average 
leverage ratio throughout the whole sample. The green columns are the leverage ratios around 
rating upgrade periods. The red columns are the leverage ratios around rating downgrade periods. 
 
  
46.6%46.2% 45.4%47.9% 44.3%
50.8%
43.0%
49.7%
57.4%56.2%
27.8%
Chapter III Credit Rating Changes, Information Asymmetry, and Firm Financing  
 
92 
 
 
Table 3. 1 Sample summary statistics 
The sample is drawn from quarterly Compustat data, excluding financial firms and utility firms and firm-
quarters with negative equity values during the period Q1 1985 - Q4 2010. The statistics is based on the 
estimation samples of tests. Panel A lists summary statistics of dependant variables and control variables in 
the tests. - is defined as long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt reduction plus changes in current 
debt and normalized by firms’ total assets. 5 is defined as sale of common and preferred stock minus 
purchases of common and preferred stock and normalized by firm’s total assets. 8 is the defined as - 
minus 5. Other control variable definitions are Leverage: ratio of the sum of short-term debt (Sd) and 
long-term debt (Ld) to the sum of short-term debt, long-term debt, and stockholders' equity. Size: logarithm of 
sales. Price: logarithm of the close price of the quarter. Liquidity: ratio of cash and cash equivalent divided 
(normalized) by total assets. Profit: ratio of EBITDA to total assets. Dividends: ratio of dividends 
to total assets. Earnings: ratio of retained earnings to total assets. Growth: total debt book value plus 
quarterly close price multiply outstanding common stock shares and normalized by total assets. Tangibility: 
ratio of property plant and equipment (Net) to total assets. NDTS: ratio of deferred taxes and investment tax 
credit to total assets. Panel B lists firm characteristics by financing types. The four types are defined as: Debt 
only financing firms are those with positive- but non-positive 5; Equity only financing firms are those 
with positive 5  but non-positive - ; Dual financing means both -  and 5  are positive and 
Internal financing is assumed if no issuance is made, which means both - and 5 are both non-positive. 
Outliers do not contaminate the results as shown in Appendix 1 and 2. 
Panel A Summary statistics of dependant and control variables  
Variables  N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum -  125,805 0.006 0.000 0.086 -1.414 11.164 5  229,674 0.014 0.000 0.161 -1.795 17.584 8  114,970 -0.010 -0.002 0.200 -17.584 11.164 9-  134,263 0.002 0.000 0.049 -1.414 3.885 :-  230,587 0.005 0.000 0.088 -3.876 11.164 
Leverage  114,970 0.226 0.160 0.240 0.000 1.000 
Size  114,970 3.280 3.266 2.520 -6.908 11.730 
Price  114,970 1.953 2.183 1.529 -7.419 11.523 
Liquidity  114,970 0.197 0.102 0.225 -0.034 1.000 
Profit  114,970 0.007 0.024 0.224 -59.926 13.207 
Dividends  114,970 0.007 0.000 0.037 -0.012 3.700 
Earnings  114,970 -0.653 0.141 9.344 -2624.430 2.337 
Growth  114,970 1.957 1.167 8.760 0.001 2370.330 
Tangibility  114,970 0.258 0.191 0.227 0.000 1.000 
NDTS  114,970 0.018 0.000 0.033 -0.013 0.692 
Pricechange  255,519 -0.014 -0.010 0.364 -7.107 9.420 
 
Panel B Firm characteristics by financing types  
Financing 
types 
% of 
Obs. Leverage Size Price Liquidity Profit Dividends Earnings  Growth Tangibility NDTS 
Dual 5.19% 0.313 4.115 2.322 0.090 -0.001 0.002 -0.422 1.967 0.312 0.022 
Debt only 8.93% 0.356 4.164 2.023 0.076 0.006 0.003 -0.457 1.480 0.315 0.022 
Equity only 30.66% 0.245 3.684 2.192 0.203 -0.002 0.002 -1.222 2.427 0.276 0.017 
Internal 55.22% 0.289 3.542 1.762 0.184 -0.002 0.003 -1.576 1.956 0.285 0.019 
 
  
The image part with relationship ID rId40 was not found in the  
file.
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Panel C Separate summary statistics for 
 
good

 issuers and 
 
bad

 issuers  
 
Good

 issuers 
Variables  N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum -  781 0.008 0.000 0.110 -0.514 1.825 5  781 0.002 0.000 0.040 -0.153 0.851 8  781 0.006 -0.001 0.116 -0.496 1.824 9-  781 0.001 0.000 0.043 -0.509 0.446 :-  781 0.007 0.000 0.102 -0.448 1.910 
Leverage  781 0.441 0.426 0.220 0.000 0.996 
Size  781 6.042 6.149 1.651 -2.096 10.250 
Price  781 3.057 3.252 0.996 -2.364 5.045 
Liquidity  781 0.096 0.052 0.119 0.000 0.772 
Profit  781 0.030 0.029 0.042 -0.540 0.305 
Dividends  781 0.002 0.000 0.005 -0.006 0.057 
Earnings  781 0.110 0.147 0.454 -8.965 1.774 
Growth  781 1.370 1.085 1.048 0.024 11.869 
Tangibility  781 0.346 0.296 0.232 0.002 0.951 
NDTS  781 0.031 0.016 0.039 0.000 0.199 
 
 
Bad

 issuers 
Variables  N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum -  1,288 0.020 0.000 0.137 -0.333 2.604 5  1,288 0.002 0.000 0.047 -0.318 1.250 8  1,288 0.018 0.001 0.146 -1.263 2.578 9-  1,288 0.003 0.000 0.071 -0.416 1.998 :-  1,288 0.017 0.000 0.123 -0.333 2.604 
Leverage  1,288 0.439 0.436 0.221 0.000 0.984 
Size  1,288 6.006 6.090 1.732 -3.689 11.170 
Price  1,288 2.890 3.044 0.998 -2.040 11.523 
Liquidity  1,288 0.073 0.032 0.112 0.000 0.927 
Profit  1,288 0.017 0.022 0.053 -0.667 0.190 
Dividends  1,288 0.003 0.001 0.006 -0.060 0.070 
Earnings  1,288 0.176 0.193 0.354 -4.389 1.262 
Growth  1,288 1.213 0.927 1.048 0.261 13.720 
Tangibility  1,288 0.364 0.314 0.225 0.000 0.984 
NDTS  1,288 0.033 0.020 0.038 0.000 0.290 
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Panel D Correlation Matrix of Control Variables 
 
Correlations 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
Number of Observations 
Leverage Size Price Liquidity Profit Dividends Earnings Growth Tangibility NDTS 
Leverage 
1          
          
482741          
Size 
0.29849 1         
<.0001          
464442 464442         
Price 
0.14737 0.64371 1        
<.0001 <.0001         
457695 439666 457695        
Liquidity 
-0.47375 -0.35971 -0.19247 1       
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001        
481406 463178 456513 481406       
Profit 
0.00508 0.01173 0.01776 -0.01382 1      
0.0009 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001       
426976 411602 403291 426188 426976      
Dividends 
-0.02863 0.00217 0.01027 0.04786 0.00264 1     
<.0001 0.1667 <.0001 <.0001 0.1035      
425018 407715 406482 424267 381663 425018     
Earnings 
0.01671 0.03971 0.04321 -0.0264 0.0387 -0.01433 1    
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001     
463760 446122 440140 462709 411227 410232 463760    
Growth 
-0.02547 -0.05764 -0.01154 0.03243 -0.09767 0.01081 -0.29597 1   
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001    
450557 432878 450557 449552 398284 402005 435506 450557   
Tangibility 
0.15320 0.20122 0.02730 -0.32696 0.00402 -0.00511 0.01015 -0.00871 1  
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0089 0.0009 <.0001 <.0001   
476849 458706 452504 475846 424394 419683 458215 445624 476849  
NDTS 
0.20821 0.31825 0.29182 -0.27923 0.00523 0.00858 0.01114 -0.0131 0.49628 1 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0015 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  
408032 390149 384190 407293 367056 383357 392643 378432 403098 408032 
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Table 3. 4 Firm financing around changes in individual Ratings 
Values of estimated coefficients and their t-statistic of Equitation (3.6a)-(3.6c) for non-financial firms. Estimated 
parameters on rating indicators indicate influences of delayed rating changes on financing plan making. The 
numbers in brackets underneath coefficient estimates are t-statistic. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, the 5% and the 1% level, respectively. The four panels show the financing adjustments during the four 
periods from two periods before and two periods after rating changes. S&P Long Term Credit Rating, S&P Short 
Term Credit Rating, S&P Subordinated Debt Rating and S&P Quality Ranking are the four individual rating 
indicators. 
  
Panel A 
Two quarters before rating changes 
( V = -1 ) 
 
Panel B 
One quarter before rating changes 
( V = 0 ) 
-) 5) 8)  - 5 8 
Intercept 
 
0.01025*** 0.02253*** -0.01689***  0.01185*** 0.01927*** -0.01091*** 
  
(8.40) (13.20) (-5.14)  (15.94) (18.72) (-6.28) 
:=3  
 
-0.00385 0.00589 -0.01027  -0.00018 0.00895*** -0.0073 
  
(-0.71) (0.93) (-0.70)  (-0.05) (2.30) (-0.93) 
:=3  
 
0.00892** 0.00888* -0.00582  0.02205*** 0.00470 0.01474*** 
  
(2.06) (1.70) (-0.50)  (8.36) (1.49) (2.40) 
9=3  
 
-0.00485 0.00980 -0.01511  0.00273 0.00851 -0.00724 
  
(-0.42) (0.61) (-0.49)  (0.39) (0.90) (-0.45) 
9=3  
 
-0.00399 0.00624 -0.00867  -0.01378*** 0.00848 -0.02083* 
  
(-0.47) (0.54) (-0.38)  (-2.74) (1.23) (-1.78) 
9>?  
 
0.01644 -0.00352 0.01558  0.02837*** 0.00033 0.0304* 
  
(1.51) (-0.28) (0.53)  (3.93) (0.04) (1.80) 
9>?  
 
0.00260 -0.00135 -0.00866  0.02139*** -0.00580 0.03545** 
  
(0.18) (-0.08) (-0.23)  (2.93) (-0.65) (2.10) 
75A  
 
-0.00205 -0.00234 -0.00005  -0.00482*** -0.00374 -0.00082 
  
(-0.64) (-0.56) (-0.01)  (-2.38) (-1.45) (-0.17) 
75A  
 
0.00027 -0.00593* 0.01164  -0.00599*** -0.00545*** 0.00104 
  
(0.11) (-1.84) (1.79)  (-3.93) (-2.76) (0.29) 
Leverage 
 
-0.01448*** 0.02501*** -0.04377***  -0.01651*** 0.01454*** -0.02768*** 
  
(-7.31) (9.69) (-8.20)  (-13.72) (9.37) (-9.83) 
Size 
 
-0.00138*** -0.01101*** 0.01077***  -0.00168*** -0.00972*** 0.00876*** 
  
(-5.57) (-31.35) (15.99)  (-11.12) (-45.91) (24.56) 
Price 
 
0.00255*** 0.00823*** -0.00681***  0.00258*** 0.00841*** -0.00701*** 
  
(6.59) (15.37) (-6.54)  (11.02) (26.23) (-12.81) 
Liquidity 
 
-0.02044*** 0.01770*** -0.02976***  -0.01871*** 0.00839*** -0.01881*** 
  
(-9.15) (5.36) (-4.85)  (-13.73) (4.21) (-5.79) 
Profit 
 
-0.00037 -0.17604*** 0.21037***  -0.00315*** -0.16249*** 0.19357*** 
  
(-0.20) (-55.05) (42.12)  (-2.69) (-83.84) (72.67) 
Dividends 
 
0.00036 -0.00220 0.00410  0.00014 -0.00231 0.00328 
  
(0.04) (-0.15) (0.18)  (0.03) (-0.25) (0.27) 
Earnings 
 
-0.00007 -0.00151*** 0.00115***  -0.00013*** -0.00125*** 0.00087*** 
  
(-1.54) (-18.91) (9.85)  (-4.72) (-25.87) (14.06) 
Growth 
 
0.00006 0.00291*** -0.00183***  0.00007*** 0.00286*** -0.00179*** 
  
(1.25) (33.38) (-14.24)  (2.39) (54.28) (-26.32) 
Tangibility 
 
0.00575*** 0.00740*** -0.00447  0.00719*** 0.00982*** -0.00718*** 
  
(2.70) (2.78) (-0.79)  (5.55) (6.13) (-2.39) 
NDTS 
 
-0.01036 -0.02581 0.05076  -0.02565*** -0.03020*** 0.02934 
  
(-0.74) (-1.46) (1.36)  (-3.01) (-2.82) (1.48) 
Adj R-square 0.0013 0.0393 0.0314  0.0050 0.0816 0.0801 
N 
 
121,123 221,313 110,657  125,805 229,674 114,970 
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Table 3.4 (Continued) 
  
Panel C 
One quarter before rating changes 
( V = 2 ) 
 
Panel D 
Two quarters after rating changes 
( V = 3 ) 
-# 5# 8#  -X 5X 8X 
Intercept 
 
0.01226*** 0.01748*** -0.00757***  0.01204*** 0.01752*** -0.00791*** 
  
(16.50) (18.55) (-4.66)  (16.18) (18.58) (-4.87) 
:=3  
 
0.00472 0.00311 0.00040  0.00162 0.01568*** -0.03107*** 
  
(1.41) (0.87) (0.05)  (0.63) (5.49) (-5.53) 
:=3  
 
0.02050*** 0.00617** 0.01257**  0.01062*** 0.00551* 0.00065 
  
(7.73) (2.11) (2.17)  (4.16) (1.96) (0.12) 
9=3  
 
0.00962 0.00719 0.00226  0.00063 -0.00496 0.01691 
  
(1.30) (0.79) (0.14)  (0.11) (-0.72) (1.36) 
9=3  
 
-0.00253 0.00758 -0.01223  -0.00943* 0.00778 -0.01800* 
  
(-0.52) (1.26) (-1.15)  (-1.94) (1.27) (-1.71) 
9>?  
 
0.00829 0.00211 0.00961  0.01033* -0.00595 0.02334* 
  
(1.07) (0.27) (0.56)  (1.68) (-0.90) (1.73) 
9>?  
 
-0.00653 -0.00761 0.00361  0.00585 -0.00694 0.02026 
  
(-0.97) (-0.99) (0.25)  (0.89) (-0.94) (1.43) 
75A  
 
0.00104 -0.00516** 0.00525  0.00082 -0.00344* 0.00483 
  
(0.51) (-2.17) (1.19)  (0.51) (-1.80) (1.38) 
75A  
 
-0.00331** -0.00336* 0.00052  -0.00219 -0.00363** 0.00447 
  
(-2.22) (-1.86) (0.16)  (-1.55) (-2.14) (1.45) 
Leverage 
 
-0.01565*** 0.01437*** -0.03074***  -0.01535*** 0.01422*** -0.03014*** 
  
(-13.08) (10.17) (-11.74)  (-12.82) (10.06) (-11.51) 
Size 
 
-0.00178*** -0.00933*** 0.00835***  -0.00171*** -0.00934*** 0.00846*** 
  
(-11.78) (-48.12) (25.05)  (-11.33) (-48.25) (25.37) 
Price 
 
0.00241*** 0.00732*** -0.00536***  0.00239*** 0.00730*** -0.00539*** 
  
(10.41) (25.13) (-10.59)  (10.28) (25.08) (-10.64) 
Liquidity 
 
-0.01856*** 0.00863*** -0.02313***  -0.01839*** 0.00852*** -0.02271*** 
  
(-13.59) (4.71) (-7.59)  (-13.46) (4.65) (-7.46) 
Profit 
 
-0.00202*** -0.07140*** 0.06503***  -0.00205*** -0.07140*** 0.06501*** 
  
(-2.74) (-60.39) (41.92)  (-2.78) (-60.40) (41.91) 
Dividends 
 
-0.00096 -0.02623* 0.04263*  -0.00124 -0.02624* 0.04210* 
  
(-0.10) (-1.82) (1.96)  (-0.13) (-1.82) (1.94) 
Earnings 
 
-0.00016*** -0.00151*** 0.00109***  -0.00016*** -0.00151*** 0.00109*** 
  
(-5.55) (-32.05) (17.50)  (-5.58) (-32.04) (17.48) 
Growth 
 
0.00013*** 0.00337*** -0.00255***  0.00013*** 0.00337*** -0.00255*** 
  
(4.18) (68.63) (-39.51)  (4.20) (68.62) (-39.49) 
Tangibility 
 
0.00634*** 0.00989*** -0.00885***  0.00643*** 0.00988*** -0.00872*** 
  
(4.91) (6.77) (-3.16)  (4.98) (6.76) (-3.11) 
NDTS 
 
-0.02310*** -0.04009*** 0.04613***  -0.02248*** -0.04011*** 0.04705*** 
  
(-2.70) (-4.08) (2.48)  (-2.63) (-4.09) (2.54) 
Adj R-square 0.0045 0.0718 0.0530  0.0041 0.0719 0.0533 
N 
 
126,693 231,399 115,779  126,693 231,399 115,779 
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Table 3. 5 Firm financing before and after changes in individual Ratings 
Values of estimated coefficients and their t-statistic for non-financial firms. Estimated parameters on rating indicators 
indicate influences of delayed rating changes on financing plan making. The numbers in brackets underneath coefficient 
estimates are t-statistic. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5% and the 1% level, respectively. The 
four panels show the financing adjustments during the four periods from two periods before rating changes to two periods 
after rating changes. S&P Long Term Credit Rating, S&P Short Term Credit Rating, S&P Subordinated Debt Rating and 
S&P Quality Ranking are the four individual rating indicators. 
Panel A 
Two quarters before 
rating changes 
( V = -1 ) 
 
Panel B 
One quarter before 
rating changes 
( V = 0 ) 
 Panel C 
One quarter after 
rating changes 
( V = 2 ) 
 
Panel D 
Two quarters after 
rating changes 
( V = 3 ) 
  
Short-term 
debt 
Long-term 
debt 
 Short-term 
debt 
Long-term 
debt 
 Short-term 
debt 
Long-term 
debt 
 Short-term 
debt 
Long-term 
debt 
  
9-) :-)  9- :-  9-# :-#  9-X :-X 
Intercept 
 
0.00641*** 0.00663***  0.00735*** 0.00730***  0.00757*** 0.00731***  0.00756*** 0.00704*** 
  
(6.19) (11.45)  (17.66) (12.52)  (18.34) (12.27)  (18.29) (11.80) 
:=3  
 
0.00094 -0.00052  0.00113 -0.00328  0.00471*** 0.00082  0.00008 0.00011 
  
(0.21) (-0.24)  (0.62) (-1.48)  (2.57) (0.36)  (0.06) (0.06) 
:=3  
 
0.00160 0.00844***  0.00459*** 0.02001***  0.00006 0.02366***  -0.00062 0.00851*** 
  
(0.45) (4.66)  (3.22) (10.90)  (0.04) (12.51)  (-0.45) (4.70) 
9=3  
 
-0.00460 -0.00350  0.00017 -0.00143  -0.00663* 0.00973  -0.00006 -0.00105 
  
(-0.48) (-0.62)  (0.05) (-0.25)  (-1.65) (1.59)  (-0.02) (-0.23) 
9=3  
 
0.00074 -0.00330  -0.00104 -0.01379***  0.00230 -0.00684*  -0.00159 -0.00520 
  
(0.11) (-0.80)  (-0.39) (-3.32)  (0.89) (-1.69)  (-0.61) (-1.27) 
9>?  
 
0.00562 0.00961**  0.00027 0.01822***  -0.00106 0.01181***  0.00912*** 0.00671 
  
(0.63) (2.22)  (0.07) (3.90)  (-0.25) (2.44)  (2.73) (1.57) 
9>?  
 
-0.00414 0.01308**  0.00068 0.01002*  -0.00382 0.00136  0.00579* 0.01169*** 
  
(-0.37) (2.20)  (0.18) (1.88)  (-1.06) (0.27)  (1.65) (2.40) 
75A  
 
0.00011 -0.00382***  -0.00151 -0.00361***  0.00145 0.00291*  -0.00006 0.00116 
  
(0.04) (-2.65)  (-1.34) (-2.44)  (1.30) (1.90)  (-0.07) (0.94) 
75A  
 
0.00097 -0.00151  -0.00285*** -0.00331***  -0.00042 -0.00527***  0.00014 -0.00359*** 
  
(0.48) (-1.36)  (-3.38) (-2.93)  (-0.52) (-4.54)  (0.18) (-3.29) 
Leverage 
 
-0.00948*** -0.00969***  -0.01170*** -0.00917***  -0.01143*** -0.00845***  -0.01148*** -0.00799*** 
  
(-5.69) (-11.04)  (-17.48) (-10.40)  (-17.31) (-9.44)  (-17.36) (-8.91) 
Size 
 
-0.00032 -0.00191***  -0.00052*** -0.00202***  -0.00057*** -0.00209***  -0.00056*** -0.00201*** 
  
(-1.55) (-16.21)  (-6.14) (-17.00)  (-6.77) (-17.23)  (-6.63) (-16.55) 
Price 
 
0.00040 0.00367***  0.00049*** 0.00363***  0.00042*** 0.00349***  0.00042*** 0.00346*** 
  
(1.21) (20.24)  (3.74) (19.99)  (3.24) (18.98)  (3.22) (18.80) 
Liquidity 
 
-0.01345*** -0.01311***  -0.01154*** -0.01354***  -0.01184*** -0.01317***  -0.01183*** -0.01295*** 
  
(-7.05) (-12.15)  (-15.02) (-12.44)  (-15.49) (-11.80)  (-15.48) (-11.60) 
Profit 
 
0.00083 -0.00402***  -0.00202*** -0.00431***  -0.00101*** -0.00230***  -0.00101*** -0.00234*** 
  
(0.50) (-3.75)  (-3.01) (-3.97)  (-2.40) (-3.08)  (-2.39) (-3.13) 
Dividends 
 
0.00012 0.00412  -0.00013 0.00396  0.00222 0.01024  0.00226 0.01010 
  
(0.02) (0.97)  (-0.04) (0.91)  (0.42) (1.29)  (0.43) (1.28) 
Earnings 
 
-0.00004 -0.00017***  -0.00004*** -0.00023***  -0.00004*** -0.00029***  -0.00004*** -0.00029*** 
  
(-0.95) (-6.17)  (-2.62) (-8.32)  (-2.39) (-9.77)  (-2.41) (-9.81) 
Growth 
 
-0.00002 0.00021***  0.00000 0.00020***  0.00002 0.00026***  0.00002 0.00026*** 
  
(-0.48) (7.22)  (-0.27) (6.76)  (1.19) (8.40)  (1.21) (8.43) 
Tangibility 
 
-0.00128 0.01012***  0.00031 0.00950***  0.00037 0.00942***  0.00036 0.00953*** 
  
(-0.72) (11.08)  (0.43) (10.33)  (0.52) (10.06)  (0.51) (10.18) 
NDTS 
 
0.00622 -0.02827***  -0.00574 -0.02787***  -0.00632 -0.02928***  -0.00621 -0.02858*** 
  
(0.53) (-4.62)  (-1.22) (-4.51)  (-1.35) (-4.64)  (-1.33) (-4.52) 
Adj R-square 
 
0.0004 0.0044  0.0034 0.0047  0.0035 0.0047  0.0035 0.0040 
N 
 
129,305 222,222  134,263 230,587  135,211 232,185  135,211 232,185 
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Table 3. 7  Price responses to the debt-equity financing  
Values of estimated coefficients and their t-statistic for nonfinancial firms. Estimated parameters 
on rating indicators describe influences of delayed rating changes on price changes in the period 
of rating changes and in the periods after rating changes. The numbers in brackets underneath 
coefficient estimates are t-statistic. Rating changes take places at quarter t+1. *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
Panel A 
One quarter before 
rating changes 
( V = 1 ) 
 Panel B 
In the quarter of 
rating changes 
 ( V = 2 ) 
 
Panel C 
One quarter after 
rating changes 
 ( V = 3 ) 
Intercept  
-0.02038***  -0.01956***  -0.01928*** 
  
(-9.09)  (-8.72)  (-8.60) 
BC  -0.00412  -0.00873  -0.00844 
  
(-0.54)  (-1.14)  (-1.37) 
BC  -0.07925***  -0.02669***  -0.01418*** 
  
(-12.83)  (-4.29)  (-2.34) 
:D@EN)  -0.06043***  -0.06192***  -0.06227*** 
  
(-18.00)  (-18.43)  (-18.52) 
9hN)  0.0231***  0.02281***  0.02272*** 
  
(50.49)  (49.84)  (49.72) 
GN)  -0.03931***  -0.03921***  -0.03917*** 
  
(-56.61)  (-56.44)  (-56.38) 
:5-AN)  0.06842***  0.06776***  0.06756*** 
  
(16.12)  (15.96)  (15.91) 
HN)  0.0342***  0.03452***  0.03458*** 
  
(11.68)  (11.79)  (11.81) 
3D-8-N)  -0.09428***  -0.09358***  -0.09349*** 
  
(-3.08)  (-3.06)  (-3.05) 
7@88EN)  -1.6E-05  -1.2E-05  -1.1E-05 
  
(-0.14)  (-0.11)  (-0.09) 
IN)  -0.0018***  -0.0018***  -0.0018*** 
  
(-14.83)  (-14.84)  (-14.85) 
=@8EJKAN)  0.03469***  0.0342***  0.03408*** 
  
(9.89)  (9.75)  (9.71) 
L3=9N)  0.22833***  0.22695***  0.22628*** 
  
(9.69)  (9.63)  (9.60) 
Adj R-square  
0.0170  0.0165  0.0164 
N  
255,519  255,519  255,519 
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4.1 Introduction 
Empirical tests and their results reported in Chapter III show that dummy variables, 
measuring gaps of expectations about delayed credit rating changes (DCRCs) 
between insiders and outsiders, significantly add explanatory power to the 
financing adjustments before the rating changes are announced by rating agencies. 
This chapter further investigates the robustness of the explanatory power of DCRCs 
by conducting a series of tests and incorporating the DCRC hypotheses within the 
tests of the existing capital structure theories. The study demonstrates the DCRCs’ 
explanatory power and finds that DCRC’s influences on capital structure could be 
partially incorporated into the Pecking-order Theory. 
This chapter first adjusts potential test problems which may be caused by OLS 
regressions in the previous chapter. The logit model examines the binary decisions 
of issuing debt or equity instead of testing the magnitudes of increases of debt and 
equity issuance. The influences of significant outliers are adjusted by the 
regressions cut outliers out of 3 standard deviations and by an alternative estimation, 
MM estimation, which cures the outliers’ effects. Time and industry effects are 
tested by the mixed model which tests the variances of time and industries. 
Secondly, this chapter discusses the extent to which the findings are consistent with 
the existing theoretical models of capital structure by incorporating the DCRC 
dummies into the existing capital structure theory tests.  
Classical capital structure theories have been developed over several past 
decades, but at best existing theories can explain certain facts of the diversity and 
complexity of financing choices (Margaritis and Psillaki (2010)). The questions 
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‘How do firms finance their business?’, ‘What factors influence firm’s financing 
choices?’ have guided research in the area for a long time. Weston (1955) felt the 
need to argue whether it was possible to develop reasonable theories about these 
matters since experts cannot arrive at a conclusive answer. The Modigliani–Miller 
theorem (M&M, henceforth) (1958) forms the basis for modern thinking on capital 
structure. The theorem basically states that, under a certain market price process 
(the classical random walk), in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency costs, 
and asymmetric information, and in an efficient market, the value of a firm is 
unaffected by how the firm is financed. It argues that it does not matter if the firm’s 
capital is raised by issuing stock or selling debt, or what the firm’s dividend policy 
is. Therefore, the Modigliani–Miller theorem is also often called the capital 
structure irrelevance principle. 
Following the M&M proposition (1958), researchers’ efforts on explaining 
financing behaviours have been turned into various market ‘imperfections’ in 
reality: for instance, the presence of taxes, bankruptcy, agency costs, information 
asymmetry in the financial market. Ross (1977) discusses a firm’s financing 
strategy when managers possess inside information. It argues the ‘signalling’ effect, 
the tendency for the stock market to respond negatively to announcements of new 
stock issues. Though the costs and benefits of signalling have not arrived at a 
unique answer about the usage of signalling tools and approaches over the recent 
decades, the theory seems to confirm the existence of large ‘information cost’ 
impacting financing choices in predictable ways (Myers, McConnell, Peterson, 
Roebuck, Soter, Stewart, et al. (1998)). Signalling was integrated with a firm’s 
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financing decisions when the well-known Pecking Order Theory of financing was 
developed (Myers and Majluf (1984)).  
The Trade-off theory refers to the idea that a company chooses how much debt 
finance and how much equity finance to use by balancing the benefits and costs of 
debt, and, in particular, offsetting the bankruptcy costs associated with debt against 
tax savings from debt. The original version of the Trade-off Theory grew out of the 
debate over the M&M theorem (Eckbo (2007)) and its classical version of the 
hypothesis goes back to Kraus and Litzenberger (1973). Often agency costs are also 
included in the balance of debt and equity. The empirical relevance of the Trade-off 
Theory has often been questioned. According to Miller (1977), taxes are generally 
large and certain, while bankruptcy is rare and has low dead-weight costs. He 
suggested that if the Trade-off Theory were true, then firms ought to have much 
higher debt levels than we observe in reality. Myers was a particularly fierce critic 
of the Trade-off Theory, who proposed the Pecking Order Theory with Nicolas 
Majluf in 1984. Despite such criticisms, the Trade-off Theory remains the dominant 
theory of corporate capital structure and is taught in the main corporate finance 
textbooks. The Dynamic Trade-off Theory extends the static theory into a time-
varying scale, which claims that managers of firms are continuously optimizing the 
leverage ratio as to maximize the value of the firm. The dynamic versions of the 
model generally seem to offer enough flexibility in matching the data, contrary to 
the Miller (1977)’s argument, dynamic trade-off models are very hard to reject 
empirically. It makes the predictions of this theory a lot more accurate and 
reflective of that in practice. 
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The Pecking Order Theory is often set up as a competitor to the Trade-off 
Theory. It was first suggested by Donaldson in 1961 and was modified and 
documented by Myers and Majluf (1984). Due to asymmetric information, the 
theory predicts a strict order of financing, internal funds, debt and equity. It 
considers the unequal distributed information between firm managers and market 
outsiders. Since managers know more about their companies’ prospects, risks and 
values than outside investors, the information asymmetry affects the choice 
between internal and external financing and between the issue of debt or equity. 
However, a crucial problem for the Pecking Order Theory is the use of equity 
financing. Strong evidence about too many equity issuances are discussed in Frank 
and Goyal (2003) and those about issuing equity at the wrong times are discussed in 
Fama and French (2005) and Leary and Roberts (2010). 
Being discussed for decades, neither of the two theories won a preponderant 
victory on having better explanatory power in financing behaviour. Instead of 
finding one general universal theory, researchers turn their study perspectives to 
specialised theories based on different hypotheses. Fama and French (2002) 
criticize both the Trade-off Theory and the Pecking Order Theory in different ways. 
Myers (2001) argues that a satisfactory unifying model is unlikely to be seen 
available in the near future. The market’s imperfections and the theory’s 
discussions based on them show that each theory has its strengths as well as 
downside, which is the limit of each theory’s serviceable range. None of the 
theories has an overwhelming advantage over the other. Different models have 
problems with different facts. The lack of discussion on comparable test power 
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using different hypotheses for various theories could lead to weak and vague 
conclusions.  
This chapter extends Chapter III in many ways. Firstly, by conducting various 
robustness checks, this chapter further confirms the added explanatory power of 
financing strategy driven by DCRCs. Secondly, the test evidence shows that DCRC 
related hypotheses could be partially incorporated into the existing capital structure 
theories, particularly the theories which have strong assumptions on information 
asymmetry. Last but not least, this chapter confirms the explanatory power of 
DCRC in the context of market insiders’ capital structure adjustment behaviours. 
The rest of the chapter is arranged as follows: Section 4.2 introduces data and 
gives summary statistics. Section 4.3 runs the robustness check on DCRCs 
explanatory power by carrying out various tests. Section 4.4 examines whether and 
how DCRC arguments are embedded into the existing theories of capital structure. 
Section 4.5 concludes.  
4.2 Data and Summary Statistics  
Data is collected from quarterly firm financials and monthly Standard & Poor (S&P) 
rating data from Compustat North America, which comprises more than 30,000 
active and inactive publicly listed firms in the U.S. and Canada. Quarterly rating 
change indicators are derived from the monthly rating data44 and amalgamated with 
the quarterly financial data. The sample covers all firms which have quarterly 
                                                          
44  Values of monthly rating change indicators are summed up for every quarter and the quarterly rating 
indicators are defined as ‘1’ if the sum of the added monthly value is greater than 0, otherwise defined as ‘0’. 
This means that the quarterly rating indicator is equal to ‘1’ when rating changes take place in any month of the 
quarter, while it is equal to ‘0’ when rating changes do not take place in any month of the quarter. 
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financial data and at least one rating record during the sample period: Q1 1985 
(when the rating data begins in Compustat) to Q4 2010. The firm-quarter 
observations with negative equity (leverage greater than one) are excluded. The 
final sample for empirical tests excludes utility companies (SIC 4000-4999) and 
financial companies (SIC 6000-6999) as with conventional treatments.  
4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
This chapter examines the effects on debt issuance, equity issuance and net debt 
issuance, which are defined as follows: 
-  ./0./12  : debt issuance, where 3  is long-term debt issuance 
(Compustat DLTISY) 45  minus long-term debt reduction 
(Compustat DLTRY) plus changes in current debt (Compustat 
DLCCHY) for firm i in quarter t, and 4)  is total asset 
(Compustat ATQ) of firm i in quarter t-1. 
5  6./0./12  : equity issuance, where 7  is the sale of common and 
preferred stock (Compustat SSTKY) minus purchases of common 
and preferred stock (Compustat PRSTKCY) for firm i in quarter t. 
8  ./)6./0./12  : net debt issuance (as in Kisgen (2006)) is the difference 
between  - and 5. 
                                                          
45 The last letter ‘Y’ in DLTISY indicates that the variable is year-to-date. All variables comprised of year-to-
date data are derived to quarterly values. 
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Looking further into details of debt issuance and examining the effects of 
short-term debt and long-term debt respectively, the two variables are defined as 
below: 
 9-  ;./0./12  , where  93  is the change in current debt (Compustat 
DLCCHY) for firm i in quarter t. 
:-  <./0./12 , where :3  is long-term debt issuance (Compustat 
DLTISY) minus long-term debt reduction (Compustat DLTRY) for 
firm i in quarter t. 
4.2.2 Indicators for Upgrade and Downgrade  
In order to indicate ratings upgrade and downgrade for firm i in quarter t+1, two 
sets of dummy variables are constructed. Each set consists of four dummy variables 
associated with the S&P ratings of long-term debt, short-term debt, subordinated 
debt and common stock. They are, respectively, Domestic Long-Term Issuer Credit 
Rating (Compustat SPLTICRM), Domestic Short-Term Issuer Credit Rating 
(SPSTICRM), Subordinated Debt Rating (SPSDRM) and Common Stock Ranking 
(SPCSRM)46.  
:=3  9=3  9>?  @8-75A : dummy variables 
for ratings upgrade. They are equal to 1 if the individual ratings of 
SPLTICRM, SPSTICRM, SPSDRM and SPCSRM of firm i, 
respectively, are upgraded in quarter t+1. 
                                                          
46 This indicator provides investors predicted direction of future market risk. It provides ‘investors with a 
measure of risk, a ranking change may signify a change in risk’ (Felton, Liu and Hearth (1994)). However, it is 
not a rating for fixed income securities like bonds. It thus has different features with the other three rating 
indicators. Therefore it is excluded from overall rating change indicators defined below but report its individual 
influence on firm financing with the other three rating indicators when testing individual rating effects. 
The image part with relationship ID rId59 was not found in the file.
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:=3  9=3  9>? @8-75A : 
dummy variables for ratings downgrade. They are equal to 1 if the 
individual ratings SPLTICRM, SPSTICRM, SPSDRM and 
SPCSRM of firm i, respectively, are downgraded in quarter t+1. 
To simplify the robustness check in this chapter, two dummy variables to 
indicate the overall rating upgrade and downgrade are conducted. It is based on the 
plausible assumption, which has been demonstrated in the previous chapter, that 
firm managers are not only concerned about a change in any of the above three 
ratings, but also about an overall outcome of the firm’s future ratings.  
BC"
>  
  if the individual ratings of firm i in quarter t+1 satisfy two 
conditions: (i) at least one of the individual ratings showing 
upgrade, and (ii) more individual ratings show upgrade than 
downgrade. 
BC"
3  
  if the individual ratings of firm i in quarter t+1 satisfy two 
conditions: (i) at least one of the individual ratings showing 
downgrade, and (ii) more individual  ratings show 
downgrade than upgrade. 
4.2.3 Control Variables 
Control variables, conventionally considered in capital structure studies47, include 
Leverage, Size, Price, Liquidity, Profit, Dividends, Earnings, Growth, Tangibility 
                                                          
47 Kisgen (2006) shows significant negative relation between Leverage and debt issuance. Titman and Wessels 
(1988) show that firm Size, as indicated by logarithm of sales, is one of the crucial determinants of capital 
structure. Marsh (1982) shows that changes in security Prices alter debt/equity ratios. Wald (1999), Myers 
(2001), and Fama and French (2002) demonstrate that Profit is an important factor that affects capital structure. 
Market-to-book ratio (defined as Growth in this study) and Tangibility are variables affecting leverage ratio in 
The image part with relationship ID rId60 was not found in the file. The image part with relationship ID rId61 was not found in the file.
The image part with relationship ID rId62 was not found in the file.
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and NDTS (non-debt tax shields) to separate their influences from DCRCs on firms’ 
financing decisions.  
:D@EF ratio of the sum of short-term debt (Sd) (Compustat DLCQ) and 
long-term debt (Ld) (Compustat DLTTQ) to the sum of short-term 
debt, long-term debt, and stockholders' equity (Compust LSEQ 
minus LTQ) for firm i in quarter t. 
: logarithm of sales (Compustat SALEQ) for firm i in quarter t. 
G : logarithm of the quarterly close price in the quarter (Compustat 
PRCCQ) for firm i in quarter t. 
:5-A: ratio of cash and cash equivalent (Compustat CHEQ) to total 
assets (Compustat ATQ)  for firm i in quarter t. 
H: ratio of EBITDA48 to total assets (Compustat ATQ) for 
firm i in quarter t.  
3D-8-: ratio of dividends (Compustat DVY) to total assets (Compustat 
ATQ) for firm i in quarter t.  
7@88E  : ratio of retained earnings (Compustat REQ) to total assets 
(Compustat ATQ) for firm i in quarter t.  
I : ratio of total debt book value plus quarterly close price 
(Compustat PRCCQ) multiplied by outstanding common stock 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Rajan and Zingales (1995). Dividends (Barclay, Smith and Watts (1995) and Titman and Wessels (1988)) and 
Earnings (Titman and Wessels (1988)) policy tightly relate to debt issuance and equity sale. Liquidity (see Kim, 
Mauer and Sherman (1998)) is included to control for possible impact on leverage from firm’s cash/liquidity 
positions and NDTS (non-debt tax shields), which is considered as an impact of optimal leverage level 
(DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) and Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984)) and may have negative influence on 
leverage. 
48 7?=34 is the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization for firm i at time t, which is 
calculated as the sum of Pretax Income (Compustat PIQ), Inertest Expense (Compustat TIEQ) and Depreciation 
and Amortization (Compustat DPQ). 
The image part with relationship ID rId63  
was not found in the file.
The image part with relationship ID rId64 was not found in the  
file.
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shares (Compustat CSHOQ) to total assets (Compustat ATQ) for 
firm i in quarter t. 
=@8EJKA : ratio of property plant and equipment (Net) (Compustat 
PPENTQ) to total assets (Compustat ATQ) for firm i in quarter t. 
L3=9 : ratio of deferred taxes and investment tax credit (Compustat 
TXDITCQ) to total assets (Compustat ATQ) for firm i in quarter t. 
4.2.4 Variables for Testing Existing Theories  
In order to conduct regressions examining DCRC’s effects in the context of existing 
capital structure theories, a few new variables are introduced. DEF is defined in 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) to test the Pecking Order Theory. It is designed to 
indicate the internal funds. KD@E  indicates the changes in leverage and is 
created to test the Market Timing Theory. @88E is also applied in the Market 
Timing Theory as an indicator of changes in retained earnings. These variables are 
defined as below: 
37i F the sum of dividend payments (Compustat DVY), capital 
expenditures (Compustat CAPXY), the net increase in working 
capital (Compustat WCAPCHY) and the current portion of long-
term debt less operating cash flows, after interest and taxes 
(Compustat LTDLCHY-OANCFY)  for firm i in quarter t.
KD@E  :D@E  :D@E) , where :D@E  is the 
same as that defined in the control variable section 4.2.3. 
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@88E  7@88E  7@88E) , where 7@88E  is the 
same as that defined in the control variable section 4.2.3. 
4.2.5 Summary Statistics 
Table 4.1 shows the summary statistics for the sample containing 343,096 firm-
quarters. Firms on average issue more equity (normalized by total assets) of 0.033 
than debt (normalized by total assets) of 0.01. The net debt issuance is negative at -
0.04. The short-term debt and long-term debt are on average both 0.005 but the 
former is more volatile than the latter.  
[Insert Table 4.1 here] 
The average firm has a Leverage ratio of 0.278, a Size of 3.660, a Price of 
1.984 and a Growth (Market-to-Book ratio) of 2.229. Other control variables are all 
normalized by firm’s total assets. The average firm holds 17.8% of its total asset 
value as cash and cash equivalent (short-term investments) and distributes 0.2% of 
its total asset value as dividends one quarter ahead of rating changes. Firms on 
average have negative Profit (-0.009) and negative retained Earnings (-1.642). The 
average firm holds approximately 28.6% of its book value of assets in fixed assets 
and has the ratio of 1.9% deferred taxes and investment tax credit to total assets. 
The newly added variables in this chapter for the tests incorporating DCRCs 
into the existing capital structure theories are DEF, KD@E and @88E, 
which have average values of -2.730, 0.003 and 0.090, respectively. It indicates that 
the internal funds are negative and both leverage and earnings increased across the 
sample.  
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4.3 Robustness Check of DCRCs Effects 
This section evaluates the robustness of the tests in Chapter III by performing a 
number of tests and analyses. The tests start from a logit model examining the 
binary decisions of issuing debt or equity instead of testing the magnitudes of 
adjustments in debt and equity issuance in the previous chapter. The result show 
that the dramatic gap between the residuals’ distribution and normal distribution is 
shown when investigating the distribution of residuals gained from OLS regressions 
in the previous chapter. Therefore, the regressions deleting outliers are conducted in 
this section. An alternative MM estimation is also conducted to check the 
robustness of the regression adjusting outliers’ influences. Finally, the mixed model 
is run to test the variances of both time and industry dimensions.  
4.3.1 Logit Tests on Debt Issuance and Equity Issuance 
Logit tests could investigate the specific mechanisms by which effects of delayed 
rating changes are manifested by binary financing choices (Kisgen (2009)). Instead 
of testing the adjusted magnitudes of debt issuance and equity issuance due to 
DCRCs defined in the previous chapter, this chapter tests the binary choices. Debt 
issuance and equity issuance are defined as dummy variables -J  and 
5A in this section to test issuers’ financing choices. 
-J  	
-   5A  	

5   (4.1) 
The logit models below are conducted to test issuer’s dichotomous financing 
choices in the four periods around DCRCs:  
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K8 j k-JN  
l
  k-JN  
lm n!"nBC " n#BC " o%&'(Q)* " +N 
(4.2a) 
K8 j k5AN  
l
  k5AN  
lm p!"pBC " p#BC " q%&'(Q)* " +N
(4.2b)
(V  -1, 0, 2, 3)  
where BC  and BC  are the overall upgrade dummy and downgrade dummy 
respectively. &'(Q)* is the vector of control variables. The left-hand-sides of the 
equations (4.2a) and (4.2b) are the logits or log-odds49. The coefficients in the two 
logit models thus represent the change in the logit of the probability associated with 
one unit change in the corresponding predictor given all the other predictors 
constant. In particular, since the two equations above contain the dummy 
independent variables BC  and BC , the explanations of their corresponding 
coefficients are slightly different. For instance, n represents the difference in the 
logit of debt issuance between when BC  equals one and when it equals zero, 
more expressly, when there is a rating upgrade and when there is no rating upgrade 
in the next period. 
Table 4.2 reports the coefficients and odds ratio estimates given by the logit 
regression. The first table ‘Coefficient estimates of logit tests’ gives the change in 
log odds of the dependent variable for a one unit increase in the independent 
variables50. The four panels in the coefficient estimates table of Table 4.2 show the 
                                                          
49 Odds is the ratio of the probability that something is true devided by the probability that it is not true. 
50 Note that the generalized R2 is calculated as rs  *  tdkuldkgvlw
sxy
 and
 
the upper-bound of the generalized R2 is 
less than 1. Nagelkerke (1991) suggests the adjusted rzs  rsrs{|}, which makes R2 achieves a maximum value 
of one. rs{|}  *  ~dkulsxy rzs is labelled as “Max-rescaled R-Square” in SAS PROC LOGISTIC result 
reports. (p.2342, SAS/STAT 9.1 User's Guide By SAS Institute, SAS Publishing Staff) 
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log odds of the four periods around DCRCs, respectively. The second table ‘Odds 
ratio estimates of logit tests’ lists the odds ratios, which are the exponentiation of 
the regression coefficients and can be interpreted as the multiplicative change in the 
odds for a one unit change in the independent variable.  
 [Insert Table 4.2 here] 
Panel Bs of Table 4.2 list the results of regressions (4.2a) and (4.2b) one 
quarter before DCRCs are announced (V 0). The coefficient estimates of equation 
(4.2a) give the log odds of debt issuance as listed in the first table of Table 4.2. The 
estimate on rating upgrade BC  is -0.1537 and is significant at the 5% 
confidence level while the estimate on downgrade BC  is 0.1150 and is 
significant at the 1% confidence level. As listed in the second table of Table 4.2, the 
corresponding odds of issuing debt (versus not issuing debt) thus significantly 
increases by a factor of 0.8575 (=)!ZX\) before delayed upgrades are announced 
and significantly increases by 1.1219 (=!Z!) before delayed downgrades. This 
indicates that ‘good’ issuers tend not to issue debt while ‘bad’ issuers do the 
opposite before rating change are announced.  
For the estimation of equation (4.2b) examining the probability of equity 
issuance, the estimated log odds of increasing equity issue before upgrades is 
0.1686 and is significant at the 1% level while the estimate on downgrades is 
insignificant. The results suggest that only ‘good’ issuers increase the odds of 
equity issuance by 1.1686 before rating upgrades but ‘bad’ issuers do not 
significant modify the odds of equity issue before downgrades.  
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Panel A, C and D of Table 4.2 show the results of the other three quarters 
before and after DCRCs are announced (V  -1,2,3). The results in Panel A imply 
that ‘good’ issuers significantly issue equity but do not increase debt issuance while 
‘bad’ issuers do not adjust their financings. Panel C indicates that only ‘bad’ issuers 
issue extra debt one quarter after DCRCs while issuers do not significantly adjust 
equity issuance in that quarter. Panel D indicates that ‘bad’ issuers prefer not to 
increase debt issuance two quarters after DCRCs while equity issuances would not 
be adjusted in this quarter as well.  
Further extending the investigation to marginal effects, the complication arises 
because the independent variable often includes dummy variables, which indicate 
binary choice (Greene (2008)). For instance, the appropriate marginal effect for the 
binary independent variable BC  would be 
J-J  
  BC  

 J-J  
  BC   
where   denotes the means of all the control variables in equation (4.2a). The 
results of marginal effects for upgrade and downgrade indicators are reported in the 
third table of Table 4.2. For example, in the Panel B of the table, the marginal 
effects around the mean of control variables show that comparing with no rating 
change, the probability of debt issuance is 1.51% less when there is upgrade in the 
next period. In contrast, given other the same, the probability of debt issuance is 
1.25% more one period before a downgrade than no rating change. Results of 
marginal effects listed in other three panels show that the probability differences 
between rating changes and no rating changes are all less than 0.5%.  
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In summary, the results of logit tests confirm the findings in the previous 
chapter, particularly the test results one quarter before DCRCs.  
4.3.2 Outliers’ Effects 
This section discusses the outliers’ effects in the OLS regressions in the previous 
chapter, in which regression (4.3) below has been tested. 
8  T!"TBC " T#BC " U%&'()* " + (4.3) 
However, as shown in Figure 4.1, the distribution of the residual +  has 
significant negative skewness of -21.238 and extreme significant kurtosis of 
1548.475, which is significantly different from the skewness of 0 and kurtosis of 3 
for an OLS regression assuming a normal distribution of residuals. Three statistics 
examining normality for the residual + are adopted in this section: Kolmogorov-
Smirnov51, Cramér-von Mises and Anderson-Darling. The residuals gained from 
regression (4.3) with the full data sample has a 0.3077 Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 
statistic, a 3665.89 Cramér-von Mises W² statistic and a 18332.265 Anderson-
Darling A² statistic. These statistics show big gaps from those of normal 
distribution. The extreme high kurtosis is normally due to infrequent and extreme 
deviations. The tests excluding outliers are thus conducted for the regression (4.3).  
[Insert Figure 4.1 here] 
                                                          
51 SAS programme uses the Shapiro-wilk test when the sample size is below 2000 and the Kolmogorov test 
when the sample size is above 2000. A low value of D statistic means that the EDF clings tightly to the 
reference Normal distribution’s CDF and is therefore a good approximation of this cdf, an argument in favor 
of H0: Normal distribution.  
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Table 4.3 reports the results of regressions (4.4a) – (4.4c) with the sample 
excluding the outliers outside of 3 standard deviations (3SD henthforth)52 of the full 
sample to test the robustness of results gained from OLS regressions in Chapter III. 
[Insert Table 4.3 here] 
-N  O!"OBC " O#BC " P%&'(Q)* " +N (4.4a) 
5N  R!"RBC " R#BC " S%&'(Q)* " +N (4.4b) 
8N  T!"TBC " T#BC " U%&'(Q)* " +N (4.4c) 
(V =-1, 0, 2, 3)  
Panel B of Table 4.3 shows the results one period before DCRCs (V =0). The D 
statistic decreases from 0.3077 of the full sample to 0.2044 of the new sample 
excluding 3SD outliers. The W² statistic for the tests based on the new sample 
decreases to 1848.63 and the A² statistic decreases to 9506.62. The skewness and 
kurtosis became -1.0121 and 21.2608 respectively, which are drastically corrected 
toward to the skewness and kurtosis of the normal distribution. The signs and 
significances of coefficient estimates on 8 , - and 5 are consistent 
with the results of the tests based on the full data sample, indicating that the outliers 
do not play a crucial role in the estimation and did not contaminate the result when 
using full data sample and its indications. The test results also indicate that ‘good’ 
issuers do not change the net debt issuance while ‘bad’ issuer increase net debt 
issuance before delayed credit rating changes. The result remains robust when the 
dependent variable 8 is broken into debt issuance - and equity issuance 
5. The coefficients in regressions (4.4b) and (4.4c) indicate that ‘good’ issuers 
                                                          
52 There is no rigid mathematical definition of what constitutes an outlier. Determining whether or not an 
observation is an outlier is ultimately a subjective exercise. I thus take the most commonly used way by 
excluding outliers outside of 3 standard deviations (SD). For example, 8 [-0.610, 0.590]. 
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moderately increase equity issuance while ‘bad’ issuers significantly increase debt 
financing one quarter before DCRCs. 
Panel A of Table 4.3 reports the results of two quarters before DCRCs (V =-1). 
The estimated values of the coefficients on the rating dummies in regressions (4.4a) 
– (4.4c) indicate issuers’ financing adjustment behaviour two quarters before 
DCRCs. The only significant coefficient on rating dummies is that on downgrade in 
(4.4a), indicating that issuers facing rating downgrades after two quarters 
significantly increase the debt issuance while issuers do not adjust .  
Panel C and D of Table 4.3 report the results in the quarters after DCRCs. In 
the first quarter after rating changes, ‘good’ issuers significantly increase debt 
issuance. ‘Bad’ issuers issue both debt and equity significantly at the 1% 
confidence level. In the second quarter after rating changes, ‘good’ issuers do not 
issue debt but significantly increase equity issuance. ‘Bad’ issuers increase both 
debt and equity issuances, but debt issuances are in a smaller scale than those in the 
last quarter.  This is consistent with results based on the full sample, as shown in 
Table 3.2. The results in this section thus indicate that outliers outside of 3SD do 
not play a significant role in contaminating the test results.  
4.3.3 MM Estimation 
The robust regression 53 , an important tool for analysing whether data are 
contaminated by outliers, is run in this section to detect the effects of outliers and to 
provide resistant (stable) results in the presence of outliers. Table 4.4 reports the 
                                                          
53 The command used here is the PROC ROBUSTREG command in SAS. It attempts to ‘retain the robustness 
and resistance of s-estimation, whilst gaining the efficiently of M-estimation’ (SAS (2004)). 
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MM estimation54 results for robust regressions in the four quarters around DCRCs. 
The ‘Deviance’ reported in the bottom of the table is a measure of ‘goodness of fit’ 
between the observed and the estimated values. The smaller the Deviance, the 
better the fit of the model. The percentages of outliers detected in the four panels 
vary from 9.41% to 15.01%, which is much higher than the percentage of outliers 
excluded in Section 4.3.255.  
 [Insert Table 4.4 here] 
Panel B of Table 4.4 indicates that a future upgrade predicts an insignificant 
change on net debt issuance but a future downgrade predicts a higher probability of 
debt issue and insignificant equity issuance. These results suggest that ‘good’ 
issuers tend not to significantly modify financing plan one quarter before DCRCs 
while ‘bad’ issues employ more net debt issuance by 0.21% as the percentage of 
total asset. These results are consistent with the conclusion in the previous chapter 
and sections.  
Panel A of Table 4.4 shows that both coefficients on upgrade and downgrade 
are significant at the 1% level, indicating that the action of financing adjustments 
take place two quarters before DCRCs. The negative coefficient on upgrade implies 
that ‘good’ issuers start to decrease net debt issue two quarters before DCRCs. The 
coefficients are also significant when independent variable net debt issue is broken 
into debt issue and equity issue. The -0.0012 coefficient and 0.0001 coefficient 
indicate that ‘good’ issues decrease debt issue but slightly increase equity issue 
                                                          
54 MM estimation is a combination of high breakdown value estimation and efficient estimation (M estimation) 
introduced by Yohai and Zamar (1987). 
55 For instance, the percentage of outliers excluded in Panel B of Table 4.2 is only 0.98% (= (114,970 -
113,835)/114,970). 
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before rating upgrades. In contrast, the ‘bad’ issuers significantly increase debt 
issue but do not adjust equity issue before rating downgrades. 
To summarize the issuers’ behaviours before DCRCs, ‘good’ issuers and ‘bad’ 
issuers commence to modify financing plan at least one quarter before rating 
change news is disclosed by rating agencies. The result strongly supports the test 
results of Hypothesis 3.1 and Hypothesis 3.2 in Chapter III. 
Panel C and D of Table 4.4 show the results of the first and second quarter 
after DCRCs, respectively. Column 1, Panel C shows that the coefficient on 
upgrade is 0.0016 and significant at the 10% level while the coefficient on 
downgrade is not significant when testing DCRC’s effects on net debt issue. These 
estimates imply that ‘good’ issuers slightly increase net debt issuance one quarter 
after DCRC while ‘bad’ issuers do not adjust the net debt issue. Panel D shows that 
the coefficient on upgrade is insignificant while that on downgrade is negative and 
significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of ‘bad’ issuers on debt issue is also 
negative and significant at the 1% level. These results indicate that ‘bad’ issuers 
decrease debt issue two quarters after rating downgrades. In brief, the results of 
outliers-cut regressions show that outliers do not contaminate the overall results.  
4.3.4 Time and Industry Effects 
To test the time and industry effects, the mixed linear model is evaluated in this 
section (Random coefficient model (ML) is applied in SAS). It is a generalization 
of the standard linear model used in the GLM procedure and also provides the 
flexibility of modelling not only the means of data (as in the standard linear model) 
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but also their variances and covariances. The model could be briefly summarized as 
follows: 
-N  O!"OBC " O#BC "P%&'(Q)* " " #9 " +N (4.5a) 
5N  R!"RBC " R#BC " S%&'(Q)* " " #9 " +N (4.5b) 
8N  T!"TBC " T#BC " U%&'(Q)* " " #9 " +N (4.5c) 
(V =-1, 0, 2, 3)  
wherek #l, k  #l and k #l  are unknown vectors of random-
effects parameters with known time and SIC (the indicator of industry), whose 
effects are assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and some unknown 
variances. +"V is an unknown random error vector whose elements are no longer 
required to be independent and homogeneous as that in OLS regressions.  
The panel data sample consists of 104 quarters and 369 industries (by 4-digit 
SIC code). Both the time and industry are assumed to cause the random variability 
in this study. Table 4.556 reports the results of the mixed linear model, which gives 
the time and industry effects. The results mainly show two features. Firstly, the test 
results listed in Panel B of Table 4.5 show that the coefficient estimates are close to 
those gained from OLS tests in the previous chapter for the period, one quarter 
before DCRC. This indicates that the OLS test results are robust in the quarter. 
Secondly, the covariance parameters indicate the random effects from the two 
dimensions. Comparing the variances of random time effects and variances of 
random industry effects, the variances of residuals are generally hundreds or 
                                                          
56 The PROC MIXED command in SAS applied to the mixed linear model estimation does not report R square. 
The firm effects are not tested here since there are 10,298 individual firms and the programme could not gain 
the results. 
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thousands times higher in the four panels. This indicates that the time and industry 
variation effects are not significant. 
[Insert Table 4.5 here] 
In particular, the results in Panel B of Table 4.5 show that ‘bad’ issuers 
increase net debt issuance before DCRC by 0.91% at the 10% level while ‘good’ 
issuers do not show significantly adjust net debt issuance one quarter before 
DCRCs. Panel A of Table 4.5 lists the result in the two quarters before DCRCs and 
the results show that neither the ‘good’ issuers nor the ‘bad’ issuers increases net 
debt issuances significantly.   
Panel C of Table 4.5 indicates that ‘good’ issuers moderately increase their net 
debt issuance while ‘bad’ issuers do not show significant behaviour on adjusting 
financing in the first quarter after DCRCs. The results show ‘good’ issuers’ 
insignificant adjustment on financing and ‘bad’ issuers’ decrease of net debt 
issuance in the second quarter after DCRCs as reported in Panel D of Table 4.5. 
The results of the last two quarters are consistent with those in the previous chapter 
after excluding outliers.  
The results of the mixed linear model imply issuers demonstrate similar 
behaviour with those in OLS regressions conducted in Chapter III. Furthermore, the 
relatively small variances of time and industry indicate that both time and industry 
effects are very small in the four panels. Overall, the results of estimation of the 
mixed linear model imply that issuers’ behaviours are consistent with that indicated 
by the results gained from the OLS regressions one quarter before DCRCs. The 
time and industry do not show significant variances.   
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4.4 DCRCs in the Context of Existing Capital Structure 
Theories 
So far, the evidence reported in the previous sections strongly support the 
hypotheses that DCRCs have considerable significant effects on issuer’s financing 
behaviours, however, this does not appear to be fully explained by traditional 
capital structure theories. In this section, tests are conducted to evaluate whether the 
DCRC’s effects investigated in the previous sections could be explained by existing 
capital structure theories and whether DCRC adds extra explanatory power to the 
existing theories of capital structure when it is nested into previous capital structure 
theory tests.  
‘There is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice and no reason to expect 
one’ (Myers (2001)). The three classical capital structure theories, however, are 
conditionally useful to explain manager’s financing strategies and tactics in 
different circumstances. For example, the Trade-off Theory indicates that firms seek 
the optimal debt level which balances the tax advantages of additional debt against 
the cost of possible financial distress and thus predicts reversion of the actual debt 
ratio to its target. Particularly designed for inefficient market with the market 
imperfection of information asymmetry, the Pecking Order Theory states that given 
insufficient internal cash flow to fund growth opportunity, the firm follows a 
hierarchy ranking of financing sources: from internal (less risky) to external (riskier) 
funds. The Market Timing Theory states that ‘capital structure evolves as the 
cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market’ (Baker and Wurgler 
(2002)). It indicates that firms prefer external equity when the cost of equity is low, 
Chapter IV The Robustness of the Explanatory Power of Delayed Credit Rating Changes  
 
126 
 
and otherwise prefer debt. Taking the warning of Myers (2001) that ‘the words 
consistent with are particularly dangerous in the branch of empirical financial 
economics’, this section takes the efforts to imbed the DCRC assumption with 
various theories in capital structure, which may help to comprehensively explain 
different aspects of DCRC’s influence on financing decisions. 
4.4.1 The Trade-off Theory 
To carry on the empirical regression testing the Trade-off Theory, Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999) (SSM henceforth) are employed to test whether managers seek 
optimal leverage and revert back to the target leverage when it flows away from the 
optimal level. Replicating SSM and referring to the test in Kisgen (2006), which 
incorporates credit rating factor into traditional capital structure tests, =:3  is 
defined as the optimal target long-term debt level for firm i. Two models below are 
estimated: (4.6a) tests the Trade-off Theory while (4.6b) nests DCRC into the 
theory’s test.  
:-  @ " J k=:3  :-)l4)# " + (4.6a) 
:-  @"-BC " -#BC " J k=:3  :-)l4)# " + (4.6b) 
where :- is the long-term debt issuance normalized by total asset for firm i at 
time t. :-  is the book value of long-term debt firm i at time t. Due to the 
unobservable=:3, the historical mean of the debt ratio for each firm is set as the 
proxy of the optimal target debt ratio (Targgart (1977)) according to the 
predominate approach, such as that used in SSM57. The null hypothesis to be tested 
                                                          
57 As Myers et al. (1998) mentioned that ‘a proportion of debt to equity that management aims to achieve, if not 
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is b>0 indicating adjustments towards the target debt level, and b<1 indicating 
positive adjustment costs. If trade-off theory is correct and DCRC does not function, 
the coefficient 0<b<1 while -  and -#  are both expected to be 0. DCRC 
assumption implies that ‘good’ issuers anticipating future rating upgrades may be 
more inclined to disclose their positive perspective to the market and thus keep net 
debt issuance unchanged. In contrast, ‘bad’ issuers facing downgrades in the next 
period intend to give the priority to the low cost of capital financing. The 
predictions in regression (4.6a) and (4.6b) thus are: - is not significant while -# is 
positive and significant.  
The regressions (4.6a) and (4.6b) are tested with the same sample from the 
previous chapter, excluding financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and utility firms (SIC 
4000-4999). Column 1, Panel A of Table 4.6 shows the results of (4.6a) testing only 
the Trade-off Theory without nesting DCRCs, it obtains an insignificant b. Column 
2, Panel A of Table 4.6 provides results of regression (4.6b) nesting DCRC dummy 
variables into the trade-off tests. It shows that the effect of delayed rating upgrade 
remains insignificant and that of delayed rating downgrades are positive on long-
term debt issue and statistically significant at the 1% level as predicted. These 
results imply the same features of financing adjustments gained in the previous 
chapter. The target adjustment coefficient, b, is insignificant with t-statistic of 0.39. 
The insignificant b in the two tests reported in Panel A of Table 4.6 does not 
support the DCRC assumption in the context of trade-off theory.  
[Insert Table 4.6 here] 
                                                                                                                                                                  
at all times, then at least as a long-run average’ , the long-term average of debt to asset ratio is thus considered 
as the target level.  
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This is in accordance to Professor Stewart Myers’s statement ‘Stop searching 
for optimal capital structure’ recorded in Myers et al. (1998). Literature and surveys 
provide also give some clues. For instance, Myers (1984) questions the trade-off 
story since debt ratios vary widely across similar firms and the study argues that 
debt ratio ‘targets depend on factors not yet recognized or understood’. Graham and 
Harvey (2001)’s survey shows that firms only aim at ‘soft’ leverage targets rather 
than rigid levels.  
Panel B of Table 4.6 shows the estimated results of the regression (4.7), which 
investigates the trade-off effects in the other three quarters around DCRCs 
announcements. The target adjustment coefficients, b, are not significant in all four 
periods around DCRCs58. The results in Panel B do not imply the appearance of 
trade-off effects when nesting DCRCs but still show strong support of DCRC’s 
effects on financing adjustments since the coefficients on rating dummies are 
significant in the quarters around DCRCs. 
:-N  @"-BC " -#BC " J k=:3  :3N)l4N)# " +N (4.7) 
(V =-1, 0, 2, 3)  
One of the vital reasons for DCRC’s assumed incompatibility with the Trade-
off Theory could be that the theory retains the assumptions of market efficiency and 
symmetric information, although it includes various imperfections which are not 
considered in Modigliani and Miller (1958). The DCRC assumption test, however, 
is fundamentally based on the condition of information asymmetry. It thus may not 
fit in well with a theory based on market perfections. 
                                                          
58 The result of the test when V =0 is the same with that in Column 2, Panel A of Table 4.6. The test examines 
the effect one quarter before DCRC. 
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4.4.2 The Pecking Order Theory 
The study in the previous chapter shows that ‘good’ issuers tend to break the 
hierarchy suggested in the Pecking Order Theory while ‘bad’ issuers seem to 
follow the order around the periods of rating changes. Some distinguished literature 
argues that firms appear more likely to follow the pecking order’s financing 
hierarchy when information asymmetry is high, where the adverse selection could 
be more severe (Myers and Majluf (1984), and Bharath, Pasquariello and Wu 
(2009)).  
Proceeding as before, replicating SSM regression for the Pecking Order 
Theory, which tests whether firms issue debt when internal cash flows are 
inadequate for investment and dividend commitments. Deficit in funds DEF is 
introduced in the regression and defined as the sum of dividend payments, capital 
expenditures, net increase in working capital and the current portion of long-term 
debt less operating cash flows, after interest and taxes (Kisgen (2006)). 
Incorporating rating change indicators, SSM tests are modified as below:  
:-  @ " J37i4) " + (4.8a) 
:-N  @"EBC " E#BC " J37iN4N) " + (4.8b) 
(V  -1, 0 , 2, 3)  
The Pecking Order Theory requires that all externally financed funds fill the 
deficit gap, which implies that b is close to 1 and a equals to 0. The lower the value 
of b is, the smaller the information asymmetry. The DCRC assumption implies that 
E is not significant while E# is positive and significant one period before DCRCs 
(V  0). If the pecking order model is correct and DCRC does not have effects on 
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issuers’ financing,  E and E# should be equal to 0. The equations are tested with 
the sample of firms from the previous chapter, additionally excluding firm-quarters 
whose DEF are missing. 
Column 1, Panel A of Table 4.7 shows the estimate results of equation (4.8a) 
testing a pure pecking order model without nesting DCRCs. The coefficient on the 
deficit DEF is 0.0034 and is significant at 10% level (t=14.81). This value is much 
smaller than the 0.75 coefficient found in SSM and 0.28 in Frank and Goyal (2003). 
However, its significance suggests that the Pecking Order Theory could stand 
weakly with the sample in the study and when DCRCs are nested. Both Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) employ firm-year data while 
this study applies firm-quarter data. The longer periods examined in literatures may 
cause more significant changes of debt issue over the whole financial year, thus 
derive a higher b. Also, this study applies the most recent data ending Q4 2010, 
when the information asymmetry has been decreasing gradually throughout the 26 
year peirod. Appendix 5 reports the changes in every five years periods, which 
shows the decreasing estimates of b in regression (4.8b): from 0.2089 to 0.0050. 
However, the five coefficients are all significant at the 1% level. The result 
indicates that information asymmetry is significant throughout the past decades, 
however, it is likely to be less severe in the sample years. 
[Insert Table 4.7 here] 
Column 2, Panel A of Table 4.7 shows the results including both the DCRC 
dummy variables and the DEF term (equation (4.8b) when V  0). This test provides 
statistical significance for the dummy variable BC  and the predicted sign. This 
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indicates that the DCRC has added power in the pecking order test. The coefficient 
on DEF remains the same as that in Column 1, indicating that pecking order 
remains with DCRC effects.  
Panel B of Table 4.7 shows the regressions for the rest of the three periods 
around DCRCs (when V  -1, 2, 3). The coefficients of the deficit DEF are all 
positive and significant in the three periods when nesting DCRCs. The coefficient 
estimate is 0.0050 with t-statistic of 17.51 in the period two quarters before DCRC. 
The coefficient estimates are both 0.0002 with t-statistic of 2.33 in the two quarters 
after DCRC. This means that long-term debt issue is positively related to the firm’s 
financial deficit. The deficit always motivates issuers to borrow more in general 
though the scale of borrowing significantly decreases after rating changes. The 
coefficients on rating dummies show features similar to those in previous sections. 
These results partly support DCRC in the context of the pecking order theory. 
It should be noted that none of the pecking order coefficients is close to 1. 
These results imply that pecking order only partly stands when nesting DCRCs in 
the four periods. Credit rating changes are not exogenous (Kisgen (2009)). Ang and 
Cheng (2011) argue that firms could choose to mitigate information asymmetry 
endogenously via superior communication, therefore alleviate information costs 
and constraints on financing decisions. This could be one of the reasons explaining 
the partial fail of pecking order hypothesis when information asymmetry is not 
significant. The self-controlled information release style particularly benefits the 
‘good’ issuers, who are more likely to choose to release information 
comprehensively and swiftly to rators. In contrast, ‘bad’ issuers may accrue 
substantial rewards for exaggerating positive qualities (Leland and Pyle (1977)). 
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They follow the hierarchy because the asymmetric information plays an important 
role for their financing. They are thus strongly motivated to hold back bad news 
from public investors and rators and take advantage of the information asymmetry 
before downgrades are released by rators in the next period. Secondly, ‘good’ 
issuers’ attempts to issue debt is prevented by the cost from possible further 
delayed release of upgrade news and the cost of more expensive debt, they thus 
contradict the pecking order. An explanation looking at the other method of 
financing, equity financing, is given by Fulghieri and Lukin (2001), which shows 
that equity, the more information-sensitive security, is more likely to be issued by a 
firm wishing to raise funds for an investment project if the cost of producing 
information is relatively low.  
Panel B of Appendix 5 shows the evidence by filtering the test sample into 
three different types of DCRCs. The coefficient on DEF for ‘bad’ issuers 
(BC =1) is significant and is the highest (0.44) among the three DEF estimates 
for the three subsamples (the other two samples are BC =1 and no rating 
changes, i.e., BC =BC =0). The results indicate that ‘good’ issuers do not 
follow pecking order while ‘bad’ issuers follow it. 
4.4.3 The Market Timing Theory 
Market timing appears to be an important aspect of real financial policy and in 
recent studies (Baker and Wurgler (2002)) is shown to cause substantial and 
persistent effects on capital structure. The importance and function of equity market 
timing are admitted by managers in Graham and Harvey’s (2001) anonymous 
survey. Jenter, Lewellen and Warner (2011) find that managers successfully time 
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the market. Managers have the incentive to time the market if they think it is 
possible to achieve and if they care more about their current shareholders than 
about prospective and exiting ones. They generally choose to issue equity when the 
market value is high relative to its fair value59. Also, the previous regression results 
testing DCRCs’ effects on issuers’ financing plans around the periods of rating 
changes show that issuers do time the market to issue securities in order to balance 
costs and benefits. 
To determine whether the DCRC hypotheses persist in the context of Market 
Timing Theory, the modified regression (4.9a) of the regression created in Baker 
and Wurgler (2002) (BW henceforth) are designed by nesting DCRC hypotheses60 
into the market timing tests. BW tests hypothesize that market-to-book ratio may be 
related to investment opportunities61 and market mispricing, and is thus the main 
determinant of changes in leverage. Specifically, high investment opportunities 
tend to push leverage toward to a higher debt capacity (Baker and Wurgler (2002)). 
The Market Timing Theory detects the significant influence of market-to-book ratio 
on change in leverage, which indicates the timing of firms’ market behaviour. 
Equation (4.9a) regresses the change in leverage against the DCRC dummies 
and the main focus market-to-book ratio, as well as against a set of benchmark 
control variables. To examine which factors drive the leverage change effect, as the 
market timing theory implies, the equation (4.9b) decomposes the change in 
leverage into three components: equity issuance as the percentage of total asset 
                                                          
59 Graham and Harvey (2001) find that two-thirds of CFOs agree that ‘the amount by which our stock is 
undervalued or overvalued was an important or very important consideration’ in issuing equity. 
60  Baker and Wurgler (2002) adopt daily and yearly data in the tests while here quarterly data is used.  
61  The Pecking Order Theory regards the market-to-book ratio as a measure of investment opportunities (Baker 
and Wurgler (2002)). 
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6./
0./ , changes in retained earnings as the percentage of total asset 
./
0./  and 
the residual change in leverage 7N)  0./  0./12 . Each of the three 
components in equation (4.9b) are employed as dependent variables, which 
regresses against the rating dummies and market-to-book ratio as well as other 
independent variables to determine whether market-to-book ratio has an effect 
through any of these three components. 
KD@EN  f!"fBC " f#BC " g%&'(Q)* " + (4.9a) 
( V = -1, 0, 2, 3)  
KD@EN  3N4N 
3N)4N)  
7N4N 
7N)4N)
 7N4N 
@88EN4N  7N) 


4N 


4N)
(4.9b) 
 
( V = -1, 0, 2, 3)  
where 7N is the equity issuance of firm i at time  " V KD@EN is the 
leverage differences between the period of  " V and  " V  
. @88ENis 
the retained earnings differences between the period of  " V  and  " V  
 
7N) is the stockholders’ equity for firm i at time  " V  
 The main focus, the 
market-to-book ratio, is included in the control variable vector &'(Q)* and notified 
as EN) in this study.  
Panel A of Table 4.8 shows the results of regression (4.9a). The effects of 
market-to-book ratio on annual changes in book leverage are significant and 
negative in the two periods before rating change is announced. A one unit increase 
in market-to-book ratio is associated with around 0.014% decrease in leverage. The 
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effects are insignificant after DCRCs, which is discussed in much more detail after 
the market-to-book ratio is subjected to the three regression tests in which the 
leverage components have been decomposed in (4.9b). 
[Insert Table 4.8 here] 
The signs and significances of coefficients on control variables are in 
accordance with Baker and Wurgler (2002)’s results. Panel A of Table 4.8 lists the 
test results of equation (4.9a). Size and tangibility tend to increase leverages while 
profit tends to reduce leverage. In addition, the degrees of influences seem higher 
before DCRCs than those after DCRCs in all control variables. For instance, one 
unit increase on profit decreases leverage 1.08% and 1.10% in two-period and one-
period before DCRCs respectively, but only 0.56% and 0.57% correspondingly 
after DCRCs. 
The results shown in the other three panels in Table 4.8, Panel B, C and D, 
suggest that the market-to-book ratio affects the change in leverage through all 
three components throughout the periods around rating change quarters. Panel B of 
Table 4.8 shows that higher market-to-book ratio is associated with higher equity 
issue, confirming the idea that firms increase equity when the market valuation is 
high as that in Marsh (1982) and Baker and Wurgler (2002). Panel C and Panel D 
of Table 4.8 show that market-to-book ratios are negatively related to both newly 
retained earnings and the residual change in leverage. The effects of market-to-
book ratio on retained earnings are significantly increased from 5.995% and 6.119% 
before DCRCs to 6.379% after DCRCs to one unit market-to-book ratio decrease. 
The effects of the ratio to the residual change in leverage decrease from two 
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quarters before DCRCs to two quarters after DCRCs, nevertheless, the effects keep 
negative.  
Summarising the results in the four panels in Table 4.8, the market-to-book 
ratio effects on leverage change are only significant before DCRC but not 
afterwards after combining the three components, which have the trade-off effects 
among them. 
In addition, the other major concern in this test is the DCRC’s added power to 
the Market Timing Theory. According to the significance of coefficient estimates, 
DCRC has the added explanatory power to the change in leverage and net equity 
issuance in the tests presented in Panel A and B of Table 4.8, relatively. The signs 
of DCRCs is rational and consistent with what was explored earlier: financing 
adjustments one period before delayed upgrades derive a significant leverage drop 
and adjustments around delayed downgrades, associated with other factors, cause a 
leverage increase in the four periods around DCRC. However, as shown in Panel C 
and D of Table 4.8, DCRC does not show added explanatory power in these two 
panels. Overall, the results in the four panels of Table 4.8 support the stand of the 
Market Timing Theory when nesting DCRCs in the tests. 
4.4.4 Other Existing Theories 
Apart from the classic capital structure theories, Ross (1977)’s signalling 
equilibrium and the Free Cash Flow Theory, for instance, are also shed lights on 
capital structure study. Ross (1977) shows that only high quality firms can afford 
the risk from increasing debt levels. This traditional Signalling Theory does not 
seem to apply in this study since delayed credit rating upgrades may increase the 
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cost of signalling for ‘good’ issuers. Flannery (1996) argues that ‘the existence of a 
signalling equilibrium is shown to depend on the (exogenous) distribution of firms’ 
quality and the magnitude of underwriting costs for corporate debt’. Issuers may 
choose to signal in a more affordable way 62 , for instance, signalling through 
quarterly earnings announcements or the presentation of financial statement, as 
introduced in Riedl and Srinivasan (2010).   
The Free Cash Flow Theory, designed for mature firms which are prone to 
overinvest, says that dangerous high debt levels will increase value, despite the 
threat of financial distress, when a firm’s operating cash flow significantly exceeds 
its profitable investment opportunities. Since it is not a theory predicting how  
managers will choose capital structures, but a theory about the consequences of 
high debt ratios (Myers (2001)), thus no efforts are made to discuss the results in 
this study in the context of the Free Cash Flow Theory.   
In summary, a range of evidence and theories have shown the fact that 
information asymmetry driven by delayed rating change affects firms’ financing 
strategies and tactics. The results are explained most naturally by the capital 
structure theories which consider the influences of information asymmetry, 
although other interpretations cannot be completely ruled out. In addition, the 
significant coefficients on rating changes show that DCRC has additional values on 
explaining financing adjustment when it is imbedded into the tests examining 
existing capital structure theories. 
                                                          
62 Firms provide disclosure through regulated financial reports. Some firms engage in voluntary communication: 
management forecasts, analysts’ presentations and conference calls, press releases, internet sites, and other 
corporate reports. In addition, there are disclosures about firms by information intermediaries, such as financial 
analysts, industry experts and the financial press. (Healy and Palepu (2001)). 
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4.5 Discussions and Conclusions 
This chapter examines the robustness of the influences of delayed credit rating 
changes (DCRCs) on financing adjustments in the North American market from Q1 
1985 to Q4 2010. By performing a number of robust regressions, the study shows 
strong evidence that the DCRCs’ effect is significant and robust to influence issuers’ 
financing policies.  
In addition, DCRC assumption is incorporated into the traditional capital 
structure theories and evidence derived from tests suggest that DCRC assumption 
has added explanatory power to the existing theories on issuers’ financing 
adjustments. However, not all the phenomena found under DCRC assumption can 
be explained by the existing theories. Since the DCRC assumption test is 
fundamentally based on the condition of information asymmetry, it fits better with 
the Pecking Order Theory and the Market Timing Theory. However, it is 
incompatible with the Trade-off Theory since the latter retains the assumptions of 
market efficiency and symmetric information though it adds various imperfections 
such as taxes, financial distress and agency costs (Baker and Wugeler (2002)). This 
study believes that the most realistic and plausible explanation for the financing 
adjustments before rating change announcements is the effects of DCRCs, which 
create an information gap window between issuers and outsiders. 
In summary, a range of evidence and theories have shown the fact that the 
effect of information asymmetry from delayed rating changes influences firms’ 
financing strategy and tactics. There is little doubt that the results are most 
plausibly explained by the theories which consider the influence of information 
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asymmetry63, although other interpretations cannot be completely ruled out. While 
shedding light on how DCRC, the factor driven information asymmetry, affects 
issuers’ financing, the study in this chapter also raises new questions: Do financing 
adjustment bring material outcomes to issuers? Do issuers gain benefits through 
issuing debt or equity before DCRC announced by rating agencies? Which 
measures of firm performance would managers aim to improve? To what extent 
would the firm performance be improved? Efforts on answering these questions are 
made in the next chapter.  
                                                          
63 The Pecking Order Theory has been considered the theory for explaining firms’ financing behaviours under 
asymmetric information conditions in recent studies, for example, Leary and Roberts (2010), have partially 
broken it by stating that pecking order is due to incentive conflicts rather than to information asymmetry. 
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Figure 4.1 Histogram for standardised residuals of the regression.  
 
The full data sample has a 0.3077 Kolmogorov-Smirnov D statistic, a 3665.89 Cramér-von Mises 
W² statistic and a 18332.265 Anderson-Darling A² statistic.   
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Table 4. 1 Summary statistics 
The sample is drawn from quarterly Compustat data, excluding financial firms and utility firms and firm-
quarters with negative equity values during the period Q1 1985 - Q4 2010. It lists summary statistics of 
dependant variables and control variables in the tests. - is defined as long-term debt issuance minus 
long-term debt reduction plus changes in current debt and normalised by firms’ total assets. 5 is defined 
as sale of common and preferred stock minus purchases of common and preferred stock and normalized by 
firms’ total assets. 8 is the defined as - minus 5. Other control variable definitions are Leverage: 
ratio of the sum of short-term debt (Sd) and long-term debt (Ld) to the sum of short-term debt, long-term 
debt, and stockholders' equity. Size: logarithm of sales. Price: logarithm of the close price of the quarter. 
Liquidity: ratio of cash and cash equivalent divided (normalised) by total assets. Profit: ratio of 
EBITDA to total assets. Dividends: ratio of dividends to total assets. Earnings: ratio of retained earnings to 
total assets. Growth: total debt book value plus quarterly close price multiplied by outstanding common 
stock shares and normalised by total assets. Tangibility: ratio of property plant and equipment (Net) to total 
assets. NDTS: ratio of deferred taxes and investment tax credit to total assets. DEF: the book value of long-
term debt. KD@E : the gap of leverage between two continuous periods. @88E : the gap of 
earnings between two continuous periods. 
Variables  N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum -  125,805 0.006 0.000 0.086 -1.414 11.164 5  229,674 0.014 0.000 0.161 -1.795 17.584 8  114,970 -0.010 -0.002 0.200 -17.584 11.164 9-  134,263 0.002 0.000 0.049 -1.414 3.885 :-  230,587 0.005 0.000 0.088 -3.876 11.164 
Leverage  114,970 0.226 0.160 0.240 0.000 1.000 
Size  114,970 3.280 3.266 2.520 -6.908 11.730 
Price  114,970 1.953 2.183 1.529 -7.419 11.523 
Liquidity  114,970 0.197 0.102 0.225 -0.034 1.000 
Profit  114,970 0.007 0.024 0.224 -59.926 13.207 
Dividends  114,970 0.007 0.000 0.037 -0.012 3.700 
Earnings  114,970 -0.653 0.141 9.344 -2624.430 2.337 
Growth  114,970 1.957 1.167 8.760 0.001 2370.330 
Tangibility  114,970 0.258 0.191 0.227 0.000 1.000 
NDTS  114,970 0.018 0.000 0.033 -0.013 0.692 
DEF  282,199 -1.988 0.021 304.833 -23648.000 30093.000 KD@E  466,186 0.003 0.000 0.071 -0.984 0.995 @88E  443,447 0.090 0.001 47.490 -0.000 0.000 
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Table 4. 6 Tests of the Trade-off Theory nested with delayed credit rating changes 
Values of estimated coefficients and their t-statistic for nonfinancial firms from the regression below.  
:-N  @"-BC " -#BC " J k=:3  :3N)l4N)# " +N (4.7) 
(V =-1, 0, 2, 3) 
 
Estimated parameters on rating indicators describe influences of delayed rating changes on price 
changes in the period of rating changes and in the periods after rating changes. The numbers in brackets 
underneath coefficient estimates are t-statistic. Rating changes take places at quarter t+1. 0<b<1 if the 
Trade-off Theory stands. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
  
Panel A 
Nesting DCRCs when V = 0 
 Panel B 
Trade-off effects around DCRCs 
 
Without rating 
change 
indicators 
With rating 
change 
indicators 
 
V = -1 V = 0 V = 2 V = 3 
Intercept  
0.0055*** 0.0050***  0.1253 0.0050*** 0.0049** 0.0051*** 
(a)  
(6.94) (6.27)  (0.81) (6.27) (6.41) (6.57) 
BC   -0.0013  -0.0519 -0.0013 0.0024 0.0008 
  
 (-0.16)  (-0.03) (-0.16) (0.30) (0.12) 
BC   0.0343***  0.1584 0.0343*** 0.0159** 0.0059 
  
 (5.12)  (0.12) (5.12) (2.46) (0.96) 
=:3  :3N)  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(b)  
(0.39) (0.39)  (0.01) (0.39) (-0.77) (-0.77) 
Adj R-square  0.0000 0.0001 
 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
N  282,364 282,364 
 279,888 282,364 282,314 282,314 
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Table 4. 7 Tests of the Pecking Order Theory nested with delayed credit rating changes 
Values of estimated coefficients and their t-statistic for nonfinancial firms from the regressions below:  
:-  @ " J37i4) " + (4.8a) 
:-N  @"EBC " E#BC " J37iN4N) " + (4.8b) 
(V  -1, 0 , 2, 3) 
 
Estimated parameters on rating indicators describe influences of delayed rating changes on price 
changes in the period of rating changes and in the periods after rating changes. The numbers in 
brackets underneath coefficient estimates are t-statistic. Rating changes take places at quarter t+1. 
a=0 and b=1 if the pecking order theory stands. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
Panel A 
Pecking order effects 
 Panel B  
Pecking order time effects around DCRCs 
  
Without 
rating change 
indicators 
(equation 
4.8a) 
With rating 
change 
indicators 
(equation 
4.8b) 
 V = -1 V = 0 V = 2 V = 3 
Intercept  
0.0051*** 0.0047***  0.0050** 0.0047*** 0.0053*** 0.0055*** 
(a)  
(6.50) (5.88)  (6.04) (5.88) (14.72) (15.29) 
BC   -0.0037  -0.0005 -0.0037 0.0008 -0.0006 
  
 (-0.46)  (-0.06) (-0.46) (0.23) (-0.15) 
BC   0.0340***  0.0059 0.0340*** 0.0162*** 0.0018 
  
 (5.04)  (0.85) (5.04) (5.23) (0.58) 
37iN  0.0034*** 0.0034***  0.0050** 0.0034*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
(b)  
(14.80) (14.81)  (17.51) (14.81) (2.33) (2.33) 
Adj R-square  
0.0008 0.0001  0.0011 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
N  
282,199 282,199  281,261 282,199 281,950 281,950 
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5.1 Introduction 
In the previous two empirical chapters, DCRCs’ effects on issuers’ capital structure 
before the rating changes have been affirmed, which supports the hypotheses that 
delayed change of credit rating exists on the financial market and brings material 
influences to market insiders who possess superior information about delayed credit 
rating changes. Based upon and further developed by the research focuses, the 
influence of information asymmetry window opened by DCRCs may function 
further on the firm performance. Research development upon DCRCs’ material 
outcomes in the previous chapters can also be confirmed by extending the 
transmission mechanism from DCRC to capital structure and further to firm 
performance. 
This chapter investigates the changes in firm performance around delayed 
credit rating changes to assess the latter’s role as a driven factor of information 
asymmetry. As demonstrated in the previous chapters, firms are motivated to adjust 
their financings before DCRCs when they possess private information to forecast 
rating changes accurately. Therefore, more specifically, this study tests whether and 
when the change in firm performance happens due to the direct effect of financing 
adjustment, which is driven by the DCRC created information asymmetry window. 
This can be achieved by designing and evaluating simultaneous equation systems. 
The issue of links between information asymmetry and firm performance has 
been discussed and well documented in the relevant literature. Capital structure, the 
mainly considered intermediate factor between information asymmetry and firm 
performance, is under the shadow of many financial imperfections, one of which 
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originates from the conflicts between managers and firm’s shareholders. Firm’s 
choice of financing is one of the decision makings which have long been concerned 
by economists due to the incentive problem which arises from the fact that 
managers are not firms’ security holders (Fama (1980)). Bhagat and Bolton (2008) 
summarise the reasons of the influence of agency problem over financing policy. 
Firstly, managers owning stock and stock options of the firm have their human 
capital tied to the firm (Fama (1980)). They may not choose the optimal capital 
structure when the benefit from choosing other level of leverage ratio is 
overwhelmed. For instance, Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) both argue 
that managers may decrease the issuance of equity in order to increase the voting 
power of their equity stakes, and reduce the likelihood of a takeover and its 
resulting possible job loss. Secondly, as suggested by Jensen (1986), a larger level 
of debt pre-commits the manager to work harder to generate and pay off the firm’s 
cash flows to outside investors. High debt ratio is believed to reduce the agency 
cost of outsider equity. 
On contrary, debt has opposite effect on firm performance since agency costs 
can also appear due to conflicts between debt holders and shareholders. These 
conflicts arise when the leverage becomes relatively high and therefore induces a 
risk of default, which may create what Myers (1977) referred to as an 
‘underinvestment’ or ‘debt overhang’ problem. Overall, the previous studies predict 
that debt will have both positive and negative effect on firm performance. This 
study expects the impact of leverage on firm performance to be positive. 
The source of information asymmetry is generally the superior knowledge that 
managers have but investors don’t (Copeland, Weston and Shastri (2004)). In 
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financial markets, borrowers cannot be expected to disclose their firms’ 
characteristics entirely to the outsiders since there may be substantial rewards for 
exaggerating positive qualities (Leland and Pyle (1977)). Healy and Palepu (2001) 
claim that the disclosure of information by management can be voluntary within 
regulations’ allowed range, which indicates that firm managers may choose to 
convey favourable information to the market but hide unfavourable information. 
The recent study Tang (2009) extends the research to the credit market through a 
specific event, Moody’s credit rating format refinement in 1982. The research 
believes that firms’ financing and investment decisions are affected by information 
asymmetry in the credit market since the latter significantly affects firms’ real 
outcomes. So far, the information asymmetry has been concretised as the 
information of credit rating changes.  
The delayed credit rating change is considered as the main source of 
asymmetric information between insiders and the market in this chapter. Rating 
agencies and their publicly announced ratings were originally in demand for 
uncovering managers’ superior information (Healy and Palepu (2001)), thus 
bridging the information gaps between insiders and outsiders in the financial 
market. However, delayed updates in credit ratings by rating agencies have drawn 
the attention of market participants, especially following the significant episodes of 
Enron 64 , WorldCom and Lehman Brothers. DCRCs cause the information 
asymmetry between issuers and the market since the former, as insiders, are able to 
forecast their rating changes earlier while the latter cannot, due to the lack of 
                                                          
64 For example, on 20th March, 2002 the US Senate Committee held a hearing seeking to elicit information on 
why the credit rating agencies continued to give Enron a good credit rating until four days before the firm 
declared bankruptcy. The hearing report, entitled ‘Rating the Raters: Enron and the Credit Rating Agencies’, 
documents that: ‘‘in the case of Enron, credit rating agencies displayed a lack of diligence in their coverage and 
assessment of Enron.’’ 
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issuer’s privileged information. The information asymmetry on future rating 
changes existing between issuers and market outsiders, gives issuers both 
motivation and opportunity to take advantage of their superior information by 
adjusting their financing if they can gain benefits from the process. In particular, 
this study hypothesizes that firms are likely to improve their firms’ performance by 
utilising their privileged and advantageous information on future rating changes 
which market outsiders do not have. 
This study constructs simultaneous equation systems to test whether issuers 
would adjust their financing before DCRCs taking place, leading them to gain 
benefits reflected in the improved firm performances. The data sample in the tests 
includes Compustat financial data and the Standard & Poor’s rating data between 
Q1 1985 and Q4 2010. The evidence shows that issuers significantly adjust their 
debt and equity financing one quarter before DCRCs and the adjustment actions 
improve their firm performances.  
The primary finding of this chapter is that issuers do improve their firm 
performance through their financing adjustment before DCRCs. In particular, the 
test results indicate that ROA in the quarter of DCRC increases by 0.0239% for 
‘bad’ issuers who anticipate future rating downgrade and who increase net debt 
issuance by 1.250% before downgrade news is announced. EPS in the quarter of 
DCRC increases by 1.805% for ‘bad’ issuers who increase net debt issuance by 
1.245% before downgrade. Tobin’s Q in the quarter of DCRC decreases but only at 
the 10% confidence level. However, ‘bad’ issuers gain increase of Tobin’s Q one 
quarter after DCRC through debt financing while ‘good’ issuers gain this benefit 
through their equity financing. 
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The theoretical and empirical evidence explains the testable benefits of issuers’ 
financing adjustment behaviours on firm performance. The direct effect of leverage 
on firm performance is stipulated by Jensen and Meckling (1976), in which the 
agency cost is addressed as the linking factor. An early study Leland and Pyle 
(1977) investigates that lack of precise and timely information transfer may cause 
poor performance of the market. As observed in Chapter III, an issuer who could 
anticipate next-quarter rating changes would take advantage in cheaper financing 
and thus adjust the choice of financing methods (Myers and Majluf (1984)). A 
recent study argues that leverage adjustment influences agency cost, and hence firm 
performance (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006)). The test results in this chapter 
show that ‘bad’ issuers gain improvement in firm performance through debt 
financing. This is in accordance to the findings in very recent studies by Korteweg 
(2010) and van Binsbergen, Graham and Yang (2010) who demonstrate benefits of 
debt financing when it can trade-off financing costs. 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 sets up the assumptions 
and testable hypotheses. Section 5.3 discusses the methodology and data. Section 
5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 describe estimation results for each of the three firm performance 
measures. Section 5.7 shows the impacts of long-term debt and short-term debt 
financing on firm performance. Section 5.8 concludes.  
5.2 Hypotheses Development  
5.2.1 The Assumptions 
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Since issuers are assumed to be insiders who are able to anticipate DCRCs and 
obtain the news of real rating change announcements by rating agencies at least one 
period earlier than outsiders, the former therefore can utilise this superior 
information to gain benefits. This chapter tests whether issuers are able to improve 
their firms’ performances by adjusting financing one period before DCRCs. The 
hypotheses of tests in this chapter are based on the fundamental assumptions:  
(i) credit ratings are informative, which containing pricing relevant information on 
shares and bonds and thus impact on issuers’ overall financing costs;  
(ii) issuers know more about their firm value and future growth opportunities than 
outsiders who are unable to forecast future rating changes65; 
(iii) issuers and raters are assumed to have the same expectation of future rating 
changes66, which helps issuers to predict future rating changes at least one period 
before DCRC is released to the public67. 
5.2.2 The Hypotheses 
As the mechanism and timeline illustrated in Figure 5.1 shows, issuers may take 
actions to exploit the asymmetric information driven by delayed credit rating 
changes. They balance the associated costs and benefits of debt and equity 
issuances to make a decision on the financing choices, from which they expect to 
                                                          
65 The assumption comes from the statistical features of rating changes shown in Table 3.2. Since most of the 
observations (on average over 97% in four quarters) are ‘no rating changes’ and the results gained from a rating 
forecasting model tell that 95% forecasts are ‘no rating changes’, therefore it is reasonable to assume that 
market cannot forecast future rating changes. 
66  Kliger and Sarig (2000) argue that instead of revealing information to the public which might benefit 
competitors, issuers provide raters with detailed insider information during the rating process. Kisgen (2006) 
states ‘Rating agencies may receive significant company information that is not public’. The documented close 
information communication between issuers and raters support the assumption (iii). S&P ‘may allow for an 
appeal if the issuer can provide new and significant information to support it’ also supports the point that issuers 
and raters share same information set as well as the same view of future rating changes. 
67 ‘The manager’s information advantage over outsider investors is large’ Myers (2001). The study in this 
chapter assumes that issuers are able to predict their future rating change at least one period before it is 
announced given two conditions: they have their firm quality and finance information earlier than outsiders and 
the rating criteria issuers can reach easily through rating agency’s public website (eg. S&P lists their criteria on 
www.standardandpoors.com/CriteriaTOC). 
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gain benefits to the firms’ financial performances. Based on the evidences shown in 
Chapter III, ‘good’ issuers issue equity to a greater extent than debt before ratings 
upgrade while ‘bad’ issuers issue debt to a greater extent than equity before ratings 
downgrade. As a result, ‘good’ issuers do not significantly adjust financing before 
DCRCs while ‘bad’ issuers increase net debt issuance before DCRCs.  
 [Insert Figure 5.1 here] 
Based on the associated costs and benefits caused by debt and equity financing 
as discussed in Chapter III, the following two hypotheses are: 
Hypothesis 5.1: Equity financing before DCRCs generally brings insignificant or 
negative effects on firm performances. 
Hypothesis 5.2: Debt financing before DCRCs generally brings significant and 
positive effects on firm performances. 
5.3 Methodology and Data 
5.3.1 Firm Performance Measures 
The hypotheses assume that issuers adjust their financing plan before 
announcements in credit rating changes, through which they can improve their 
firms’ performance. As indicated in Richard, Devinney, Yip and Johnson (2009), 
‘measuring performance requires weighing the relevance of performance to focal 
stakeholders’. Literature on measures of firm performance are various according to 
the analysing angles. Three measures of firm performance are adopted in this 
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chapter: ROA, EPS and Tobin’s Q, which respectively represent measures of 
perspectives of managers, investors and market evaluation.  
ROA (Return on Assets) is an operating performance measure (Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985), Gorton and Rosen (1995), Mehran (1995), Berger and Bonaccorsi di 
Patti (2006), and Bhagat and Bolton (2008)), which is calculated as net income 
divided by the total assets (comprised of both debt and equity). It indicates how 
profitable a company is relative to its total assets and gives an idea as to how 
efficient a company’s management is at using the firm’s assets to generate 
earnings. Sometimes this is referred to as ‘return on investment’. 
EPS (Earnings per Share) is a security analysis measure, which is often used as 
a considerable indicator of a firm’s performance. It is calculated as the company’s 
total earning divided by the total number of shares outstanding. It measures 
performance from the perspective of investors and potential investors. Since it 
shows the amount of earnings available to each ordinary shareholder, it indicates 
the potential return on individual investments. In the United States, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) requires companies’ income statements to 
report EPS for each of the major categories of the income statement. 
Tobin’s Q is calculated as the market value of a company divided by the value 
of its total assets. It compares the firm’s market value of a firm’s assets, measured 
by the market value of its outstanding stock and debt, to the replacement cost of the 
firm’s assets (Tobin (1969)). It has been employed to explain a number of diverse 
corporate phenomena, such as cross-sectional differences in investment and 
diversification decisions (Jose, Nichols and Stevens (1986), and Malkiel, Von 
Chapter V The Financing Adjustment Benefits from Delayed Credit Rating Changes  
 
160 
Furstenberg and Watson (1979)), the relationship between managerial equity 
ownership and firm value (McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Morck et al. (1988)), 
the relationship between managerial performance and tender offer gains (Lang, 
Stulz and Walkling (1989)), investment opportunities and tender offer responses 
(Lang et al. (1989)), financing, dividend, and compensation policies (Smith and 
Watts (1992)) and the corporate governance context (Bhagat and Bolton (2008), 
and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009))68. In this chapter, Tobin’s Q is used as a 
proxy of operating performance of corporate governance, as it is widely used in 
previous studies. Yermack (1996) analyses board performance using Tobin’s Q 
while Anderson and Reeb (2003) employ Tobin’s Q to examine the governance of 
family firms. 
5.3.2 Empirical Design 
In order to investigate the issuer’s benefits, in this study, particularly firms’ 
financial performance improvements gained from financing adjustment before 
DCRCs, a number of simultaneous equations are conducted to test the relations 
among the three factors: DCRCs, debt and equity financing adjustments before 
DCRCs and firm performance.  
The two-equation system below is designed to examine the effect of financing 
adjustment before DCRCs on changes in firm performance in the periods around 
DCRCs. The first equation in the simultaneous equation system tests the DCRC 
effect by regressing security issuance against delayed credit rating changes and 
                                                          
68 Several recent papers are skeptical about the role of Tobin’s Q as a firm performance measure. For instance, 
Erickson and Whited (2011) and Erickson and Whited (2006) argue that Tobin’s Q is likely to contain a great 
deal of measurement error as a proxy of unobservable investment opportunities. Dybvig and Warachka (2010) 
argue that Tobin’s Q does not measure performance and high Tobin’s Q thus may not be the evidence of good 
firm performance. 
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control variables, and the second equation tests Benefit effect by regressing changes 
in firm performance measure on firms’ security issuance. To investigate the 
changes in firm performance in the periods around DCRCs, tests for three periods 
are designed. The 3SLS69 method is applied to estimate the coefficients in the two-
equation system. 
DCRC effect   !" " # " %&'()* "  (5.1a) 
Benefit effect N  !" " %kQl&'(Q)* " DN (5.1b) 
 (V =0,1,2)   
where N is the financing asjustments of issuer i at quarter  " V, N is 
the change in firm performance measures for issuer i between quarter  " V  
 and 
 " V, and &'(Q)* is the vector of the control variables issuer i at quarter  " V  
. 
The rating change dummy variables in the regression equation (5.1a) are defined as:  
  	
    
(5.2) 
  	
    
 and  in the definition (5.2) are the ratings of the issuer i at quarters t and 
t+1, respectively. The control vector &'(  in the equation system contains the 
conventional variables found in capital structure literature: Leverage, Size, Price, 
Liquidity, Profit, Dividends, Earnings, Growth, Tangibility and NDTS (non-debt tax 
shields) to separate their influences from DCRC on firms’ financing decisions. The 
                                                          
69 For the two-equation system, the results given by 2SLS are the same as those given by 3SLS since all the 
equations are just identified (Kapteyn and Fiebig (1981)). For the three-equation system, the results given by 
2SLS are similar to those given by 3SLS, which indicate that 3SLS is done properly. 3SLS’s disadvantage is 
that the estimation for single equation is potentially less robust. However, the influences of DCRCs on firm 
performance in this study are given by the combined results of the whole equation system rather than individual 
equation in the simultaneous equation. 
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dependant variable N in equation (5.1b) is specified as Return on Assets (ROA), 
EPS and Tobin’s Q in this study.  
The coefficients , #} indicate the current-quarter financing adjustments in 
response to the expectation differences in next-quarter rating upgrades and 
downgrades respectively due to the information gap between insiders and outsiders. 
%  and %kQl  are the vectors of coefficients on the control variables in equations 
(5.1a) and (5.1b) respectively. In equation (5.1b),   is the impact of financing 
adjustments on firm performance.  
Based on the two-equation system, the change in firm performance N 
due to the delayed credit rating changes are derived as: 
N  ! " " %kQl&'(Q)* 
 ! " k! "  " # " %&'()*l " %kQl&'("Q* 
(5.3a) 
N  k " # l  H
  

#H  
 (5.3b) 
(V =0,1,2)  
where  in (5.3b) is the summary notation of   and  .  
5.3.3 Data and Sample  
Data is collected from quarterly firm financials and monthly Standard & Poor (S&P) 
rating data from Compustat North America, which comprises more than 30,000 
active and inactive publicly listed firms in the U.S. and Canada. Quarterly rating 
change indicators are derived from the monthly rating data70 and amalgamated with 
                                                          
70 I sum up values of monthly rating change indicators by quarters and define the quarterly rating indicators as 
‘1’ if the sum of the added monthly value greater than 0, otherwise it is defined as ‘0’. This means that the 
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the quarterly financial data. The sample covers all firms with quarterly financial 
data and at least one rating record during the sample period: Q1 1985 (when the 
rating data begins in Compustat) to Q4 2010. The firm-quarter observations with 
negative equity (leverage greater than one) are excluded. 
The final sample for the empirical tests further excludes utility companies (SIC 
4000-4999) and financial companies (SIC 6000-6999) as with conventional 
treatments. Myers (2001) points out that these companies have a narrower menu of 
financing choices and cannot adjust their capital structures at relatively low cost. 
Regulations related to the disclosure policy of financial firms are usually stricter 
than non-financial firms and hence decrease the advantages of superior information 
of financial firms relative to outsiders, which in turn, de-motivate these firms from 
making financing adjustments. In addition, in tests of utility companies and 
financial companies, DCRCs are not revealed to have significant effects on 
financing around the four periods of DCRCs. Tests for the two groups are thus not 
meaningful in this chapter.  
5.3.4 Dependent Variables 
The study examines the effects on debt issuance, equity issuance and net debt 
issuance, which are defined as follows: 
-  ./0./12  : debt issuance, where 3  is long-term debt issuance 
(Compustat DLTISY) 71  minus long-term debt reduction 
(Compustat DLTRY) plus changes in current debt (Compustat 
                                                                                                                                                                  
quarterly rating indicator is equal to ‘1’ when rating changes take place in any month of the quarter, while is 
equal to ‘0’ when rating changes do not take place in any month of the quarter. 
71 The last letter ‘Y’ in DLTISY indicates that the variable is year-to-date. Quarterly values of observations for 
all variables comprised of year-to-date data is derived. 
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DLCCHY) for firm i in quarter t, and 4)  is total asset 
(Compustat ATQ) of firm i in quarter t-1. 
5  6./0./12  : equity issuance, where  7  is the sale of common and 
preferred stock (Compustat SSTKY) minus purchases of common 
and preferred stock (Compustat PRSTKCY) for firm i in quarter t. 
8  ./)6./0./12  : net debt issuance (as in Kisgen (2006)) is the difference 
between  - and 5. 
Further details of debt issuance and an examination of the effects of short-term 
and long-term debt respectively: 
 9-  ;./0./12  , where 93  is the change in current debt (Compustat 
DLCCHY) for firm i in quarter t. 
:-  <./0./12  , where :3  is long-term debt issuance (Compustat 
DLTISY) minus long-term debt reduction (Compustat DLTRY) for 
firm i in quarter t. 
The dependant variables in the benefit equation measuring changes in firm 
performance are: 
CB4  CB4  CB4, change in Return on Asset, where CB4 
is the ratio of net income (Compustat NIQ) to total assets 
(Compustat ATQ) for firm i in quarter t+1. 
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79  79  79: change in earnings per share, where 79 
is the earnings per share (Compustat EPSPXQ) for firm i in quarter 
t+1. 
=J8  =J8  =J8 : change in Tobin’s Q, where 
=J8 is the ratio of total debt book value plus quarterly close 
price (Compustat PRCCQ) multiplied by outstanding common 
stock shares (Compustat CSHOQ) to total assets (Compustat ATQ) 
for firm i in quarter t+1, which is the same with one of the control 
variables I defined in the section 5.3.6. 
5.3.5 Indicators for Upgrade and Downgrade  
In order to indicate ratings upgrade and downgrade for firm i in quarter t+1, two 
sets of dummy variables are constructed. Each set consists of three dummy 
variables associated with the S&P ratings of long-term debt, short-term debt and 
subordinated debt. They are, respectively, Domestic Long-Term Issuer Credit 
Rating (Compustat SPLTICRM), Domestic Short-Term Issuer Credit Rating 
(SPSTICRM) and Subordinated Debt Rating (SPSDRM), in this study. 
:=3  9=3 @8-9>?  : dummy variables for ratings 
upgrade. They are equal to 1 if the individual ratings of 
SPLTICRM, SPSTICRM and SPSDRM of firm i, respectively, are 
upgraded in quarter t+1. 
:=3  9=3 @8-9>?  : dummy 
variables for ratings downgrade. They are equal to 1 if the 
The image part with relationship ID rId73 was not found in the file.
The image part with relationship ID rId74 was not found in the file. The image part with relationship ID rId75 was not found in the file.
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individual ratings SPLTICRM, SPSTICRM and SPSDRM of firm i, 
respectively, are downgraded in quarter t+1. 
It is plausible that firm managers are not only concerned about a change in any 
of the above three ratings, but also about an overall outcome of the firm’s future 
ratings. To simplify the tests with the overall rating upgrade and downgrade in this 
chapter, two dummy variables are constructed below: 
BC"
>  =  1 if the individual ratings of firm i in quarter t+1 satisfy 
two conditions: (i) at least one of the individual ratings showing 
upgrade, and (ii) more individual ratings showing upgrade than 
downgrade. 
BC"
3   1 if the individual ratings of firm i in quarter t+1 satisfy two 
conditions: (i) at least one of the individual ratings showing 
downgrade, and (ii) more individual  ratings showing 
downgrade than upgrade. 
5.3.6 Control Variables 
Control variables, conventionally considered in capital structure studies72, include 
Leverage, Size, Price, Liquidity, Profit, Dividends, Earnings, Growth, Tangibility 
                                                          
72 Kisgen (2006) shows significant negative relations between leverage and debt issuance. Titman and Wessels 
(1988) show that firm size, as indicated by logarithm of sales, is one of the crucial determinants of capital 
structure. Marsh (1982) shows that changes in security prices alter debt/equity ratios. Wald (1999), Myers 
(2001), and Fama and French (2002) demonstrate that profit is an important factor that impacts capital structure. 
Market-to-book ratio (defined as growth in this study) and tangibility are variables affecting leverage ratio in 
Rajan and Zingales (1995). Dividends (Barclay, Smith and Watts (1995) and Titman and Wessels (1988)) and 
earnings (Titman and Wessels (1988)) policy tightly relate to debt issuance and equity sale. liquidity (see Kim, 
Mauer and Sherman (1998)) is included to control for possible impacts on leverage from firm’s cash/liquidity 
positions and NDTS (non-debt tax shields), which is considered as an impact on optimal leverage level 
(DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) and Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984)) and may have a negative influence on 
leverage. 
The image part with relationship ID rId76 was not found in the file.
The image part with relationship ID rId77 was not found in the file.
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and NDTS (non-debt tax shields) to separate their influences from DCRCs on firms’ 
financing decisions.  
:D@EF ratio of the sum of short-term debt (Sdet) (Compustat DLCQ) 
and long-term debt (Ld) (Compustat DLTTQ) to the sum of short-
term debt, long-term debt, and stockholders' equity (Compust 
LSEQ minus LTQ) for firm i in quarter t. 
: logarithm of sales (Compustat SALEQ) for firm i in quarter t. 
G : logarithm of the quarterly close price in the quarter (Compustat 
PRCCQ) for firm i in quarter t. 
:5-A: ratio of cash and cash equivalent (Compustat CHEQ) to total 
assets (Compustat ATQ)  for firm i in quarter t. 
H : ratio of EBITDA73 to total assets (Compustat ATQ) for 
firm i in quarter t.  
3D-8-: ratio of dividends (Compustat DVY) to total assets (Compustat 
ATQ) for firm i in quarter t.  
7@88E : ratio of Retained Earnings (Compustat REQ) to total assets 
(Compustat ATQ) for firm i in quarter t.  
I : ratio of total debt book value plus quarterly close price 
(Compustat PRCCQ) multiplied by outstanding common stock 
shares (Compustat CSHOQ) to total assets (Compustat ATQ) for 
firm i in quarter t. 
                                                          
73 7?=34  is the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization for firm i at time t, which 
calculated as the sum of Pretax Income (Compustat PIQ), Inertest Expense (Compustat TIEQ) and Depreciation 
and Amortization (Compustat DPQ). 
The image part with relationship ID rId78  
was not found in the file.
The image part with relationship ID rId79 was not found in the  
file.
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=@8EJKA : ratio of Property Plant and Equipment (Net) (Compustat 
PPENTQ) to total assets (Compustat ATQ) for firm i in quarter t. 
L3=9 : ratio of Deferred Taxes and Investment Tax Credit (Compustat 
TXDITCQ) to total assets (Compustat ATQ) for firm i in quarter t. 
5.3.7 Regression Models 
To specify the variables in the empirical design section, net debt issue 8N is 
substituted into (5.1a) as the dependent variable and BC  and BC  are 
specified as rating change dummies. The 3SLS method is applied to estimate the 
coefficients in the two-equation system. 
8  T!"TBC " T#BC " U%&'()* "  (5.4a) 
N  !"8 " %kQl&'(Q)* " DN (5.4b) 
(V =0,1,2)   
The dependent variable N  in equation (5.4b) is specified as Return on 
Assets (ROA), EPS and Tobin’s Q and is tested individually (this also refers to the 
equation systems below if not specified otherwise).  
To further test the influences on firm performance from -N and 5N 
separately, the two two-equation systems are employed below: 
-  O!"OBC " O#BC " P%&'()* "  (5.5a) 
N  !"- " %kQl&'(Q)* " DN (5.5b) 
(V =0,1,2)   
5  R!"RBC " R#BC " S%&'()* "  (5.6a) 
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N  !"5 " % kQl&'(Q)* " D (5.6b) 
(V =0,1,2)   
where the dependent variable N  in equation (5.5b) and (5.6b) are again 
specified as Return on Assets (ROA), EPS and Tobin’s Q and tested individually.  
Alternatively, a three-equation system is created to test the separate effects 
from - and 5 and is used to confirm the robustness of the two-equation 
system (5.5a) (5.5b) and (5.6a) (5.6b): 
-  O!"OBC " O#BC " P%&'()* "  (5.7a) 
5  R!"RBC " R#BC " S%&'()* " + (5.7b) 
N  !"-"5 " %kQl&'(Q)*"nN (5.7c) 
(V =0,1,2)  
O, O#} and { R, R#} respectively indicate adjustments of the ratios - 
and 5 in response to delayed credit rating upgrades and downgrades. P% and 
S% (c=3,4,…, 12) are respectively the vectors of coefficients on the control variables 
in equation (5.7a) and (5.7b).   indicates the impact of -  on firm 
performance and   indicates that of 5  on firm performance in (5.7c). The 
change in firm performance N derived from the three-equation system is: 
N  !"-"5 " %kQl&'(Q)* 
 !"kO!"OBC " O#BC " P%&'()*l 
"kR!"RBC " R#BC " S%&'()*l +%kQl&'(Q)* 
(5.8a) 
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NBC = 
O"RHBC  
O#"R#HBC  
 (5.8b)
(V =0,1,2)  
where BC is the summary notation of BC  and BC . In particular, the 
performance changes due to debt financing and equity financing are derived 
respectively:  
Nk-BCl = 
OHBC  
O#HBC  
 
Nk5BCl = 
RHBC  
R#HBC  
 
(V =0,1,2) 
To further understand DCRCs’ effects on firm performance through long-term 
debt issue :-N  and short-term debt issue 9-N  adjustment, a three-
equation system is constructed to examine the effects. The first two equations test 
DCRCs’ influences on long-term debt issue and short-term debt issue, and the third 
equation tests the influence of debt ratios on firm performance.  
:-N  O!<"O<BC " O#<BC " P%d&'()* "  (5.9a) 
9-N  O!;"O;BC " O#;BC " P%c&'()* " + (5.9b) 
N  !"<:-";9- " %kQl&'(Q)*"n (5.9c) 
(V =0,1,2)  
{O< , O#< } and O; , O#; } respectively indicate adjustments of the ratios 
:-N  and 9-N  in response to delayed credit rating upgrades and 
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downgrades. P%d and P%c (c=3,4,…, 12) are respectively the vectors of coefficients 
on the control variables in equation (5.9a) and (5.9b). < is the impact of - 
on firm performance and ; is that of 5 on firm performance in (5.9c). The 
change in firm performance N  the three-equation system can be similarly 
derived as: 
N  !"<:-";9- " %kQl&'(Q)* 
 !"<kO!<"O<BC " O#<BC " P%d&'()*l 
";kO!;"O;BC " O#;BC " P%c&'()*l 
"%kQl&'(Q)* 
(5.10a)
NBC = 
<O<";O;HBC  

<O#<";O#;HBC  

 (5.10b)
(V =0,1,2)  
where BC is the summary notation of BC  and BC . In particular, the 
performance changes due to long-term debt financing and short-term debt financing 
are derived respectively: 
Nk:-BCl = 
<O< HBC  

<O#< HBC  

 
Nk9-BCl = 
;O;HBC  

;O#;HBC  

 
(V =0,1,2) 
5.3.8 Summary Statistics 
Chapter V The Financing Adjustment Benefits from Delayed Credit Rating Changes  
 
172 
Table 5.1 reports summary statistics of the variables applied in this chapter for the 
sample containing 343,096 firm-quarters. Firms on average issue more equity 
(normalised by total assets) of 0.033 than debt (normalised by total assets) of 0.01. 
The net debt issue is negative at -0.04. The average firm has a Leverage ratio of 
0.278, a Size of 3.660, a Price of 1.984 and a Growth (Market-to-Book ratio) of 
2.229. Other control variables are all normalised by firms’ total assets. The average 
firm holds 17.8% of its total asset value as cash and cash equivalent (short-term 
investments) and distributes 0.2% of its total asset value as dividends one quarter 
ahead of rating changes. Firms on average have negative Profit (-0.009) and 
negative retained Earnings (-1.642). The average firm holds approximately 28.6% 
of its book value of assets in fixed assets and has a ratio of 1.9% deferred taxes and 
investment tax credit to total assets. Three dependent variables in benefit equations 
measuring changes in firm performances have a mean of 0.001 (CB4l, 2.259 
(79l and -0.174 (=J8l, respectively.   
[Insert Table 5.1 here] 
The following three sections, Sections 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6, respectively discuss the 
changes in the three firm performance measures, ROA, EPS and Tobin’s Q in the 
three periods, one quarter before DCRC, in the quarter of DCRC and one quarter 
after DCRC.  
5.4 ROA Changes in Response to Financing Adjustments 
5.4.1 Two-equation System 
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In this section, the simultaneous equation system (5.4a) (5.4b) is tested. CB4 is 
applied as the measure of change in firm performance and is substituted into (5.4b). 
Table 5.2 presents the estimates of the two-equation system with 3SLS method.  
[Insert Table 5.2 here] 
The first implication from the simultaneous equation system is that issuers who 
anticipate rating upgrades would not adjust net debt issue before upgrades and those 
who anticipate rating downgrades would issue more debt than equity before 
downgrades. The coefficient estimate on delayed rating upgrades T in (5.4a) is not 
significant while that on rating downgrades T# is 0.01148 and is significant at the 5% 
level with a t-statistic of 2.14. The estimates indicate that ‘good’ issuers do not 
significantly adjust net debt issue before anticipated future upgrades while ‘bad’ 
issuers increase net debt issue by around 1.148% as the percentage of total asset 
before anticipated downgrades. This is consistent with the results in the previous 
chapters. The second implication is that the adjustments of financing grant real 
benefits to issuers, which is tested through equation (5.4b). The estimate of 
coefficient   is not significant (t= -1.64), which suggests that issuers financing 
adjustments before DCRC do not bring them immediate financial benefits in the 
period of financing adjustment.  
Examining the system in the next period (V =1), the period when DCRCs take 
place, the signs of rating dummies remain the same as in the last period: T  is 
insignificant and T# is significantly positive at the 1% level. The coefficient  in 
this period is 0.01910 and is significant at the 1% level. Equation (5.3b) quantifies 
the benefit from the change of the firm performance due to DCRCs by the 
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calculations based on coefficient estimates in the two-equation system. , the 
ROA change between time t and t+1, does not significantly increase for ‘good’ 
issuers while it significantly increases by 0.024% for ‘bad’ issuers. The estimation 
result of the simultaneous equation system encompassing equations (5.4a) and (5.4b) 
present a picture of the overall transmission effects of DCRCs and the benefits on 
firms’ return efficiency. 
When the test is conducted in the period one quarter after DCRC, neither of the 
coefficients on rating dummies are significant. Even if the coefficient on net debt 
issue is significant in (5.4b), it is not systematically directly driven by DCRCs. The 
insignificant systematical change in ROA conveys that the improvement in ROA 
from net debt issuance adjustment only prevails temporarily.   
The two new equation systems (5.5a) (5.5b) and (5.6a) (5.6b) are created when 
the dependant variable -  in (5.4a) is broken down into -  and 5 . 
Table 5.3 and 5.4 present the estimate results of the three periods around DCRCs 
for the two systems respectively. Panel A of Table 5.3 shows the results in the 
quarter one quarter before DCRC. The estimates of the first equation show that both 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ issuers increase their debt issuance in the quarter before DCRC 
while the coefficient estimate on debt issuance in the second equation is statistically 
significantly negative at -1.57012, suggesting that ROA significantly decreases. 
However, as shown in the last two rows in the table, the estimates of the equation 
system reveal that the ROA drop of ‘good’ issuers (-0.00912) is less than that of 
‘bad’ issuers (-0.02822)74. Panel B of Table 5.3 shows the results in the quarter of 
                                                          
74 The result is robust when regression (5.5b) (V =0) is run individually. The coefficient on CB4 is -0.03183 
with t-statistic of -3.16, which indicates that ROA drops one quarter before DCRC in general without the drive 
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DCRC. The ROA change gained from the estimates of the system indicates that 
‘good’ issuers’ ROA does not significantly increase after the financing adjust, while 
‘bad’ issuers’ ROA increases on average by 0.234%. The result shown in Panel C 
of Table 5.3 implies that the increase of ROA driven by debt issuance seems 
temporary and does not last for more periods. Summarising the results listed in 
Table 5.3 shows that ROA of ‘good’ issuers significantly decreases in the quarter 
before DCRC but does not drop in the following periods. ROA of ‘bad’ issuers 
decreases in the quarter before DCRC, while increasing in the quarter of DCRC due 
to the adjustment of debt issuance before DCRC, which indicates that they gain real 
benefits on return efficiency through financing adjustment when they have private 
information on future rating changes. 
[Insert Table 5.3 here] 
Table 5.4 shows the changes in ROA due to the adjustments of equity issue. 
Panel A of Table 5.4 shows that ROA drops before DCRCs, however, the drop of 
‘good’ issuers is less than the drop of ‘bad’ issuers in both significance and 
magnitude. Panel B of Table 5.4 shows that ‘good’ issuers tend to increase equity 
issue moderately before DCRC but it seems the equity issuance does not drive 
ROA increase. ‘Bad’ issuers do not significantly increase equity issuance in the 
period, which is consistent with the results of previous chapters. Panel C of Table 
5.4 shows ROA decreases for both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ issuers. The result indicates 
that the usage of equity financing before DCRC might bring benefits through 
decreasing the magnitude of ROA drops. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
of DCRCs. 
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[Insert Table 5.4 here] 
5.4.2 The Control Variables in the Two-equation System 
The coefficient estimates on control variables in the one quarter before DCRCs 
(when V  =0) in equation (5.4a) are listed in Panel A of Table 5.2. They are 
consistent with those from the equation estimations in Chapter III. For example, the 
negative coefficient -0.02734 (t = -9.71) on leverage indicates that Leverage brings 
significantly negative effects on net debt issuance in the quarter, i.e., firms with 
higher leverage issue less debt than equity. The coefficient on Size is 0.00868 with 
the t-statistic of 24.32, indicating that firm size is positively and significantly 
related to the net debt issue. Larger firms generally have fewer concerns of financial 
distress and can afford transaction costs and thus issue more debt. Price is 
negatively and significantly related to net debt issue, which is in line with the 
market timing theory that issuers prefer equity to debt when Price is high. The net 
debt issue decreases 0.703% when quarterly close price increases 1 unit. The 
negative coefficient (-0.01814) on Liquidity indicates that firms with cash and 
short-term investment opportunities choose equity issue rather than debt issue. 
Profitable firms have more internal financing available (Myers (2001)). Profit thus 
negatively correlates to both external debt (-0.02790) and equity (-0.15957), which 
results in the significant positive coefficient on net debt issuance. Retained earnings, 
measuring the amount of internal funds, shows a positive and significant coefficient 
of 0.00108 on net debt issuance. Firms with retained earnings tend to finance 
projects internally (Dittmar and Thakor (2007)). The positive coefficient on net debt 
issuance is due to greather decrease in the level of equity issuance (-0.00157) than 
that of debt issuance (-0.00015). Firms holding valuable Growth opportunities, as 
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proxied by the market-to-book ratio in Rajan and Zingales (1995), tend to use a 
greater amount of equity finance than debt and thus overall borrow less (Myers 
(1984), Barclay et al. (1995), Rajan and Zingales (1995), and Barclay and Smith 
(1999)). Tangibility is positively related to both debt and equity issues while in 
response to 1 unit increase of Tangibility the increase a range to debt issue is higher 
than that to equity issue, which results in its positive relation to net debt issuance. 
NDTS is negatively related to both debt issuance (-0.02594) (DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980), and Bradley et al. (1984)) and equity issuance (-0.03145), it thus positively 
impacts net debt issuance but not significantly.  
In particular, comparing the three panels in Table 5.2, the coefficient estimates 
on Leverage, Size, Liquidity and Earnings are significant and keep the same 
positive or negative signs in both equations in the three quarters. For instance, the 
coefficients on Leverage and Liquidity are always negative, which indicates that 
firms with greater leverage ratio and higher cash flow decrease net debt issuance 
and ROA. Firms with greater Size and Earnings tend to lift up net debt issuance and 
ROA.  
In contrast, Price shows opposite effects to net debt issuance and ROA. Firms 
with higher equity price may issue more equity, thus reducing net debt issuance. 
However, firms with higher price tend to gain higher ROA in the next period. Profit 
is positively related to net debt issuance which is consistent with the results in 
Chapter III and the relevant literature. Yet, it is significantly negative correlated to 
CB4N when V =1 and 2, which implies that profit is negatively correlated with 
changes in ROA. Dividend’s effect is not significant to net debt issuance but 
positively significant to improved ROA. The negative estimates for Growth in (5.4a) 
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in all periods indicate that firms with high growth opportunities tend to decrease the 
net debt issuance in the next period. However, the estimates on Growth in (5.4b) 
show different signs and significances. The significant Growth estimate in the 
period of DCRC (V =1) shows that growth is positively correlated with an increase 
of ROA. NDTS is negatively associated to net debt issuance but is positively related 
to ROA improvements. 
5.4.3 Three-equation System 
To examine the robustness of the results from the two-equation system, the three-
equation system (5.7a)-(5.7c) is implemented. N  in (5.7c) is substituted by 
CB4N in this section. The three panels in Table 5.5 present the results for three 
periods around DCRCs respectively.  
[Insert Table 5.5 here] 
The last two rows in Panel A of Table 5.5 shows that the changes in ROA, 
driven by financing adjustments before DCRC, are not significant for both ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ issuers. The evidence is consistent when breaking down net debt issuance 
into debt issuance and equity issuance. This is caused by the insignificant 
coefficient estimates on debt and equity issuance in (5.7c). The insignificant effects 
indicate that financing adjustments do not immediately improve ROA. Panel B of 
Table 5.5 shows that only ‘bad’ issuers increase debt issuance before DCRC, while 
neither of them significantly increases equity issuance in the quarter. The 
coefficient on debt issue in (5.7c) is statistically significantly positive at the 1% 
confidence level while that on equity issue is not significant. These coefficients 
bring the inference in the last two rows in the panel that ‘good’ issues’ ROA does 
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not significantly change while ‘bad’ issuers’ ROA increases by 0.208% in the 
period of DCRC being announced due to the increase of debt issuance. Panel C of 
Table 5.5 shows that the signs and significances of coefficients on debt issue and 
equity issue are the same as those in Panel B. The coefficient on debt issue in (5.7c) 
is significantly positive while that on equity issue is significantly negative. The 
overall change in ROA is not significant to ‘good’ issuers while it is positive at 
0.171% to ‘bad’ issuers driven by net debt issuance.  
In summary, comparing the results of the three two-equation systems (5.4a) 
(5.4b), (5.5a) (5.5b) and (5.6a) (5.6b) with the three-equation system (5.7a)-(5.7c), 
the signs and significances of ROA changes shown by the equation systems appear 
to be consistent only for the period when the DCRCs are announced. The results 
imply that ‘bad’ issues’ ROA improves in the quarter of DCRC being announced to 
the public, although the improvement may be temporary. This is consistent with 
Hypothesis 5.2 that ‘bad’ issuers gain improvement in firm performance by utilising 
private information about future rating downgrade.  
5.5 EPS Change in Response to Financing Adjustments 
5.5.1 Two-equation System 
This section examines the changes in EPS by testing simultaneous equation system 
(5.5a) (5.5b). 79 is applied as the measure of change in firm performance and is 
substituted into (5.4b). Table 5.6 presents the estimates of the two-equation system 
with 3SLS estimation.  
[Insert Table 5.6 here] 
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Panel A of Table 5.6 shows that the coefficient estimate on delayed rating 
upgrades T  in (5.4a) is not significant while that on rating downgrades T#  is 
0.01079 and is significant at the 5% level with a t-statistic of 1.99. The estimates 
indicate that ‘good’ issuers do not significantly adjust net debt issue before 
anticipated future upgrades while ‘bad’ issuers increase net debt issue by around 
1.079% as the percentage of total asset before anticipated downgrades. It is again 
consistent with the results in the previous chapters. The estimate of coefficient  in 
the second equation (5.4b) is not significant (t = -0.58), suggesting that issuers 
financing adjustments before DCRC do not bring them financial benefits 
immediately.  
Examining the system in the period of DCRC taking places, the signs and 
significances of the rating dummies, shown in Panel B of Table 5.6, remain the 
same as in the last period: T is insignificant and T# is positive at the 1% level. The 
coefficient  in this period is 1.44935 with t-statistic of 3.66. The overall change 
of EPS through the equation system between time t and t+1, quantified by (5.3b), 
does not significantly increase for ‘good’ issuers while it significantly increases by 
1.805% for ‘bad’ issuers. As shown in Panel C of Table 5.6, the overall changes in 
EPS calculated according to (5.3b) are not significant due to the insignificant 
coefficients on the rating dummies. The coefficient estimates on control variables in 
equation (5.4a) are consistent with those from the equation estimations in Chapter 
III.  
Table 5.7 and 5.8 respectively present the results of the two equation systems 
(5.5a) (5.5b) and (5.6a) (5.6b) when net debt issuance, the independent variable in 
the second equation, is broken down into debt issuance and equity issuance. Table 
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5.7 shows the changes in EPS due to the adjustments of debt financing. Panel A of 
Table 5.7 shows that change in EPS is not significant one quarter before DCRC, in 
which ‘good’ issuers keep debt issue unadjusted and ‘bad’ issuers increase debt 
issue. Panel B of Table 5.7 indicates the same issuer’s financing behaviours with 
those in the last period, confirming that ‘good’ issuers do not issue debt while ‘bad’ 
issuers increase debt issue before DCRC. However, the coefficient on debt issue in 
(5.5b) is significant at the 1% level. The system derives EPS changes for ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ issuers are 0.01534 and 0.06805 respectively yet only the latter is 
significant. The results imply that ‘good’ issuer’s EPS does not significantly 
increase after the financing change while ‘bad’ issuers’ EPS on average increases 
by 6.805%. The result shown in Panel C of Table 5.3 implies that the increase of 
EPS seems to last into the next period. ‘Good’ issuers again do not gain benefit 
while ‘bad’ issuers improve EPS through increasing debt issuance before DCRC. 
[Insert Table 5.7 here] 
Table 5.8 shows the changes in EPS due to adjustments in equity issuance. The 
last two rows in the three panels of Table 5.8 show that neither ‘good’ issuers nor 
‘bad’ issuers gain benefit through equity financing. In particular, the results imply 
that ‘good’ issuers tend to issue extra equity moderately before DCRC but it seems 
the equity issuance drives down EPS. ‘Bad’ issuers do not significantly increase 
equity issue in the period, which is consistent with the results of previous chapters, 
and there is no change to their EPS due to equity issuance driven by DCRC. The 
result reminds issuers not to adopt the equity tool before DCRC if it is not urgent, 
as it could bring negative effects on their earnings. 
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[Insert Table 5.8 here] 
5.5.2 Three-equation System 
To examine the robustness of the results from the two-equation system, the three-
equation system (5.7a)-(5.7c) is estimated. The three panels in Table 5.9 present the 
results for three periods around DCRCs respectively. The last two rows in Panel A 
of Table 5.9 show that changes in EPS are not significant for both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
issuers in the quarter before DCRC. This is consistent with the results of two-
equation system estimation. This is caused by the insignificant coefficients on debt 
and equity issuances in (5.7c). Panel B of Table 5.9 shows that only ‘bad’ issuers 
increase their debt issues before DCRCs while both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ issuers do not 
significantly increase equity issuance. The coefficient on debt issue in (5.7c) is 
statistically significantly positive at the 1% confidence level while that on equity 
issue is significantly negative at the 10% level. The coefficients in the three 
equations of the equation system reveal the overall influences, as reported in the 
last two rows of the panel. ‘Good’ issue’s EPS does not significantly change while 
‘bad’ issuers’ EPS increases by 6.678% in the period of DCRC being released and 
it is mainly driven by debt issuance rather than equity issuance. Panel C of Table 
5.9 shows that the signs and significances of coefficients on debt issue and equity 
issue in equations (5.7a) and (5.7b) are the same as those in the Panel B. The 
coefficient on debt issuance in (5.7c) is significantly positive while that on equity 
issuance is insignificant. The overall change in EPS driven by net debt issuance 
remains significantly positive for the ‘bad’ issuers at 1%.  
[Insert Table 5.9 here] 
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In brief, comparing the results from the three two-equation systems (5.4a) 
(5.4b), (5.5a) (5.5b) and (5.6a) (5.6b) and the three-equation system (5.7a)-(5.7c), 
the signs and significances of EPS changes produced by the equation systems 
appear to be consistent for the first two periods. Neither ‘good’ nor ‘bad’ issuers 
gain benefits through increases of EPS in the quarter before DCRCs are announced. 
In the quarter of DCRC, EPS of ‘good’ issuers does not significantly change. 
However, ‘bad’ issuers’ EPS change is significantly positive. Unlike the change in 
ROA tested in the last section, the increasing trend of EPS seems to continue in the 
quarter after DCRC. ‘Good’ issuers gain improvement on EPS in a small scale. 
‘Bad’ issuers continue to gain improvement on EPS through debt issuance. The 
increase of EPS is 7.747% and it is significant at the 1% level. The results imply 
that ‘bad’ issuers’ EPS improvement lasts from the quarter DCRC is announced to 
the one quarter after DCRC. 
5.6 Tobin’s Q Change in Response to Financing Adjustments 
5.6.1 Two-equation System 
This section examines the Tobin’s Q changes by testing simultaneous equation 
system (5.4a) (5.4b). =J8  is applied as the measure of change in firm 
performance and is substituted into (5.4b). Table 5.10 presents the estimates of the 
two-equation system with the 3SLS method.  
[Insert Table 5.10 here] 
Panel A of Table 5.10 shows that the coefficient estimate on delayed rating 
upgrades T  in (5.4a) is not significant while that on rating downgrades T#  is 
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0.00899 and is significant at the 10% level with a t-statistic of 1.71. The estimates 
indicate that ‘good’ issuers do not significantly adjust net debt issuance before 
anticipated future upgrades while ‘bad’ issuers increase net debt issuance by around 
0.899% as the percentage of total asset before anticipated downgrades. It is again 
consistent with the results in the previous chapters. The estimate of coefficient  in 
the second equation (5.4b) is not significant (t= 0.81), suggesting that issuers 
financing adjustments before DCRC do not bring improvement on Tobin’s Q 
immediately.  
Examining the system in the period of DCRC taking place, the signs and 
significances of the rating dummies, listed in Panel B of Table 5.10, keep the same 
as the last period: T  is insignificant and T#  is positive at the 10% level. The 
coefficient  on net debt issuance in this period is -1.79956 with t-statistic of -
25.48. (5.3b) quantifying the overall influence on Tobin’s Q through the equation 
system. The change between time t and t+1, does not significantly increase for 
‘good’ issuers while it significantly decreases by 1.902% for ‘bad’ issuers. Panel C 
of Table 5.10 shows the overall changes in Tobin’s Q calculated according to (5.3b) 
are not significant due to the insignificant coefficients on rating dummies. The 
coefficient estimates on control variables in equation (5.4a) are consistent with 
those from the DCRC effect equation estimation in Chapter III.  
Table 5.10 and 5.11 respectively presents the results of the two equation 
systems (5.5a) (5.5b) and (5.6a) (5.6b) when net debt issuance, the independent 
variable in the second equation, is broken down into debt issuance and equity 
issuance. Table 5.10 shows the changes in Tobin’s Q due to the adjustments of debt 
issuance. Panel A of Table 5.10 shows that change in Tobin’s Q is insignificant 
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with t-statistic of 0.50 one quarter before DCRC, suggesting that Tobin’s Q does 
not change significantly in the quarter. Panel B of Table 5.10 indicates that ‘good’ 
issuers do not issue debt while ‘bad’ issuers increase debt issuance in the quarter of 
DCRC. However, the coefficient on debt issuance in (5.5b) is negatively significant 
at the 1% level. The system derived change in Tobin’s Q for ‘good’ issuers is not 
significant but that for ‘bad’ issuers is significant at -0.00569. The results imply 
that ‘good’ issuers’ Tobin’s Q does not significantly decrease after the financing 
change while ‘bad’ issuers’ Tobin’s Q moderately decreases by 0.569%. The result 
in Panel C of Table 5.3 shows that the coefficient   on net debt issuance is 
2.04430 and significant at 1%. The result implies that system derived change in 
Tobin’s Q seems significantly converted from decrease to increase in the period one 
quarter after DCRC. ‘Good’ issuers do not gain benefit while ‘bad’ issuers improve 
Tobin’s Q through increasing debt financing before DCRC. 
[Insert Table 5.11 here] 
Table 5.12 shows the changes in Tobin’s Q due to the adjustments of equity 
financing. Panel A of Table 5.12 shows that  in the second equation demonstrates 
that Tobin’s Q do not change significantly in the period. Panel B and Panel C of 
Table 5.12 show that only ‘good’ issuers increase equity issuance in the quarter of 
DCRC and one quarter after DCRC, yet, the significance levels of 5% and 10% 
respectively.  in the two panels indicating the changes in Tobin’s Q due to equity 
issuance in the two periods, is significant for both at the 1% level. The summarized 
Tobin’s Q changes in the two periods, reported in the last two rows in the panels, 
show that ‘good’ issuers gain improvements in Tobin’s Q due to moderate equity 
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issuance before DCRC while ‘bad’ issuers do not gain benefit through equity 
issuance. 
[Insert Table 5.12 here] 
5.6.2 Three-equation System 
To examine the robustness of the results from two-equation system, the three-
equation system (5.7a)-(5.7c) is implemented. The last two rows of the three panels 
in Table 5.13 present the results of system derived changes in Tobin’s Q for the 
three periods around DCRCs respectively. Panel A of Table 5.13 shows that the 
changes in Tobin’s Q driven by financing adjustments before DCRC are not 
significant for ‘good’ and ‘bad’ issuers. This is determined by the insignificant 
coefficient estimates of change in Tobin’s Q in (5.7c). Panel B of Table 5.13 shows 
that only ‘bad’ issuers increase their debt issuance before DCRC while neither of 
them significantly increase equity issuance in the quarter of DCRC. The coefficient 
on debt issuance in (5.7c) is statistically significantly positive at the 1% confidence 
level while that on equity issuance is not significant. As a result, the final changes 
in Tobin’s Q for ‘good’ and ‘bad’ issuers are not significant. Panel C of Table 5.13 
shows that the signs and significances of coefficients in (5.7a) and (5.7b) on debt 
and equity issuance are the same as those in Panel B. The coefficients on both debt 
and equity issuance in (5.7c) are significantly positive. The changes in Tobin’s Q 
are mainly driven by debt issuance and are significant to both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
issuers at 0.01631 and 0.03599, yet at 10% and 1% confidence level respectively. 
[Insert Table 5.13 here] 
Chapter V The Financing Adjustment Benefits from Delayed Credit Rating Changes  
 
187 
To summarise the results given by the two-equation system shown in Section 
5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 employing ROA, EPS and Tobin’s Q as firm performance measures, 
the evidence shows that ‘good’ issuers do not adjust financing before upgrades 
while ‘bad’ issuers increase debt issuance before downgrade. In addition, the 
coefficients on debt issuance in the benefit equation are significantly positive in the 
last two quarters when the firm performance measures are ROA and EPS while it is 
significantly negative when the firm performance measure is Tobin’s Q. The 
coefficients on equity financing have opposite signs and significances for the three 
performance measures. The estimation results of the three-equation systems show 
that issuers only adopt debt financing in response to DCRCs. The coefficients in the 
benefits equation are positive on debt issuance but negative on equity issuance 
when firm performance measures are ROA and EPS. They are both significantly 
positive when the firm performance measure is Tobin’s Q. The results indicate that 
changes in ROA and EPS are positively related to the debt issuances of ‘bad’ 
issuers and change in Tobin’s Q improves due to the equity financing of ‘good’ 
issuers.   
5.7 Effects of Long-term Debt and Short-term Debt Issuance 
The previous sections have discussed the changes in firm performance measures 
due to debt issuance and equity issuance before DCRCs when anticipated next-
quarter upgrades and downgrade are anticipated. This section discusses the changes 
in firm performance measures due to long-term debt financing :- and short-
term debt financing 9-  which further decomposes the influences of debt 
financing. Estimates for the three-equation system are presented in Table 5.14, 5.15 
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and 5.16 corresponding to the firm performance measures: ROA, EPS and Tobin’s 
Q. 
[Insert Table 5.14 here] 
Table 5.14 lists the estimated result for the three-equation system (5.9a), (5.9b) 
and (5.9c) when ROA is adopted as a firm performance measure. Panel A of Table 
5.14 shows the results one quarter before DCRC. The insignificant estimates of O< 
on :- and O; on 9- indicate the insignificant use of long-term debt and 
short-term financing for ‘good’ issuers. In contrast, the significantly positive 
estimates of O< on :- and O; on 9- indicate the significant increase of 
long-term debt and short-term financing for ‘bad’ issuers before next-quarter 
downgrades. It is consistent with the prediction of debt financing for ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ issuers that the former do not adjust debt issuance while the latter issue 
cheaper debt before downgrade. The insignificant estimates of < and ; in (5.9c) 
imply that ROA does not significantly move in the quarter of financing adjustment. 
The system derived influences on ROA thus are not significant in this period.   
Panel B of Table 5.14 shows the results in the quarter of DCRC. The signs and 
significances of coefficient estimates of rating dummies in (5.9a) and (5.9b) keep 
the same as those in the last quarter. However, <  and ;  in (5.9c) are both 
significant in this quarter. <  is 1.76073 with a t-statistic of 30.26 while ;  is -
2.17103 with a t-statistic of -26.60. The result indicates that long-term debt 
financing is positively correlated with ROA improvement while short-term debt 
financing is negatively correlated with it. As a result, the systemised ROA 
improvement given by (5.10b) indicates that ‘good’ issuers’ ROA is not 
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significantly driven by financing adjustment, while ‘bad’ issuers’ ROA increases 
due to the increase of long-term debt financing, but decreases due to the usage of 
short-term financing. The results shown in Panel C of Table 5.14 indicate that ROA 
of ‘bad’ issuers continues to increase due to long-term debt increase one quarter 
after DCRC.  
Table 5.15 shows a different phenomenon to that in Table 5.14. The estimation 
result in one quarter before DCRC is reported in Panel A of Table 5.15. Neither 
long-term debt nor short-term debt financing would benefit the improvement of 
EPS. In the quarter of DCRC, < and ; reported in Panel B are both significant, 
however, their signs are opposite to those in Panel B of Table 5.14. < is negatively 
significant at -13.4262 with a t-statistic of -2.68, while ; is positively significant 
at 27.46567 with a t-statistic of 3.89. As shown in the last two rows of this panel, 
EPS decreases due to ‘bad’ issuers’ long-term debt financing and it increases due to 
‘bad’ issuers’ short-term financing. However, the increase of EPS due to short-term 
financing is temporary since the improvement of EPS is not significant though 
positive as shown in Panel C of Table 5.14. The EPS of ‘good’ issuers and ‘bad’ 
issuers slightly decrease due to long-term debt financing in the quarter after DCRC. 
[Insert Table 5.15 here] 
Table 5.16 presents changes in Tobin’s Q due to long-term debt and short-term 
debt financing respectively. Panel A does not show significant changes in Tobin’s 
Q due to financing adjustments. Panel B of Table 5.16 shows that the coefficient on 
long-term debt issuance is positive while that on short-term debt issuance is 
negative, which is consistent with the results reported in Table 5.14 on the changes 
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in ROA. The last two rows of Panel B show the results derived by (5.10b) that long-
term debt financing increases Tobin’s Q while short-term financing decreases 
Tobin’s Q. The long-term debt financing effect lasts at least till the next quarter, 
one quarter after DCRC takes place. 
[Insert Table 5.16 here] 
5.8 Conclusions 
This chapter examines issuers’ benefits in adjusting financing prior to rating change 
taking place. This study assumes that both issuers and rating agencies are insiders, 
whose predictions on next-period rating announcements are the same as each other. 
They know firms’ future rating changes earlier and more precisely than outsiders, 
specifically investors and other market participants. This study assumes that the 
rating announcements from agencies are delayed at least one period and thus create 
an information asymmetry window. Therefore, issuers are able to benefit 
themselves, particularly through the improvement of firm performance, by utilising 
their superior information. Issuers adjust their financing strategy before the real 
rating changes announced by raters in order to balance associated costs and benefits 
to improve their real financial status.  
The data sample includes all non-missing observations from quarterly 
Compustat North data from Q1 1985 to Q4 2010 and the Standard & Poor’s ratings 
data. The tests in this chapter focus on the nonfinancial firms. The overall result 
robustly supports the hypotheses that the information gap between issuers and 
outsiders driven by DCRCs contains value and affects issuers’ financing strategy in 
many ways. Firstly, the evidence shows that firms adjust debt and equity issuances 
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one-period before rating changes, which is consistent with the results in the 
previous chapters. More specifically, ‘good’ issuers do not significantly adjust net 
debt issuance while ‘bad’ issuers significantly increase net debt issuance. Secondly, 
debt financing before DCRCs seem always to bring some temporary improvement 
in ROA and EPS. Yet, its influences on Tobin’s Q transfer from negative to positive. 
Thirdly, equity financing generally does not bring significant improvement on ROA 
and EPS, but does improve on Tobin’s Q. Fourth, long-term debt financing brings 
improvements on ROA and Tobin’s Q and short-term debt brings negative changes 
on these two measures, while short-term debt bring positive changes in EPS for 
issuers.   
The evidence shown in this chapter supports the hypotheses that financing 
adjustment before DCRC brings material benefits to firms who possess superior 
information on next-quarter rating changes. The combination of DCRC, the newly 
considered driving factor of asymmetric information, and its driven behaviour on 
issuers’ financing adjustment enriches the explicit understanding of relations among 
DCRC, financing behaviour and firm performance. 
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Figure 5.1 The timeline of actions of issuers and market  
The graph displays the timeline of the actions of issuers and market and thus indicates the 
transmission mechanism.  
     Timeline 
Time t-1 
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Table 5. 1 Summary statistics 
The sample is drawn from quarterly Compustat data, excluding financial firms and utility firms and firm-
quarters with negative equity values during the period Q1 1985 - Q4 2010. The table lists summary 
statistics of dependant variables and control variables in the tests. -  is defined as long-term debt 
issuance minus long-term debt reduction plus changes in current debt and normalised by firms’ total assets. 
5 is defined as sale of common and preferred stock minus purchases of common and preferred stock and 
normalized by firm’s total assets. 8 is defined as - minus 5. Other control variable definitions 
are Leverage: ratio of the sum of short-term debt (Sd) and long-term debt (Ld) to the sum of short-term debt, 
long-term debt, and stockholders' equity. Size: logarithm of sales. Price: logarithm of the close price of the 
quarter. Liquidity: ratio of cash and cash equivalent divided (normalised) by total assets. Profit: 
ratio of EBITDA to total assets. Dividends: ratio of dividends to total assets. Earnings: ratio of retained 
earnings to total assets. Growth: total debt book value plus quarterly close price multiply outstanding 
common stock shares and normalised by total assets. Tangibility: ratio of property plant and equipment (Net) 
to total assets. NDTS: ratio of deferred taxes and investment tax credit to total assets. Panel B lists firm 
characteristics by financing types. The four types are defined as: Debt only financing firms are those with 
positive- but non-positive 5 ; Equity only financing firms are those with positive 5  but non-
positive -; Dual financing means both - and 5 are positive and Internal financing is assumed if 
no issuance is made, which means both - and 5 are both non-positive. CB4 is the change in ROA 
(Return on Assets), 79 is the change in EPS (earnings per share) and =J8 is the change in Tobin’s 
Q. Outliers are less than 1% of the overall observations. These observations or outliers are in the end of the 
time series of each firm’s observations, which means no more observations are available after the 
observations containing extreme numbers. It indicates that the company could not ‘survive’ after it. Tests 
excluding outliers are conducted and the results show consistency with those of the full sample. 
Variables  N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum -  125,805 0.006 0.000 0.086 -1.414 11.164 5  229,674 0.014 0.000 0.161 -1.795 17.584 8  114,970 -0.010 -0.002 0.200 -17.584 11.164 9-  134,263 0.002 0.000 0.049 -1.414 3.885 :-  230,587 0.005 0.000 0.088 -3.876 11.164 
Leverage  114,970 0.226 0.160 0.240 0.000 1.000 
Size  114,970 3.280 3.266 2.520 -6.908 11.730 
Price  114,970 1.953 2.183 1.529 -7.419 11.523 
Liquidity  114,970 0.197 0.102 0.225 -0.034 1.000 
Profit  114,970 0.007 0.024 0.224 -59.926 13.207 
Dividends  114,970 0.007 0.000 0.037 -0.012 3.700 
Earnings  114,970 -0.653 0.141 9.344 -2624.430 2.337 
Growth  114,970 1.957 1.167 8.760 0.001 2370.330 
Tangibility  114,970 0.258 0.191 0.227 0.000 1.000 
NDTS  114,970 0.018 0.000 0.033 -0.013 0.692 
ROA  114,783 -0.013 0.009 0.137 -12.721 12.839 
EPS  114,712 0.150 0.070 13.255 -3435.000 2087.000 CB4  114,793 -0.001 0.000 0.376 -93.410 59.637 79  114,738 0.010 0.000 10.931 -1967.490 3113.000 =J8  114,354 -0.074 -0.004 9.045 -2258.463 172.637 
 
 
  
The image part with relationship ID rId80 was not found in the  
file.
C
ha
pt
er
 V
 T
he
 F
in
an
ci
ng
 A
dj
us
tm
en
t B
en
ef
its
 fr
om
 D
el
ay
ed
 C
re
di
t R
at
in
g 
C
ha
ng
es
 
 
 
19
4 
T
ab
le
 5
. 2
 R
O
A
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 r
es
po
ns
e 
to
 n
et
 d
eb
t i
ss
ua
nc
e 
T
he
 ta
bl
e 
re
po
rt
s 
th
e 
pa
ra
m
et
er
 e
st
im
at
es
 o
f 
th
e 
tw
o-
eq
ua
tio
n 
si
m
ul
ta
ne
ou
s 
sy
st
em
s 
es
tim
at
ed
 b
y 
3S
LS
. V
al
ue
s 
of
 e
st
im
at
ed
 c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
an
d 
th
ei
r 
t-
st
at
is
tic
 in
 b
ra
ck
et
s 
fo
r 
E
qu
at
io
n 
(5
.4
a)
 a
nd
 
(5
.4
b)
 f
or
 n
on
-f
in
an
ci
al
 f
ir
m
s.
 Y
 in
 (
5.
4b
) 
is
 s
ub
st
itu
te
d 
as
 R
O
A
 in
 th
e 
te
st
s.
 E
st
im
at
ed
 p
ar
am
et
er
s 
on
 r
at
in
g 
ch
an
ge
 in
di
ca
to
rs
 in
di
ca
te
 in
fl
ue
nc
es
 o
f 
de
la
ye
d 
cr
ed
it 
ra
tin
g 
ch
an
ge
s 
on
 f
in
an
ci
ng
 
pl
an
 m
ak
in
g.
 T
he
 th
re
e 
pa
ne
ls
 s
ho
w
 th
e 
fi
na
nc
in
g 
ad
ju
st
m
en
ts
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
th
re
e 
pe
ri
od
s 
ar
ou
nd
 D
C
R
C
 re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 BC
 

 a
nd
 BC
 

 a
re
 u
pg
ra
de
 a
nd
 d
ow
ng
ra
de
 o
f o
ve
ra
ll 
cr
ed
it 
ra
tin
g.
 *
, *
*,
 
**
* 
re
pr
es
en
t s
ta
tis
tic
al
 s
ig
ni
fi
ca
nc
e 
at
 th
e 
10
%
, t
he
 5
%
 a
nd
 th
e 
1%
 le
ve
l, 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 
P
an
el
 A
 ( 
V =
 0
 ) 
O
ne
 q
ua
rt
er
 b
ef
or
e 
D
C
R
C
 
 
P
an
el
 B
 ( 
V =
 1
 ) 
In
 th
e 
qu
ar
te
r 
of
 D
C
R
C
 
 
P
an
el
 C
 ( 
V =
 2
 ) 
O
ne
 q
ua
rt
er
 a
ft
er
 D
C
R
C
 
E
qu
at
io
n 
(a
) 
8
  
E
qu
at
io
n 
(b
) 
CB
4 
 
 
E
qu
at
io
n 
(a
) 
8
  
E
qu
at
io
n 
(b
) 
CB
4 

 
 
E
qu
at
io
n 
(a
) 
8
  
E
qu
at
io
n 
(b
) 
CB
4 
#
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
-0
.0
10
45
**
* 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
-0
.0
66
85
**
* 
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
-0
.0
05
45
**
* 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
-0
.0
28
11
**
* 
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
-0
.0
11
43
**
* 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
-0
.0
22
6*
**
 
 
(-
6.
01
) 
 
(-
4.
17
) 
 
 
(-
3.
16
) 
 
(-
23
.4
9)
 
 
 
(-
3.
91
) 
 
(-
19
.7
4)
 
BC
 

 
0.
00
30
7 
8
  
-2
.3
45
61
 
 
BC
 

 
-0
.0
01
00
 
8
  
0.
01
91
03
**
* 
 
BC
 

 
-0
.0
02
92
 
8
  
0.
07
60
68
**
* 
 
(0
.7
5)
 
 
(-
1.
64
) 
 
 
(-
0.
14
) 
 
(4
.5
4)
 
 
 
(-
0.
25
) 
 
(1
5.
33
) 
BC
 

 
0.
01
14
8*
* 
 
 
 
BC
 

 
0.
01
25
0*
**
 
 
 
 
BC
 

 
0.
00
31
52
 
 
 
 
(2
.1
4)
 
 
 
 
 
(2
.3
1)
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.3
4)
 
 
 
:D
@
E 
)
 
-0
.0
27
34
**
* 
:D
@
E 
)
 
-0
.0
84
62
**
 
 
:D
@
E 
)
 
-0
.0
26
06
**
* 
:D
@
E 
 
-0
.0
24
27
**
* 
 
:D
@
E 
)
 
-0
.0
36
71
**
* 
:D
@
E 

 
-0
.0
16
23
**
* 
 
(-
9.
71
) 
 
(-
2.
15
) 
 
 
(-
9.
38
) 
 
(-
12
.6
6)
 
 
 
(-
7.
73
) 
 
(-
8.
90
) 
9h
 )
 
0.
00
86
75
**
* 
9h
 )
 
0.
02
99
57
**
* 
 
9h
 )
 
0.
00
83
3*
**
 
9h
  
0.
00
78
2*
**
 
 
9h
 )
 
0.
01
02
05
**
* 
9h
 
 
0.
00
53
26
**
* 
 
(2
4.
32
) 
 
(2
.3
9)
 
 
 
(2
3.
36
) 
 
(3
1.
44
) 
 
 
(1
6.
81
) 
 
(2
2.
14
) 

G 
)
 
-0
.0
07
03
**
* 

G 
)
 
-0
.0
07
53
 
 

G 
)
 
-0
.0
09
16
**
* 

G 
 
0.
00
69
09
**
* 
 

G 
)
 
-0
.0
08
71
**
* 

G 

 
0.
00
75
69
**
* 
 
(-
12
.8
4)
 
 
(-
0.
74
) 
 
 
(-
16
.7
4)
 
 
(1
8.
30
) 
 
 
(-
9.
33
) 
 
(2
0.
66
) 
:5
-
A 
)
 
-0
.0
18
14
**
* 
:5
-
A 
)
 
-0
.0
59
2*
* 
 
:5
-
A 
)
 
-0
.0
07
83
**
* 
:5
-
A 
 
-0
.0
15
13
**
* 
 
:5
-
A 
)
 
-0
.0
26
35
**
* 
:5
-
A 

 
-0
.0
09
65
**
* 
 
(-
5.
58
) 
 
(-
2.
17
) 
 
 
(-
2.
43
) 
 
(-
6.
67
) 
 
 
(-
4.
81
) 
 
(-
4.
42
) 

H 
)
 
0.
19
18
2*
**
 

H 
)
 
-0
.4
64
48
* 
 

H 
)
 
0.
16
77
3*
**
 

H 
 
-0
.9
33
31
**
* 
 

H 
)
 
0.
20
15
23
**
* 

H 

 
-0
.8
04
66
**
* 
 
(7
1.
63
) 
 
(-
1.
69
) 
 
 
(6
0.
38
) 
 
(-
71
8.
34
) 
 
 
(4
5.
15
) 
 
(-
24
7.
03
) 
3D
-
8-
)
 
0.
00
42
44
 
3D
-
8-
)
 
0.
04
92
12
 
 
3D
-
8-
)
 
0.
01
28
49
 
3D
-
8-
 
0.
20
30
35
**
* 
 
3D
-
8-
)
 
0.
01
91
92
 
3D
-
8-

 
0.
11
74
09
**
* 
 
(0
.3
5)
 
 
(1
.4
1)
 
 
 
(1
.0
8)
 
 
(1
2.
72
) 
 
 
(0
.9
7)
 
 
(8
.6
0)
 
7@
88
E 
)
 
0.
00
10
8*
**
 
7@
88
E 
)
 
0.
00
32
89
**
 
 
7@
88
E 
)
 
0.
00
47
85
**
* 
7@
88
E 
 
0.
00
45
9*
**
 
 
7@
88
E 
)
 
0.
00
32
23
**
* 
7@
88
E 

 
0.
00
28
64
**
* 
 
(1
6.
22
) 
 
(2
.1
2)
 
 
 
(2
8.
48
) 
 
(4
1.
18
) 
 
 
(1
5.
69
) 
 
(2
6.
30
) 
I

)
 
-0
.0
01
88
**
* 
I

)
 
-0
.0
04
15
 
 
I

)
 
-0
.0
01
54
**
* 
I

 
0.
00
01
5*
**
 
 
I

)
 
-0
.0
01
37
**
* 
I


 
-0
.0
00
63
**
* 
 
(-
27
.3
1)
 
 
(-
1.
54
) 
 
 
(-
23
.0
0)
 
 
(3
.1
3)
 
 
 
(-
12
.1
6)
 
 
(-
5.
69
) 
=@8
EJ
K
A )
 
-0
.0
07
5*
**
 
=@8
EJ
K
A )
 
0.
01
41
6 
 
=@8
EJ
K
A )
 
-0
.0
08
93
**
* 
=@8
EJ
K
A 
 
0.
02
31
1*
**
 
 
=@8
EJ
K
A )
 
-0
.0
06
12
 
=@8
EJ
K
A 
 
0.
02
15
76
**
* 
 
(-
2.
49
) 
 
(1
.0
4)
 
 
 
(-
3.
01
) 
 
(1
1.
25
) 
 
 
(-
1.
21
) 
 
(1
1.
07
) 
L3
=9 
)
 
0.
03
00
3 
L3
=9 
)
 
0.
01
06
21
 
 
L3
=9 
)
 
0.
03
92
47
**
 
L3
=9 
 
-0
.0
26
70
* 
 
L3
=9 
)
 
0.
04
36
58
 
L3
=9 

 
-0
.0
35
67
**
* 
 
(1
.5
1)
 
 
(0
.1
5)
 
 
 
(2
.0
0)
 
 
(-
1.
95
) 
 
 
(1
.3
1)
 
 
(-
2.
76
) 
A
dj
 R
-s
qu
ar
e 
0.
21
59
 
 
 
 
A
dj
 R
-s
qu
ar
e 
0.
71
24
 
 
 
 
A
dj
 R
-s
qu
ar
e 
0.
24
23
 
 
 
N
 
22
9,
56
1 
 
 
 
N
 
21
8,
08
5 
 
 
 
N
 
20
6,
58
3 
 
 
 
B
C 

 
-0
.0
07
2 
 
 
 
 

B
C 

 
-0
.0
00
02
 
 
 
 
 

#B
C 

 
-0
.0
00
22
 
 
 
 
B
C 

 
-0
.0
26
93
 
 
 
 
 

B
C 

 
0.
00
02
39
**
* 
 
 
 
 

#B
C 

 
0.
00
02
4 
 
 
C
ha
pt
er
 V
 T
he
 F
in
an
ci
ng
 A
dj
us
tm
en
t B
en
ef
its
 fr
om
 D
el
ay
ed
 C
re
di
t R
at
in
g 
C
ha
ng
es
 
 
 
19
5 
T
ab
le
 5
. 3
 R
O
A
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 r
es
po
ns
e 
to
 d
eb
t i
ss
ua
nc
e 
 
T
he
 ta
bl
e 
re
po
rt
s 
th
e 
pa
ra
m
et
er
 e
st
im
at
es
 o
f 
th
e 
tw
o-
eq
ua
tio
n 
si
m
ul
ta
ne
ou
s 
sy
st
em
s 
es
tim
at
ed
 b
y 
3S
LS
. V
al
ue
s 
of
 e
st
im
at
ed
 c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
an
d 
th
ei
r 
t-
st
at
is
tic
 in
 b
ra
ck
et
s 
fo
r 
E
qu
at
io
n 
(5
.5
a)
 a
nd
 
(5
.5
b)
 f
or
 n
on
-f
in
an
ci
al
 f
ir
m
s.
 Y
 in
 (
5.
5b
) 
is
 s
ub
st
itu
te
d 
as
 R
O
A
 in
 th
e 
te
st
s.
 E
st
im
at
ed
 p
ar
am
et
er
s 
on
 r
at
in
g 
ch
an
ge
 in
di
ca
to
rs
 in
di
ca
te
 in
fl
ue
nc
es
 o
f 
de
la
ye
d 
cr
ed
it 
ra
tin
g 
ch
an
ge
s 
on
 f
in
an
ci
ng
 
pl
an
 m
ak
in
g.
 T
he
 th
re
e 
pa
ne
ls
 s
ho
w
 th
e 
fi
na
nc
in
g 
ad
ju
st
m
en
ts
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
th
re
e 
pe
ri
od
s 
ar
ou
nd
 D
C
R
C
 re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 BC
 

 a
nd
 BC
 

 a
re
 u
pg
ra
de
 a
nd
 d
ow
ng
ra
de
 o
f o
ve
ra
ll 
cr
ed
it 
ra
tin
g.
 *
, *
*,
 
**
* 
re
pr
es
en
t s
ta
tis
tic
al
 s
ig
ni
fi
ca
nc
e 
at
 th
e 
10
%
, t
he
 5
%
 a
nd
 th
e 
1%
 le
ve
l, 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 
P
an
el
 A
 ( 
V =
 0
 ) 
O
ne
 q
ua
rt
er
 b
ef
or
e 
D
C
R
C
 
 
P
an
el
 B
 ( 
V =
 1
 ) 
In
 th
e 
qu
ar
te
r 
of
 D
C
R
C
 
 
P
an
el
 C
 ( 
V =
 2
 ) 
O
ne
 q
ua
rt
er
 a
ft
er
 D
C
R
C
 
E
qu
at
io
n 
(a
) 
-
  
E
qu
at
io
n 
(b
) 
CB
4 
 
 
E
qu
at
io
n 
(a
) 
-
  
E
qu
at
io
n 
(b
) 
CB
4 

 
 
E
qu
at
io
n 
(a
) 
-
  
E
qu
at
io
n 
(b
) 
CB
4 
#
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
0.
01
15
7*
**
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
-0
.0
25
56
**
* 
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
0.
01
06
9*
**
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
-0
.0
30
11
**
* 
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
0.
01
11
8*
**
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
-0
.0
16
99
**
* 
 
(1
5.
55
) 
 
(-
4.
10
) 
 
 
(1
3.
78
) 
 
(-
26
.2
2)
 
 
 
(1
1.
11
) 
 
(-
6.
11
) 
BC
 

 
0.
00
58
1*
* 
-
  
-1
.5
70
12
**
* 
 
BC
 

 
0.
00
39
8 
-
  
0.
12
89
3*
**
 
 
BC
 

 
0.
00
61
4 
-
  
-0
.0
01
86
 
 
(2
.1
2)
 
 
(-
3.
20
) 
 
 
(1
.2
7)
 
 
(1
5.
77
) 
 
 
(1
.5
0)
 
 
(-
0.
06
) 
BC
 

 
0.
01
79
8*
**
 
 
 
 
BC
 

 
0.
01
81
2*
**
 
 
 
 
BC
 

 
0.
01
54
4*
**
 
 
 
 
(7
.7
4)
 
 
 
 
 
(7
.4
2)
 
 
 
 
 
(4
.8
5)
 
 
 
:D
@
E 
)
 
-0
.0
16
34
**
* 
:D
@
E 
)
 
-0
.0
47
00
**
* 
 
:D
@
E 
)
 
-0
.0
16
85
**
* 
:D
@
E 
 
-0
.0
26
51
**
* 
 
:D
@
E 
)
 
-0
.0
14
62
**
* 
:D
@
E 

 
-0
.0
08
37
* 
 
(-
13
.5
7)
 
 
(-
5.
22
) 
 
 
(-
13
.5
0)
 
 
(-
14
.0
1)
 
 
 
(-
8.
95
) 
 
(-
1.
80
) 
9h
 )
 
-0
.0
01
69
**
* 
9h
 )
 
0.
00
72
7*
**
 
 
9h
 )
 
-0
.0
01
73
**
* 
9h
  
0.
00
86
07
**
* 
 
9h
 )
 
-0
.0
01
63
**
* 
9h
 
 
0.
00
65
0*
**
 
 
(-
11
.2
1)
 
 
(7
.4
1)
 
 
 
(-
10
.9
2)
 
 
(3
6.
39
) 
 
 
(-
7.
89
) 
 
(1
1.
22
) 

G 
)
 
0.
00
25
7*
**
 

G 
)
 
0.
01
29
4*
**
 
 

G 
)
 
0.
00
29
3*
**
 

G 
 
0.
00
63
5*
**
 
 

G 
)
 
0.
00
25
3*
**
 

G 

 
0.
00
04
4 
 
(1
0.
97
) 
 
(8
.3
4)
 
 
 
(1
1.
92
) 
 
(1
7.
46
) 
 
 
(7
.8
6)
 
 
(0
.5
0)
 
:5
-
A 
)
 
-0
.0
18
57
**
* 
:5
-
A 
)
 
-0
.0
51
34
**
* 
 
:5
-
A 
)
 
-0
.0
20
39
**
* 
:5
-
A 
 
-0
.0
20
19
**
* 
 
:5
-
A 
)
 
-0
.0
20
31
**
* 
:5
-
A 

 
0.
02
41
4*
**
 
 
(-
13
.6
1)
 
 
(-
4.
92
) 
 
 
(-
14
.3
3)
 
 
(-
9.
55
) 
 
 
(-
10
.9
9)
 
 
(4
.7
4)
 

H 
)
 
-0
.0
02
79
**
* 

H 
)
 
-0
.9
09
31
**
* 
 

H 
)
 
0.
00
37
2*
**
 

H 
 
-0
.9
29
38
**
* 
 

H 
)
 
0.
00
04
5 

H 

 
-0
.8
63
71
**
* 
 
(-
2.
37
) 
 
(-
18
9.
88
) 
 
 
(2
.9
1)
 
 
(-
72
1.
26
) 
 
 
(0
.2
8)
 
 
(-
11
0.
04
) 
3D
-
8-
)
 
-0
.0
00
01
 
3D
-
8-
)
 
0.
04
18
0*
* 
 
3D
-
8-
)
 
-0
.0
00
62
 
3D
-
8-
 
0.
18
21
**
* 
 
3D
-
8-
)
 
-0
.0
00
26
 
3D
-
8-

 
0.
16
69
4*
**
 
 
(0
.0
0)
 
 
(2
.0
7)
 
 
 
(-
0.
12
) 
 
(1
2.
62
) 
 
 
(-
0.
04
) 
 
(5
.2
3)
 
7@
88
E 
)
 
-0
.0
00
15
**
* 
7@
88
E 
)
 
0.
00
06
5*
**
 
 
7@
88
E 
)
 
-0
.0
00
93
**
* 
7@
88
E 
 
0.
00
49
38
**
* 
 
7@
88
E 
)
 
-0
.0
00
24
**
* 
7@
88
E 

 
0.
01
45
1*
**
 
 
(-
5.
29
) 
 
(4
.7
7)
 
 
 
(-
12
.7
0)
 
 
(4
7.
73
) 
 
 
(-
3.
42
) 
 
(5
7.
58
) 
I

)
 
0.
00
00
8*
**
 
I

)
 
0.
00
04
1*
**
 
 
I

)
 
0.
00
00
6*
* 
I

 
0.
00
01
**
 
 
I

)
 
0.
00
00
4 
I


 
-0
.0
00
33
 
 
(2
.7
6)
 
 
(3
.2
8)
 
 
 
(2
.0
4)
 
 
(2
.0
8)
 
 
 
(0
.9
5)
 
 
(-
1.
23
) 
=@8
EJ
K
A )
 
0.
00
73
5*
**
 
=@8
EJ
K
A )

0.
04
35
6*
**
 
 
=@8
EJ
K
A )
 
0.
00
75
2*
**
 
=@8
EJ
K
A 
 
0.
02
39
6*
**
 
 
=@8
EJ
K
A )
 
0.
00
46
5*
**
 
=@8
EJ
K
A 
 
0.
02
38
7*
**
 
 
(5
.6
7)
 
 
(6
.9
6)
 
 
 
(5
.6
1)
 
 
(1
2.
10
) 
 
 
(2
.6
5)
 
 
(5
.0
2)
 
L3
=9 
)
 
-0
.0
25
94
**
* 
L3
=9 
)
 
-0
.1
03
34
**
* 
 
L3
=9 
)
 
-0
.0
25
83
**
* 
L3
=9 
 
-0
.0
36
17
**
* 
 
L3
=9 
)
 
-0
.0
07
5 
L3
=9 

 
-0
.0
36
79
 
 
(-
3.
04
) 
 
(-
2.
92
) 
 
 
(-
2.
92
) 
 
(-
2.
75
) 
 
 
(-
0.
65
) 
 
(-
1.
16
) 
A
dj
 R
-s
qu
ar
e 
0.
15
42
 
 
 
 
A
dj
 R
-s
qu
ar
e 
0.
69
13
 
 
 
 
A
dj
 R
-s
qu
ar
e 
0.
05
71
 
 
 
N
 
25
1,
21
5 
 
 
 
N
 
23
8,
24
3 
 
 
 
N
 
22
6,
06
3 
 
 
 
B
C 

 
-0
.0
09
12
**
 
 
 
 
 

B
C 

 
0.
00
05
1 
 
 
 
 

#B
C 

 
-0
.0
00
01
 
 
 
 
B
C 

 
-0
.0
28
22
**
* 
 
 
 
 

B
C 

 
0.
00
23
4*
**
 
 
 
 
 

#B
C 

 
-0
.0
00
03
 
 
 
C
ha
pt
er
 V
 T
he
 F
in
an
ci
ng
 A
dj
us
tm
en
t B
en
ef
its
 fr
om
 D
el
ay
ed
 C
re
di
t R
at
in
g 
C
ha
ng
es
 
 
 
19
6 
T
ab
le
 5
. 4
 R
O
A
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 r
es
po
ns
e 
to
 e
qu
it
y 
is
su
an
ce
  
T
he
 ta
bl
e 
re
po
rt
s 
th
e 
pa
ra
m
et
er
 e
st
im
at
es
 o
f 
th
e 
tw
o-
eq
ua
tio
n 
si
m
ul
ta
ne
ou
s 
sy
st
em
s 
es
tim
at
ed
 b
y 
3S
LS
. V
al
ue
s 
of
 e
st
im
at
ed
 c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
an
d 
th
ei
r 
t-
st
at
is
tic
 in
 b
ra
ck
et
s 
fo
r 
E
qu
at
io
n 
(5
.6
a)
 a
nd
 
(5
.6
b)
 f
or
 n
on
-f
in
an
ci
al
 f
ir
m
s.
 Y
 in
 (
5.
6b
) 
is
 s
ub
st
itu
te
d 
as
 R
O
A
 in
 th
e 
te
st
s.
 E
st
im
at
ed
 p
ar
am
et
er
s 
on
 r
at
in
g 
ch
an
ge
 in
di
ca
to
rs
 in
di
ca
te
 in
fl
ue
nc
es
 o
f 
de
la
ye
d 
cr
ed
it 
ra
tin
g 
ch
an
ge
s 
on
 f
in
an
ci
ng
 
pl
an
 m
ak
in
g.
 T
he
 th
re
e 
pa
ne
ls
 s
ho
w
 th
e 
fi
na
nc
in
g 
ad
ju
st
m
en
ts
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
th
re
e 
pe
ri
od
s 
ar
ou
nd
 D
C
R
C
 r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
 BC
  a
nd
 BC
  a
re
 u
pg
ra
de
 a
nd
 d
ow
ng
ra
de
 o
f 
ov
er
al
l c
re
di
t r
at
in
g.
 *
, *
*,
 *
**
 
re
pr
es
en
t s
ta
tis
tic
al
 s
ig
ni
fi
ca
nc
e 
at
 th
e 
10
%
, t
he
 5
%
 a
nd
 th
e 
1%
 le
ve
l, 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 
P
an
el
 A
 ( 
V =
 0
 ) 
O
ne
 q
ua
rt
er
 b
ef
or
e 
D
C
R
C
 
 
P
an
el
 B
 ( 
V =
 1
 ) 
In
 th
e 
qu
ar
te
r 
of
 D
C
R
C
 
 
P
an
el
 C
 ( 
V =
 2
 ) 
O
ne
 q
ua
rt
er
 a
ft
er
 D
C
R
C
 
E
qu
at
io
n 
(a
) 
5
  
E
qu
at
io
n 
(b
) 
CB
4 
 
 
E
qu
at
io
n 
(a
) 
5
  
E
qu
at
io
n 
(b
) 
CB
4 

 
 
E
qu
at
io
n 
(a
) 
5
  
E
qu
at
io
n 
(b
) 
CB
4 
#
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
0.
01
85
1*
**
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
0.
00
59
6 
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
0.
01
36
5*
**
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
-0
.0
23
53
**
* 
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
0.
01
79
1*
**
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
-0
.0
20
35
**
* 
 
(1
7.
98
) 
 
(0
.3
8)
 
 
 
(1
3.
50
) 
 
(-
26
.6
8)
 
 
 
(1
1.
96
) 
 
(-
22
.8
0)
 
BC
 

 
0.
00
52
6*
 
5
  
-2
.1
73
86
**
* 
 
BC
 

 
0.
00
72
8*
* 
5
  
-0
.0
06
63
 
 
BC
 

 
0.
01
06
2*
**
 
5
  
-0
.1
21
44
**
* 
 
(1
.7
1)
 
 
(-
2.
58
) 
 
 
(2
.1
0)
 
 
(-
1.
61
) 
 
 
(2
.0
8)
 
 
(-
23
.4
7)
 
BC
 

 
0.
00
94
8*
**
 
 
 
 
BC
 

 
0.
00
40
8 
 
 
 
BC
 

 
0.
00
84
7*
* 
 
 
 
(4
.3
6)
 
 
 
 
 
(1
.4
5)
 
 
 
 
 
(2
.0
2)
 
 
 
:D
@
E 
)
 
0.
01
43
1*
**
 
:D
@
E 
)
 
0.
01
55
21
 
 
:D
@
E 
)
 
0.
01
03
7*
**
 
:D
@
E 
 
-0
.0
18
94
**
* 
 
:D
@
E 
)
 
0.
01
96
3*
**
 
:D
@
E 

 
-0
.0
10
50
**
* 
 
(9
.2
2)
 
 
(1
.1
9)
 
 
 
(6
.8
4)
 
 
(-
14
.4
2)
 
 
 
(8
.6
9)
 
 
(-
7.
90
) 
9h
 )
 
-0
.0
09
66
**
* 
9h
 )
 
-0
.0
13
03
 
 
9h
 )
 
-0
.0
09
18
**
* 
9h
  
0.
00
67
6*
**
 
 
9h
 )
 
-0
.0
10
55
**
* 
9h
 
 
0.
00
36
4*
**
 
 
(-
45
.6
3)
 
 
(-
1.
61
) 
 
 
(-
43
.8
9)
 
 
(3
6.
41
) 
 
 
(-
33
.9
1)
 
 
(1
9.
07
) 

G 
)
 
0.
00
84
5*
**
 

G 
)
 
0.
02
72
0*
**
 
 

G 
)
 
0.
01
09
6*
**
 

G 
 
0.
00
72
3*
**
 
 

G 
)
 
0.
01
05
9*
**
 

G 

 
0.
01
01
8*
**
 
 
(2
6.
36
) 
 
(3
.8
0)
 
 
 
(3
4.
58
) 
 
(2
6.
20
) 
 
 
(2
2.
43
) 
 
(3
6.
34
) 
:5
-
A 
)
 
0.
00
74
2*
**
 
:5
-
A 
)
 
-0
.0
13
39
 
 
:5
-
A 
)
 
-0
.0
06
00
**
* 
:5
-
A 
 
-0
.0
24
15
**
* 
 
:5
-
A 
)
 
0.
01
12
2*
**
 
:5
-
A 

 
-0
.0
21
49
**
* 
 
(3
.7
2)
 
 
(-
1.
61
) 
 
 
(-
3.
06
) 
 
(-
13
.7
4)
 
 
 
(3
.8
6)
 
 
(-
11
.9
6)
 

H 
)
 
-0
.1
59
57
**
* 

H 
)
 
-1
.2
35
13
**
* 
 

H 
)
 
-0
.1
59
97
**
* 

H 
 
-0
.9
15
15
**
* 
 

H 
)
 
-0
.1
92
92
**
* 

H 

 
-0
.7
38
09
**
* 
 
(-
81
.9
6)
 
 
(-
9.
18
) 
 
 
(-
79
.1
9)
 
 
(-
73
2.
9)
 
 
 
(-
67
.2
) 
 
(-
26
6.
82
) 
3D
-
8-
)
 
-0
.0
03
57
 
3D
-
8-
)
 
0.
03
35
5 
 
3D
-
8-
)
 
-0
.0
11
67
 
3D
-
8-
 
0.
14
01
9*
**
 
 
3D
-
8-
)
 
-0
.0
15
00
**
* 
3D
-
8-

 
0.
09
90
3*
**
 
 
(-
0.
39
) 
 
(1
.3
8)
 
 
 
(-
1.
31
) 
 
(1
1.
42
) 
 
 
(-
1.
15
) 
 
(8
.0
0)
 
7@
88
E 
)
 
-0
.0
01
57
**
* 
7@
88
E 
)
 
-0
.0
02
35
* 
 
7@
88
E 
)
 
-0
.0
05
75
**
* 
7@
88
E 
 
0.
00
47
5*
**
 
 
7@
88
E 
)
 
-0
.0
04
12
**
* 
7@
88
E 

 
-0
.0
00
77
**
* 
 
(-
30
.5
9)
 
 
(-
1.
76
) 
 
 
(-
52
.1
4)
 
 
(5
0.
95
) 
 
 
(-
32
.3
0)
 
 
(-
18
.1
2)
 
I

)
 
0.
00
30
0*
**
 
I

)
 
0.
00
66
6*
**
 
 
I

)
 
0.
00
24
2*
**
 
I

 
-0
.0
00
11
**
* 
 
I

)
 
0.
00
21
2*
**
 
I


 
-0
.0
01
61
**
* 
 
(5
6.
36
) 
 
(2
.6
4)
 
 
 
(4
7.
01
) 
 
(-
2.
40
) 
 
 
(2
8.
17
) 
 
(-
16
.1
5)
 
=@8
EJ
K
A )
 
0.
01
00
9*
**
 
=@8
EJ
K
A )
 
0.
04
61
1*
**
* 
 
=@8
EJ
K
A )
 
0.
01
16
6*
**
 
=@8
EJ
K
A 
 
0.
01
82
11
**
* 
 
=@8
EJ
K
A )
 
0.
00
80
4*
**
 
=@8
EJ
K
A 
 
0.
01
74
4*
**
 
 
(6
.2
9)
 
 
(4
.8
1)
 
 
 
(7
.4
8)
 
 
(1
3.
41
) 
 
 
(3
.4
6)
 
 
(1
2.
73
) 
L3
=9 
)
 
-0
.0
31
45
**
* 
L3
=9 
)
 
-0
.1
16
34
**
* 
 
L3
=9 
)
 
-0
.0
40
44
**
* 
L3
=9 
 
-0
.0
31
29
**
* 
 
L3
=9 
)
 
-0
.0
26
01
* 
L3
=9 

 
-0
.0
46
53
**
* 
 
(-
2.
94
) 
 
(-
3.
02
) 
 
 
(-
3.
87
) 
 
(-
3.
42
) 
 
 
(-
1.
68
) 
 
(-
5.
06
) 
A
dj
 R
-s
qu
ar
e 
0.
07
02
 
 
 
 
A
dj
 R
-s
qu
ar
e 
0.
56
89
 
 
 
 
A
dj
 R
-s
qu
ar
e 
0.
17
04
 
 
 
N
 
45
8,
65
7 
 
 
 
N
 
43
6,
29
3 
 
 
 
N
 
41
3,
04
1 
 
 
 
B
C 

 
-0
.0
11
43
* 
 
 
 
 

B
C 

 
-0
.0
00
05
 
 
 
 
 

#B
C 

 
-0
.0
01
29
**
 
 
 
 
B
C 

 
-0
.0
20
61
**
* 
 
 
 
 

B
C 

 
-0
.0
00
03
 
 
 
 
 

#B
C 

 
-0
.0
01
03
**
 
 
 
Chapter V The Financing Adjustment Benefits from Delayed Credit Rating Changes  
 
197 
 
Table 5. 5 Changes in ROA due to debt and equity issuance  
Values of estimated coefficients and their t-statistic for Equation (5.7a) (5.7b) and (5.7c) for non-financial 
firms. Y in (5.7c) is substituted as ROA. Estimated parameters on rating indicators describe influences of 
delayed credit rating changes on financing plan making one period before rating changes. The numbers in 
brackets underneath coefficient estimates are t-statistic. Rating changes take places at quarter t+1. k-BC l is change in ROA due to adjustment in debt financing when upgrade is anticipated. k-BC l  is change in ROA due to adjustment in debt financing when downgrade is 
anticipated. k5BC l is change in ROA due to adjustment in equity financing when upgrade 
is anticipated. k5BC l is change in ROA due to adjustment in equity financing when 
downgrade is anticipated. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5% and the 1% level, 
respectively. 
Panel A ( V = 0 ) 
Before the quarter of DCRC  
Equation (a) - 
Equation (b) 5 
Equation (c) CB4 
Intercept 0.01173*** Intercept -0.01359 Intercept -0.01359 
 
(15.06)  (-0.36)  (-0.36) 
BC 0.00626** BC -1.33344 - -1.33344 
 
(2.01)  (-1.17)  (-1.17) 
BC 0.01774*** BC -0.59279 5 -0.59279 
 
(7.29)  (-0.27)  (-0.27) 
:D@E) -0.01651*** :D@E) -0.03601 :D@E) -0.03601 
 
(-13.07)  (-0.87)  (-0.87) 
9h) -0.00168*** 9h) 0.00124 9h) 0.00124 
 
(-10.51)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
G) 0.00256*** G) 0.01805 G) 0.01805 
 
(10.42)  (0.98)  (0.98) 
:5-A) -0.01889*** :5-A) -0.00082 :5-A) -0.04226** 
 
(-12.96)  (-0.28)  (-2.03) 
H) -0.00247** H) -0.19428*** H) -1.03290*** 
 
(-2.06)  (-81.57)  (-2.46) 
3D-8-) -0.00029 3D-8-) -0.00453 3D-8-) 0.03617 
 
(-0.05)  (-0.42)  (1.51) 
7@88E) -0.00016*** 7@88E) -0.00124*** 7@88E) -0.00019 
 
(-5.39)  (-20.94)  (-0.07) 
I) 0.00008*** I) 0.00196*** I) 0.00153 
 
(2.59)  (32.01)  (0.37) 
=@8EJKA) 0.00688*** =@8EJKA) 0.01434*** =@8EJKA) 0.04948* 
 
(5.09)  (5.35)  (1.96) 
L3=9) -0.02624*** L3=9) -0.05635*** L3=9) -0.12812 
 
(-2.95)  (-3.19)  (-1.23) 
Adj R-square 0.1156 
N 344,340 
BC  0.78210 k-BC l -0.00835 k5BC l 0.79045 BC  0.32774 k-BC l -0.02366 k5BC l 0.35140 
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Table 5.5 (continued) 
Panel B ( V = 1 ) 
In the quarter of DCRC 
Equation (a) - 
Equation (b) 5 
Equation (c) CB4 
Intercept 0.01073*** Intercept 0.01619*** Intercept -0.02910*** 
 
(13.18)  (10.72)  (-24.28) 
BC 0.00491 BC 0.00588 - 0.11698*** 
 
(1.50)  (0.96)  (13.66) 
BC 0.01781*** BC 0.00523 5 0.00443 
 
(6.98)  (1.10)  (0.89) 
:D@E) -0.01719*** :D@E) 0.00886*** :D@E -0.02556*** 
 
(-13.12)  (3.64)  (-12.90) 
9h) -0.00169*** 9h) -0.01002*** 9h 0.00829*** 
 
(-10.03)  (-32.09)  (32.59) 
G) 0.00298*** G) 0.01212*** G 0.00636*** 
 
(11.53)  (25.32)  (16.70) 
:5-A) -0.02103*** :5-A) -0.01324*** :5-A -0.01432*** 
 
(-13.82)  (-4.69)  (-6.25) 
H) 0.00438*** H) -0.16317*** H -0.93316*** 
 
(3.34)  (-67.11)  (-717.84) 
3D-8-) -0.00121 3D-8-) -0.01395 3D-8- 0.20490*** 
 
(-0.22)  (-1.34)  (12.83) 
7@88E) -0.00108*** 7@88E) -0.00586*** 7@88E 0.00478*** 
 
(-13.57)  (-39.87)  (42.82) 
I) 0.00005 I) 0.00160*** I 0.00014*** 
 
(1.64)  (27.17)  (2.83) 
=@8EJKA) 0.00706*** =@8EJKA) 0.01600*** =@8EJKA 0.02254*** 
 
(5.05)  (6.17)  (10.96) 
L3=9) -0.02654*** L3=9) -0.06587*** L3=9 -0.02303* 
 
(-2.87)  (-3.84)  (-1.68) 
Adj R-square 0.6254 
N 327,126 
BC  0.00060 k-BC l 0.00057 k5BC l 0.00003 BC  0.00211*** k-BC l 0.00208*** k5BC l 0.00002 
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Table 5.5 (continued) 
Panel C ( V = 2 ) 
One quarter after DCRC 
Equation (a) - 
Equation (b) 5 
Equation (c) CB4# 
Intercept 0.01186*** Intercept 0.02340*** Intercept -0.02277*** 
 
(11.13)  (9.34)  (-19.88) 
BC 0.00685 BC 0.00986 - 0.11321*** 
 
(1.58)  (0.97)  (8.13) 
BC 0.01512*** BC 0.01212 5 -0.06964*** 
 
(4.51)  (1.54)  (-12.23) 
:D@E) -0.01472*** :D@E) 0.02154*** :D@E -0.01737*** 
 
(-8.49)  (5.29)  (-8.99) 
9h) -0.00160*** 9h) -0.01180*** 9h 0.00545*** 
 
(-7.22)  (-22.68)  (22.27) 
G) 0.00233*** G) 0.01105*** G 0.00745*** 
 
(6.84)  (13.82)  (20.2) 
:5-A) -0.02167*** :5-A) 0.00437 :5-A -0.00981*** 
 
(-10.84)  (0.93)  (-4.46) 
H) 0.00216 H) -0.19972*** H -0.80433*** 
 
(1.32)  (-52.14)  (-246.29) 
3D-8-) 0.00129 3D-8-) -0.01789 3D-8- 0.11766*** 
 
(0.18)  (-1.05)  (8.62) 
7@88E) -0.00028*** 7@88E) -0.00352*** 7@88E 0.00288*** 
 
(-3.79)  (-19.95)  (26.46) 
I) 0.00005 I) 0.00143*** I -0.00065*** 
 
(1.23)  (14.74)  (-5.82) 
=@8EJKA) 0.00417*** =@8EJKA) 0.01036*** =@8EJKA 0.02158*** 
 
(2.26)  (2.39)  (11.07) 
L3=9) -0.00824 L3=9) -0.05195* L3=9 -0.03502*** 
 
(-0.68)  (-1.82)  (-2.71) 
Adj R-square 0.1816 
N 309,873 
#BC  0.00009 #k-BC l 0.00078 #k5BC l -0.00069 #BC  0.00087 #k-BC l 0.00171*** #k5BC l -0.00084 
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Table 5. 9 Changes in EPS due to debt and equity issuance  
Values of estimated coefficients and their t-statistic for Equation (5.7a) (5.7b) and (5.7c) for non-financial 
firms. Y in (5.7c) is substituted as EPS. Estimated parameters on rating indicators describe influences of 
delayed credit rating changes on financing plan making one period before rating changes. The numbers in 
brackets underneath coefficient estimates are t-statistic. Rating changes take places at quarter t+1. k-BC l is change in EPS due to adjustment in debt financing when upgrade is anticipated. k-BC l  is change in EPS due to adjustment in debt financing when downgrade is 
anticipated. k5BC l is change in EPS due to adjustment in equity financing when upgrade 
is anticipated. k5BC l  is change in EPS due to adjustment in equity financing when 
downgrade is anticipated. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5% and the 1% level, 
respectively. 
Panel A ( V = 0 ) 
One quarter before DCRC  
Equation (a) - 
Equation (b) 5 
Equation (c) 79 
Intercept 0.01175*** Intercept 0.02223*** Intercept -0.08836 
 
(15.11)  (14.38)  (-0.08) 
BC 0.00497 BC 0.00845 - -14.10970 
 
(1.60)  (1.37)  (-0.42) 
BC 0.01781*** BC 0.00708 5 8.32902 
 
(7.32)  (1.46)  (0.13) 
:D@E) -0.01644*** :D@E) 0.01082*** :D@E) -0.16055 
 
(-13.03)  (4.32)  (-0.13) 
9h) -0.00169*** 9h) -0.01038*** 9h) 0.04999 
 
(-10.55)  (-32.69)  (0.08) 
G) 0.00255*** G) 0.00959*** G) 0.01566 
 
(10.40)  (19.69)  (0.03) 
:5-A) -0.01891*** :5-A) -0.00082 :5-A) -0.29449 
 
(-13.00)  (-0.28)  (-0.48) 
H) -0.00244** H) -0.19425*** H) 0.98786 
 
(-2.04)  (-81.58)  (0.08) 
3D-8-) -0.00025 3D-8-) -0.00447 3D-8-) 0.06273 
 
(-0.05)  (-0.42)  (0.08) 
7@88E) -0.00016*** 7@88E) -0.00124*** 7@88E) 0.00787 
 
(-5.39)  (-20.94)  (0.11) 
I) 0.00008*** I) 0.00196*** I) -0.01959 
 
(2.61)  (32.01)  (-0.16) 
=@8EJKA) 0.00687*** =@8EJKA) 0.01435*** =@8EJKA) 0.06082 
 
(5.10)  (5.36)  (0.08) 
L3=9) -0.02747*** L3=9) -0.05633*** L3=9) -1.75316 
 
(-3.10)  (-3.19)  (-0.58) 
Adj R-square 0.0397 
N 344,175 
BC  0.00026 k-BC l -0.07013 k5BC l 0.07038 BC  -0.19232 k-BC l -0.25129 k5BC l 0.05897 
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Table 5.9 (continued) 
Panel B ( V = 1 ) 
In the quarter of DCRC 
Equation (a) - 
Equation (b) 5 
Equation (c) 79 
Intercept 0.01066*** Intercept 0.01607*** Intercept 0.11721 
 
(13.11)  (10.64)  (1.04) 
BC 0.00518 BC 0.00612 - 3.58077*** 
 
(1.58)  (1.00)  (4.44) 
BC 0.01865*** BC 0.00619 5 -0.82342* 
 
(7.28)  (1.30)  (-1.76) 
:D@E) -0.01715*** :D@E) 0.00894*** :D@E -0.25421 
 
(-13.10)  (3.67)  (-1.36) 
9h) -0.00170*** 9h) -0.01004*** 9h 0.03438 
 
(-10.11)  (-32.13)  (1.44) 
G) 0.00303*** G) 0.01219*** G -0.13422*** 
 
(11.77)  (25.45)  (-3.74) 
:5-A) -0.02087*** :5-A) -0.01300*** :5-A 0.11383 
 
(-13.72)  (-4.60)  (0.53) 
H) 0.00277*** H) -0.16476*** H -0.18941 
 
(2.11)  (-67.74)  (-1.55) 
3D-8-) -0.00203 3D-8-) -0.01482 3D-8- 0.57312 
 
(-0.36)  (-1.42)  (0.38) 
7@88E) -0.00105*** 7@88E) -0.00584*** 7@88E 0.00972 
 
(-13.30)  (-39.71)  (0.93) 
I) 0.00005 I) 0.00159*** I 0.00242 
 
(1.43)  (27.04)  (0.53) 
=@8EJKA) 0.00695*** =@8EJKA) 0.01593*** =@8EJKA 0.05190 
 
(4.97)  (6.14)  (0.27) 
L3=9) -0.02608*** L3=9) -0.06539*** L3=9 -0.38835 
 
(-2.82)  (-3.81)  (-0.3) 
Adj R-square 0.0456 
N 326,949 
BC  0.01351 k-BC l 0.01855 k5BC l -0.00504 BC  0.06168*** k-BC l 0.06678*** k5BC l -0.00510 
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Table 5.9 (continued) 
Panel C ( V = 2 ) 
One quarter after DCRC 
Equation (a) - 
Equation (b) 5 
Equation (c) 79# 
Intercept 0.01149*** Intercept 0.02460*** Intercept 0.09767*** 
 
(10.77)  (9.81)  (0.81) 
BC 0.00740* BC 0.00813 - 4.67808*** 
 
(1.70)  (0.80)  (3.18) 
BC 0.01656*** BC 0.00786 5 -0.96366 
 
(4.91)  (0.99)  (-1.61) 
:D@E) -0.01453*** :D@E) 0.02063*** :D@E -0.30911 
 
(-8.38)  (5.06)  (-1.52) 
9h) -0.00164*** 9h) -0.01162*** 9h 0.04582* 
 
(-7.41)  (-22.29)  (1.78) 
G) 0.00250*** G) 0.01039*** G -0.14019*** 
 
(7.35)  (12.97)  (-3.61) 
:5-A) -0.02093*** :5-A) 0.00204 :5-A 0.10923 
 
(-10.46)  (0.43)  (0.47) 
H) 0.00072 H) -0.19494*** H -1.31192*** 
 
(0.44)  (-50.72)  (-3.80) 
3D-8-) -0.00086 3D-8-) -0.01062 3D-8- 0.66675 
 
(-0.12)  (-0.62)  (0.46) 
7@88E) -0.00028*** 7@88E) -0.00352*** 7@88E 0.01687 
 
(-3.76)  (-19.89)  (1.47) 
I) 0.00004 I) 0.00146*** I 0.01074 
 
(1.00)  (14.99)  (0.91) 
=@8EJKA) 0.00408** =@8EJKA) 0.01094*** =@8EJKA 0.05956 
 
(2.21)  (2.52)  (0.29) 
L3=9) -0.00721 L3=9) -0.05628* L3=9 -0.30866 
 
(-0.59)  (-1.97)  (-0.23) 
Adj R-square 0.0217 
N 309,711 
#BC  0.02678* #k-BC l 0.03462* #k5BC l -0.00783 #BC  0.06989*** #k-BC l 0.07747*** #k5BC l -0.00757 
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Table 5. 13 Changes in Tobin’s Q due to debt and equity issuance  
Values of estimated coefficients and their t-statistic for Equation (5.7a) (5.7b) and (5.7c) for non-financial 
firms. Y in (5.7c) is substituted as Tobin’s Q. Estimated parameters on rating indicators describe influences 
of delayed credit rating changes on financing plan making one period before rating changes. The numbers 
in brackets underneath coefficient estimates are t-statistic. Rating changes take places at quarter t+1. k-BC l  is change in Tobin’s Q due to adjustment in debt financing when upgrade is 
anticipated. k-BC l  is change in Tobin’s Q due to adjustment in debt financing when 
downgrade is anticipated. k5BC l  is change in Tobin’s Q due to adjustment in equity 
financing when upgrade is anticipated. k5BC l is change in Tobin’s Q due to adjustment in 
equity financing when downgrade is anticipated. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5% 
and the 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A ( V = 0 ) 
One quarter before DCRC  
Equation (a) - 
Equation (b) 5 
Equation (c) =J8 
Intercept 0.01148*** Intercept 0.02090*** Intercept 0.71387 
 
(14.69)  (14.35)  (0.67) 
BC 0.00626** BC 0.00800 - 3.72664 
 
(2.02)  (1.39)  (0.09) 
BC 0.01621*** BC 0.00728 5 8.01507 
 
(6.53)  (1.58)  (0.11) 
:D@E) -0.01603*** :D@E) 0.01167*** :D@E) -0.19376 
 
(-12.63)  (4.93)  (-0.13) 
9h) -0.00164*** 9h) -0.01016*** 9h) -0.10244 
 
(-10.18)  (-33.86)  (-0.16) 
G) 0.00248*** G) 0.00970*** G) 0.19482 
 
(10.05)  (21.12)  (0.33) 
:5-A) -0.01829*** :5-A) 0.00079 :5-A) 0.48226 
 
(-12.48)  (0.29)  (0.6) 
H) -0.00316*** H) -0.19655*** H) 7.21299 
 
(-2.60)  (-86.61)  (0.53) 
3D-8-) -0.00049 3D-8-) -0.01392 3D-8-) -1.62629 
 
(-0.05)  (-0.72)  (-1.07) 
7@88E) -0.00013*** 7@88E) -0.00098*** 7@88E) -0.25106*** 
 
(-4.78)  (-19.01)  (-3.92) 
I) 0.00006** I) 0.00176*** I) -0.60429*** 
 
(2.01)  (30.52)  (-4.99) 
=@8EJKA) 0.00652*** =@8EJKA) 0.01437*** =@8EJKA) 0.11152 
 
(4.81)  (5.68)  (0.14) 
L3=9) -0.02435*** L3=9) -0.05601*** L3=9) -2.76875 
 
(-2.73)  (-3.37)  (-0.86) 
Adj R-square 0.1319 
N 334,224 
BC  0.08745 k-BC l 0.02333 k5BC l 0.06412 BC  0.11876 k-BC l 0.06041 k5BC l 0.05835 
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Table 5.13 (continued) 
Panel B ( V = 1 ) 
In the quarter of DCRC 
Equation (a) - 
Equation (b) 5 
Equation (c) =J8 
Intercept 0.01042*** Intercept 0.01471*** Intercept 0.92929*** 
 
(12.81)  (9.92)  (47.00) 
BC 0.00517 BC 0.00616 - -0.23082 
 
(1.59)  (1.05)  (-1.62) 
BC 0.01698*** BC 0.00625 5 2.27954*** 
 
(6.54)  (1.32)  (27.21) 
:D@E) -0.01672*** :D@E) 0.01010*** :D@E -0.11146*** 
 
(-12.76)  (4.23)  (-3.41) 
9h) -0.00164*** 9h) -0.00989*** 9h -0.19684*** 
 
(-9.75)  (-32.21)  (-46.89) 
G) 0.00291*** G) 0.01225*** G 0.42096*** 
 
(11.30)  (26.06)  (66.96) 
:5-A) -0.02022*** :5-A) -0.01124*** :5-A 0.92678*** 
 
(-13.27)  (-4.05)  (24.51) 
H) 0.00255* H) -0.17021*** H -0.24783*** 
 
(1.92)  (-70.48)  (-11.70) 
3D-8-) -0.00870 3D-8-) -0.06389*** 3D-8- -0.05535 
 
(-0.72)  (-2.93)  (-0.21) 
7@88E) -0.00107*** 7@88E) -0.00567*** 7@88E -0.11366*** 
 
(-13.51)  (-39.34)  (-61.14) 
I) 0.00004 I) 0.00161*** I -0.73046*** 
 
(1.13)  (27.73)  (-915.05) 
=@8EJKA) 0.00653*** =@8EJKA) 0.01632*** =@8EJKA 0.05071 
 
(4.67)  (6.40)  (1.49) 
L3=9) -0.02309*** L3=9) -0.06333*** L3=9 -3.08188*** 
 
(-2.50)  (-3.76)  (-13.66) 
Adj R-square 0.7279 
N 318,222 
BC  0.01285 k-BC l -0.00119 k5BC l 0.01404 BC  0.01033 k-BC l -0.00392 k5BC l 0.01425 
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Table 5.13 (continued) 
Panel C ( V = 2 ) 
One quarter after DCRC 
Equation (a) - 
Equation (b) 5 
Equation (c) =J8# 
Intercept 0.01148*** Intercept 0.02425*** Intercept 0.48979*** 
 
(10.77)  (9.70)  (27.42) 
BC 0.00749* BC 0.00841 - 2.17745*** 
 
(1.72)  (0.84)  (10.16) 
BC 0.01653*** BC 0.00650 5 2.28375*** 
 
(4.89)  (0.84)  (25.79) 
:D@E) -0.01672*** :D@E) 0.02313*** :D@E -0.11210*** 
 
(-8.28)  (5.68)  (-3.71) 
9h) -0.00166*** 9h) -0.01170*** 9h -0.08261*** 
 
(-7.49)  (-22.54)  (-21.65) 
G) 0.00250*** G) 0.00992*** G 0.20646*** 
 
(7.35)  (12.45)  (36.00) 
:5-A) -0.02097*** :5-A) 0.00264 :5-A 0.67587*** 
 
(-10.49)  (0.56)  (19.70) 
H) 0.00126 H) -0.18514*** H -0.10420** 
 
(0.77)  (-48.86)  (-2.09) 
3D-8-) -0.00063 3D-8-) -0.00635 3D-8- -0.12997 
 
(-0.09)  (-0.38)  (-0.62) 
7@88E) -0.00028*** 7@88E) -0.00341*** 7@88E -0.05710*** 
 
(-3.67)  (-19.61)  (-34.05) 
I) 0.00007 I) 0.00194*** I -0.44970*** 
 
(1.64)  (20.38)  (-262.76) 
=@8EJKA) 0.00398** =@8EJKA) 0.01032*** =@8EJKA 0.04481 
 
(2.16)  (2.38)  (1.47) 
L3=9) -0.00650 L3=9) -0.05307* L3=9 -1.61836*** 
 
(-0.54)  (-1.87)  (-8.01) 
Adj R-square 0.1968 
N 309,699 
#BC  0.03552 #k-BC l 0.01631* #k5BC l 0.01921 #BC  0.05084 #k-BC l 0.03599*** #k5BC l 0.01484 
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Table 5. 14 Long-term debt and short-term debt effects on changes in ROA 
Values of estimated coefficients and their t-statistic for Equation (5.8a) (5.8b) and (5.8c) for non-financial 
firms. Y in (5.8c) is substituted as ROA. Estimated parameters on rating indicators describe influences of 
delayed credit rating changes on financing plan making one period before rating changes. The numbers in 
brackets underneath coefficient estimates are t-statistic. Rating changes take place at quarter t+1. :-BC  is change in ROA due to adjustment in long-term debt financing when upgrade is 
anticipated. k:-BC l is change in ROA due to adjustment in long-term debt financing when 
downgrade is anticipated k9-BC l is change in ROA due to adjustment in short-term debt 
financing when upgrade is anticipated. k9-BC lis change in ROA due to adjustment in 
short-term debt financing when downgrade is anticipated. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, the 5% and the 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A ( V = 0 ) 
One quarter before DCRC 
Equation (a) :- 
Equation (b) 9- 
Equation (c) CB4 
Intercept 0.00418*** Intercept 0.00739*** Intercept 0.00174 
 
(6.35)  (17.18)  (0.02) 
BC 0.00323 BC 0.00204 :- -0.35237 
 
(1.23)  (1.19)  (-0.10) 
BC 0.01430*** BC 0.00376*** 9- -5.97613 
 
(6.94)  (2.79)  (-0.48) 
:D@E) -0.00478*** :D@E) -0.01157*** :D@E) -0.09164 
 
(-4.48)  (-16.62)  (-0.72) 
9h) -0.00115 9h) -0.00054*** 9h) 0.00625** 
 
(-8.61)  (-6.18)  (2.08) 
G) 0.00209 G) 0.00049*** G) 0.01249*** 
 
(10.06)  (3.59)  (5.56) 
:5-A) -0.00676 :5-A) -0.01179*** :5-A) -0.09525 
 
(-5.6)  (-14.95)  (-0.77) 
H) -0.00103 H) -0.00173*** H) -0.91620*** 
 
(-0.99)  (-2.55)  (-48.33) 
3D-8-) -0.00848 3D-8-) -0.00034 3D-8-) 0.21961*** 
 
(-0.78)  (-0.05)  (3.33) 
7@88E) -0.00011 7@88E) -0.00005*** 7@88E) 0.00058** 
 
(-4.17)  (-2.78)  (2.11) 
I) 0.00009 I) 0.00000 I) 0.00030 
 
(3.15)  (-0.02)  (0.90) 
=@8EJKA) 0.00699 =@8EJKA) 0.00036 =@8EJKA) 0.03665* 
 
(6.09)  (0.49)  (1.76) 
L3=9) -0.01941 L3=9) -0.00636 L3=9) -0.11088*** 
 
(-2.57)  (-1.29)  (-2.38) 
Adj R-square 0.0926 
N 376,821 
BC  -0.01333 k:-BC l -0.00114 k9-BC l -0.01219 BC  -0.02751 k:-BC l -0.00504 k9-BC l -0.02247 
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Table 5.14 (continued) 
Panel B ( V = 1 ) 
In the quarter of DCRC 
Equation (a) :- 
Equation (b) 9- 
Equation (c) CB4 
Intercept 0.00387*** Intercept 0.00686*** Intercept -0.01711*** 
 
(5.67)  (15.48)  (-11.16) 
BC 0.00054 BC 0.00271 :- 1.76073*** 
 
(0.22)  (1.64)  (30.26) 
BC 0.00620*** BC 0.00860*** 9- -2.17103*** 
 
(3.23)  (6.66)  (-26.60) 
:D@E) -0.00456*** :D@E) -0.01199*** :D@E -0.04828*** 
 
(-4.13)  (-16.76)  (-19.26) 
9h) -0.00103*** 9h) -0.00065*** 9h 0.00888*** 
 
(-7.49)  (-7.24)  (31.49) 
G) 0.00168*** G) 0.00101*** G 0.00480*** 
 
(7.86)  (7.23)  (10.99) 
:5-A) -0.00742*** :5-A) -0.01247*** :5-A -0.04561*** 
 
(-5.92)  (-15.33)  (-15.49) 
H) 0.01490*** H) -0.00733*** H -0.92997*** 
 
(14.74)  (-10.79)  (-721.12) 
3D-8-) 0.00631 3D-8-) -0.00455 3D-8- 0.17525*** 
 
(1.49)  (-1.59)  (12.12) 
7@88E) -0.00074*** 7@88E) -0.00021*** 7@88E 0.00501*** 
 
(-11.59)  (-5.04)  (41.01) 
I) 0.00010*** I) -0.00003 I 0.00007 
 
(3.82)  (-1.55)  (1.35) 
=@8EJKA) 0.00807*** =@8EJKA) -0.00009 =@8EJKA 0.01021*** 
 
(6.83)  (-0.12)  (4.13) 
L3=9) -0.02014*** L3=9) -0.00559 L3=9 -0.03304** 
 
(-2.59)  (-1.11)  (-2.08) 
Adj R-square 0.5624 
N 357,963 
BC  -0.00493 k:-BC l 0.00095 k9-BC l -0.00588 BC  -0.00775 k:-BC l 0.01092*** k9-BC l -0.01867*** 
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Table 5.14 (continued) 
Panel C ( V = 2 ) 
One quarter after DCRC 
Equation (a) :- 
Equation (b) 9- 
Equation (c) CB4# 
Intercept 0.00447*** Intercept 0.00594*** Intercept -0.00549 
 
(7.26)  (7.11)  (-1.53) 
BC 0.00430* BC 0.00204 :- 1.21403*** 
 
(1.73)  (0.63)  (8.02) 
BC 0.01361*** BC 0.00355 9- -2.03472*** 
 
(7.05)  (1.40)  (-7.98) 
:D@E) -0.00579*** :D@E) -0.00856*** :D@E -0.02351*** 
 
(-5.79)  (-6.29)  (-4.28) 
9h) -0.00111*** 9h) -0.00059*** 9h 0.00667*** 
 
(-8.81)  (-3.48)  (11.01) 
G) 0.00192*** G) 0.00107*** G -0.00043 
 
(9.76)  (4.04)  (-0.45) 
:5-A) -0.00714*** :5-A) -0.01385*** :5-A 0.00016 
 
(-6.32)  (-9.05)  (0.02) 
H) -0.00140 H) 0.00260** H -0.85745*** 
 
(-1.45)  (2.06)  (-107.79) 
3D-8-) 0.00118 3D-8-) -0.00393 3D-8- 0.15881*** 
 
(0.28)  (-0.71)  (4.97) 
7@88E) 0.00005 7@88E) -0.00058 7@88E 0.01396*** 
 
(1.23)  (-10.29)  (54.11) 
I) 0.00006*** I) 0.00001 I -0.00073*** 
 
(2.32)  (0.19)  (-2.53) 
=@8EJKA) 0.00662*** =@8EJKA) -0.00210 =@8EJKA 0.01121** 
 
(6.18)  (-1.44)  (2.12) 
L3=9) -0.01532** L3=9) 0.00604 L3=9 -0.03475 
 
(-2.18)  (0.63)  (-1.04) 
Adj R-square 0.0387 
N 339,093 
#BC  0.00107 #k:-BC l 0.00522* #k9-BC l -0.00415 #BC  0.00930 #k:-BC l 0.01652*** #k9-BC l -0.00722 
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Table 5. 15 Long-term debt and short-term debt effects on changes in EPS 
Values of estimated coefficients and their t-statistic for Equation (5.8a) (5.8b) and (5.8c) for non-financial 
firms. Y in (5.8c) is substituted as EPS Estimated parameters on rating indicators describe influences of 
delayed credit rating changes on financing plan making one period before rating changes. The numbers in 
brackets underneath coefficient estimates are t-statistic. Rating changes take place at quarter t+1. :-BC  is change in EPS due to adjustment in long-term debt financing when upgrade is 
anticipated. k:-BC l is change in EPS due to adjustment in long-term debt financing when 
downgrade is anticipated k9-BC l is change in EPS due to adjustment in short-term debt 
financing when upgrade is anticipated. k9-BC lis change in EPS due to adjustment in short-
term debt financing when downgrade is anticipated. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
the 5% and the 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A ( V = 0 ) 
One quarter before DCRC 
Equation (a) :- 
Equation (b) 9- 
Equation (c) 79 
Intercept 0.00420*** Intercept 0.00739*** Intercept 0.07131 
 
(6.39)  (17.18)  (0.03) 
BC 0.00236 BC 0.00172 :- 
 
-10.8236 
 
(0.90)  (1.00)  (-0.12) 
BC 0.01437*** BC 0.00376*** 9- -13.50470 
 
(6.97)  (2.78)  (-0.04) 
:D@E) -0.00115*** :D@E) -0.00054*** :D@E) -0.03145 
 
(-4.45)  (-16.58)  (-0.01) 
9h) -0.00115*** 9h) -0.00054*** 9h) -0.03145 
 
(-8.65)  (-6.18)  (-0.39) 
G) 0.00208*** G) 0.00049*** G) 0.08647 
 
(10.03)  (3.60)  (1.58) 
:5-A) -0.00678*** :5-A) -0.01180*** :5-A) -0.26447 
 
(-5.62)  (-14.95)  (-0.08) 
H) -0.00100 H) -0.00173*** H) -0.65939 
 
(-0.96)  (-2.55)  (-1.30) 
3D-8-) -0.00822 3D-8-) -0.00033 3D-8-) 0.06074 
 
(-0.76)  (-0.05)  (0.04) 
7@88E) -0.00011*** 7@88E) -0.00005** 7@88E) -0.00187 
 
(-4.17)  (-2.78)  (-0.25) 
I) 0.00009*** I) 0.00000 I) -0.00369 
 
(3.16)  (-0.02)  (-0.42) 
=@8EJKA) 0.00700*** =@8EJKA) 0.00035 =@8EJKA) 0.16843 
 
(6.11)  (0.47)  (0.31) 
L3=9) -0.02053*** L3=9) -0.00642 L3=9) -2.04891* 
 
(-2.72)  (-1.30)  (-1.77) 
Adj R-square 0.0021 
N 376,644 
BC  -0.04877 k:-BC l -0.02554 k9-BC l -0.02323 BC  -0.20631 k:-BC l -0.15554 k9-BC l -0.05078 
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Table 5.15 (continued) 
Panel B ( V = 1 ) 
In the quarter of DCRC 
Equation (a) :- 
Equation (b) 9- 
Equation (c) 79 
Intercept 0.00361*** Intercept 0.00702*** Intercept -0.05045 
 
(5.25)  (15.72)  (-0.44) 
BC 0.00272 BC 0.00153 :- 
 
-13.42620*** 
 
(0.98)  (0.85)  (-2.68) 
BC 0.01582*** BC 0.00338*** 9- 27.46567*** 
 
(7.28)  (2.40)  (3.89) 
:D@E) -0.00117*** :D@E) -0.00058*** :D@E 0.03565 
 
(-4.74)  (-16.14)  (-0.07) 
9h) -0.00117*** 9h) -0.00058*** 9h 0.03565* 
 
(-8.32)  (-6.32)  (1.67) 
G) 0.00238*** G) 0.00062*** G -0.10757*** 
 
(10.93)  (4.38)  (-3.21) 
:5-A) -0.00817*** :5-A) -0.01210*** :5-A 0.36492 
 
(-6.48)  (-14.79)  (1.66) 
H) 0.00227** H) -0.00043 H -0.21383* 
 
(2.01)  (-0.59)  (-1.84) 
3D-8-) -0.00116 3D-8-) -0.00044 3D-8- 0.56340 
 
(-0.24)  (-0.14)  (0.43) 
7@88E) -0.00065 7@88E) -0.00026*** 7@88E 0.01173 
 
(-10.00)  (-6.09)  (1.25) 
I) 0.00007*** I) -0.00001 I 0.00219 
 
(2.35)  (-0.52)  (0.51) 
=@8EJKA) 0.00689*** =@8EJKA) 0.00052 =@8EJKA 0.17550 
 
(5.80)  (0.67)  (0.95) 
L3=9) -0.01930*** L3=9) -0.00618 L3=9 -0.51401 
 
(-2.46)  (-1.21)  (-0.43) 
Adj R-square 0.0026 
N 357,777 
BC  0.00550 k:-BC l -0.03652 k9-BC l 0.04202 BC  -0.11957 k:-BC l -0.21240*** k9-BC l 0.09283*** 
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Table 5.15 (continued) 
Panel C ( V = 2 ) 
One quarter after DCRC 
Equation (a) :- 
Equation (b) 9- 
Equation (c) 79# 
Intercept 0.00404*** Intercept 0.00714*** Intercept -0.11149 
 
(6.55)  (8.51)  (-0.81) 
BC 0.00440* BC 0.00183 :- 
 
-11.26620* 
 
(1.76)  (0.54)  (-1.89) 
BC 0.01468*** BC 0.00110 9- 31.68777*** 
 
(7.51)  (0.41)  (3.15) 
:D@E) -0.00116*** :D@E) -0.00044*** :D@E 0.05215 
 
(-5.63)  (-6.69)  (-0.50) 
9h) -0.00116*** 9h) -0.00044*** 9h 0.05215*** 
 
(-9.17)  (-2.58)  (2.25) 
G) 0.00218*** G) 0.00031 G -0.11381*** 
 
(11.05)  (1.15)  (-3.13) 
:5-A) -0.00752*** :5-A) -0.01271*** :5-A 0.38463 
 
(-6.64)  (-8.25)  (1.52) 
H) -0.00098 H) 0.00146 H -1.50205*** 
 
(-1.01)  (1.11)  (-4.76) 
3D-8-) -0.00024 3D-8-) 0.00014 3D-8- 0.68814 
 
(-0.06)  (0.02)  (0.54) 
7@88E) -0.00011*** 7@88E) -0.00013** 7@88E 0.02153** 
 
(-2.51)  (-2.23)  (2.13) 
I) 0.00007*** I) -0.00003 I 0.01441 
 
(2.82)  (-0.88)  (1.27) 
=@8EJKA) 0.00661*** =@8EJKA) -0.00189 =@8EJKA 0.22136 
 
(6.16)  (-1.30)  (1.10) 
L3=9) -0.01663*** L3=9) 0.00910 L3=9 -0.47429 
 
(-2.36)  (0.95)  (-0.37) 
Adj R-square 0.0014 
N 338,928 
#BC  0.00842 #k:-BC l -0.04957* #k9-BC l 0.05799 #BC  -0.13053 #k:-BC l -0.16539* #k9-BC l 0.03486 
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Table 5. 16 Long-term debt and short-term debt effects on changes in Tobin’s Q 
Values of estimated coefficients and their t-statistic for Equation (5.8a) (5.8b) and (5.8c) for non-financial 
firms. Y in (5.8c) is substituted as Tobin’s Q. Estimated parameters on rating indicators describe 
influences of delayed credit rating changes on financing plan making one period before rating changes. 
The numbers in brackets underneath coefficient estimates are t-statistic. Rating changes take place at 
quarter t+1. :-BC   is change in Tobin’s Q due to adjustment in long-term debt 
financing when upgrade is anticipated. k:-BC l is change in Tobin’s Q due to adjustment 
in long-term debt financing when downgrade is anticipated k9-BC l is change in Tobin’s 
Q due to adjustment in short-term debt financing when upgrade is anticipated. k9-BC lis 
change in Tobin’s Q due to adjustment in short-term debt financing when downgrade is anticipated. *, **, 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5% and the 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A ( V = 0 ) 
One quarter before DCRC 
Equation (a) :- 
Equation (b) 9- 
Equation (c) =J8 
Intercept 0.00399*** Intercept 0.00738*** Intercept 0.53176 
 
(6.06)  (16.95)  (0.25) 
BC 0.00323 BC 0.00207 :- 
 
-8.91455 
 
(1.24)  (1.20)  (-0.07) 
BC 0.01255*** BC 0.00431*** 9- 53.11380 
 
(6.00)  (3.11)  (0.15) 
:D@E) -0.00110*** :D@E) -0.00057*** :D@E) -0.17306 
 
(-4.04)  (-16.45)  (0.13) 
9h) -0.00110*** 9h) -0.00057*** 9h) -0.17306*** 
 
(-8.21)  (-6.45)  (-2.48) 
G) 0.00199*** G) 0.00054*** G) 0.28600*** 
 
(9.57)  (3.94)  (3.80) 
:5-A) -0.00613*** :5-A) -0.01189*** :5-A) 1.11435 
 
(-5.07)  (-14.87)  (0.32) 
H) -0.00146 H) -0.00203*** H) 5.62497*** 
 
(-1.38)  (-2.91)  (10.18) 
3D-8-) -0.00899 3D-8-) 0.00292 3D-8-) -1.74238 
 
(-0.80)  (0.39)  (-0.67) 
7@88E) -0.00009*** 7@88E) -0.00004*** 7@88E) -0.25231*** 
 
(-3.63)  (-2.56)  (-50.67) 
I) 0.00007*** I) 0.00000 I) -0.58463*** 
 
(2.60)  (-0.24)  (-53.53) 
=@8EJKA) 0.00655*** =@8EJKA) 0.00040 =@8EJKA) 0.27892 
 
(5.69)  (0.53)  (0.40) 
L3=9) -0.01692*** L3=9) -0.00670 L3=9) -3.09666*** 
 
(-2.24)  (-1.34)  (-2.93) 
Adj R-square 0.1037 
N 365,724 
BC  0.08115 k:-BC l -0.02879 k9-BC l 0.10995 BC  0.11704 k:-BC l -0.11188 k9-BC l 0.22892 
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Table 5.16 (continued) 
Panel B ( V = 1 ) 
In the quarter of DCRC 
Equation (a) 
:- 
Equation (b) 
9- 
Equation (c) 
=J8 
Intercept 0.00284*** Intercept 0.00735*** Intercept 1.07821*** 
 
(4.15)  (16.38)  (46.94) 
BC 0.00312 BC 0.00129 :- 
 
16.19102*** 
 
(1.19)  (0.75)  (16.32) 
BC 0.01197*** BC 0.00486*** 9- -22.62450*** 
 
(5.70)  (3.51)  (-16.91) 
:D@E) -0.00108*** :D@E) -0.00061*** :D@E -0.21851*** 
 
(-3.69)  (-16.75)  (-7.57) 
9h) -0.00108*** 9h) -0.00061*** 9h -0.21851*** 
 
(-7.73)  (-6.67)  (-51.07) 
G) 0.00213*** G) 0.00073*** G 0.42829*** 
 
(9.84)  (5.13)  (64.44) 
:5-A) -0.00728*** :5-A) -0.01227*** :5-A 0.84378*** 
 
(-5.79)  (-14.88)  (19.13) 
H) 0.00056 H) 0.00050 H -0.29233*** 
 
(0.51)  (0.69)  (-13.59) 
3D-8-) -0.00671 3D-8-) 0.00091 3D-8- -0.32640 
 
(-0.76)  (0.16)  (-1.36) 
7@88E) -0.00064*** 7@88E) -0.00028*** 7@88E -0.11527*** 
 
(-9.90)  (-6.56)  (-61.28) 
I) 0.00027*** I) -0.00014*** I -0.72280*** 
 
(10.24)  (-8.14)  (-887.32) 
=@8EJKA) 0.00671*** =@8EJKA) 0.00032 =@8EJKA -0.04035 
 
(5.66)  (0.41)  (-1.09) 
L3=9) -0.01388* L3=9) -0.00738 L3=9 -3.21060*** 
 
(-1.78)  (-1.44)  (-13.46) 
Adj R-square 0.6844 
N 348,246 
BC  0.02133 k:-BC l 0.05052 k9-BC l -0.02919 BC  0.08385*** k:-BC l 0.19381*** k9-BC l -0.10996*** 
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Table 5.16 (continued) 
Panel C ( V = 2 ) 
One quarter after DCRC 
Equation (a) 
:- 
Equation (b) 
9- 
Equation (c) 
=J8# 
Intercept 0.00398*** Intercept 0.00725*** Intercept 0.55124*** 
 
(6.46)  (8.64)  (25.89) 
BC 0.00459* BC 0.00163 :- 
 
5.27185*** 
 
(1.84)  (0.48)  (5.70) 
BC 0.01451*** BC 0.00121 9- -3.62029*** 
 
(7.45)  (0.45)  (-2.33) 
:D@E) -0.00117*** :D@E) -0.00045*** :D@E -0.09986*** 
 
(-5.41)  (-6.87)  (-3.09) 
9h) -0.00117*** 9h) -0.00045*** 9h -0.09986*** 
 
(-9.28)  (-2.63)  (-27.86) 
G) 0.00217*** G) 0.00036 G 0.19914*** 
 
(11.05)  (1.33)  (35.39) 
:5-A) -0.00782*** :5-A) -0.01247*** :5-A 0.72091*** 
 
(-6.91)  (-8.09)  (18.41) 
H) -0.00160* H) 0.00215 H -0.20040*** 
 
(-1.66)  (1.64)  (-4.12) 
3D-8-) 0.00016 3D-8-) -0.00048 3D-8- -0.23581 
 
(0.04)  (-0.08)  (-1.20) 
7@88E) -0.00011*** 7@88E) -0.00013*** 7@88E -0.05534*** 
 
(-2.55)  (-2.25)  (-35.4) 
I) 0.00014*** I) -0.00012*** I -0.42292*** 
 
(5.59)  (-3.47)  (-240.28) 
=@8EJKA) 0.00652*** =@8EJKA) -0.00187 =@8EJKA 0.03162 
 
(6.08)  (-1.28)  (1.01) 
L3=9) -0.01550** L3=9) 0.00828 L3=9 -1.55323*** 
 
(-2.20)  (0.86)  (-7.91) 
Adj R-square 0.1645 
N 338,895 
#BC  0.01830 #k:-BC l 0.02420* #k9-BC l -0.00590 #BC  0.07211 #k:-BC l 0.07649*** #k9-BC l -0.00438 
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6.1 Thesis Overview and Concluding Remarks 
A decade has passed since the Enron scandal in 2001, however, the scenarios of the 
credit rating changes given by the ‘big three’ rating agencies between 15th October 
2001 to 2nd December 2001, when Enron went bankrupt, remain clear to market 
practitioners. The chronology of Enron’s ratings change announced by the rating 
agency S&P during the two months before Enron’s bankruptcy show that the 
changes in credit ratings were tardy and inaccurate. The credit ratings changes have 
always been delayed throughout the whole process. For instance, S&P affirmed 
Enron’s BBB+ rating one day after its release of their earnings, announcing a $1.2 
billion equity write down on the 15th October, 2001. The agency still affirmed the 
rating but only revised the outlook to negative. It only downgraded Enron’s rating 
to CC and placed the rating on CreditWatch Negative on the 30th November, 2001, 
two days before Enron’s bankruptcy and it lowered Enron’s rating to junk level D 
following Enron’s 2nd December, 2001 filing for bankruptcy protection.  
Having faced denounces from the market, rating agencies have been throwing 
their efforts behind increasing the transparency of their rating process and criteria 
as well as improving the timeliness and accuracy of the announced credit ratings. 
For instance, S&P has developed a number of ways to publish its credit ratings, 
criteria, and research: press releases, websites 75 , podcasts 76 , newsletters 
(CreditMatters Today)77, service desk, hosted events, direct contact with market 
participants and participation in industry and credit events (Standard & Poor’s 
                                                          
75 Websites listing credit rating related information are: www.standardandpoors.com, www.RatingsDirect.com, 
www.AboutCreditRatings.com and www.UnderstandingRatings.com. 
76  www.podcasts.standardandpoors.com. 
77  The newsletters are presented at www.standardandpoors.com/getcmt. 
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(2011)). It recently claimed in its updated publication ‘Credit Rating Essentials’ 
that the credit ratings it announced are forward looking, and based on firms’ 
available current and historical information and assessment of the impacts of 
foreseeable future events (Standard & Poor’s (2011)). However, during the past 
decade, following the Enron scandal, the phenomenon of rating changes’ delay 
continuously appears, and this has motivated this research.  
The introduction to this thesis noted that not only in industry but academics too 
have recently been highly sceptical of the preciseness and timeliness of credit 
ratings. However, not many of academics talk about utilising delays in credit rating 
changes as a source of favourable information for market insiders. Thus, the 
existing literature is limited in many areas. This research is motivated by the current 
insufficient research efforts towards the understanding of the importance of 
information asymmetry driven by delayed credit rating changes and the 
determinants of capital structures. Regarding the market insiders’ practical 
perspective, unevenly distributed firm information between them and market 
outsiders as well as the delays in credit rating changes lead to unavoidable 
information asymmetry, which is favourable to them. Continuous efforts have been 
made to alleviate this asymmetry through regulatory bodies, such as the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act of 2002 78 , attempting to enforce prompt and accurate information 
dissemination. This thesis has examined the information value effects of the 
delayed credit rating changes on insider issuers’ capital structures. Furthermore, it 
has suggested the mechanisms under which these effects work. Given the 
                                                          
78 The Sarbanes–Oxley Act is a United States federal law enhanced in July 2002. It was enacted as a reaction to 
a number of major corporate and accounting scandals including those affecting Enron, Tyco International, 
Adelphia, Peregrine Systems and WorldCom. The act set new or enhanced standards for all U.S. public 
company boards, management and public accounting firms.  
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highlighted importance of DCRCs, this thesis has contributed to capital structure 
literature by introducing a significant information factor DCRC which has not been 
examined in previous research.  
This thesis addresses three issues based on the introduction of the DCRC 
phenomenon in the reality of the current financial market. They are the influence of 
information asymmetry driven by DCRCs on capital structure and its working 
mechanism on the market, the added values on the existing theories to explain 
capital structure, and the adjustment in firm performance due to financing 
adjustments. The three distinct empirical chapters of this thesis, Chapter III, IV and 
V, make extensive contributions to the understanding of the above three issues. 
6.1.1 Summary of Main Findings of Each Empirical Chapter 
The first empirical chapter, Chapter III, addresses the delay in credit rating changes 
in the financial market and defines the concept to test its effects on capital structure. 
It explicitly investigates the influences of DCRCs on the market insider’s financing 
adjustment. Based on the assumption that both the issuers and rating agencies are 
insiders, whose knowledge and predictions on next-period rating changes are more 
precise than those of outsiders, the main finding of the chapter is that DCRCs 
significantly affect issuer’s capital structure decisions at least one period before the 
rating change takes place. The test result is based on the quarterly financial data of 
companies in North America and Standard & Poor’s ratings data collected from 
Compustat for the period between Q1 1985 and Q4 2010. Adjusting firm’s 
financing before rating changes is consistent with the hypothesis that the financing 
adjustment is due to information asymmetry before rating news is disclosed.  
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Firstly, consistent with the assumption (iv) made in Chapter III, the results of 
the chapter have suggested that issuers’ rationality in estimating their future rating 
changes by combining their private information on updated firm financials with 
rating agencies’ rating criteria as well as the potential communication with the 
agencies. As a result, issuers utilise their superior information, which is reflected by 
their financing adjustment behaviours before DCRC taking places. In particular, the 
result of the chapter shows that ‘good’ issuers moderately increase equity issuance 
by 0.901% (as the percentage of total asset in the last quarter) while ‘bad’ issuers 
significantly increase debt issuance by 1.809%. As a result, issuers take significant 
actions in adjusting their net debt issuance by 1.065% when they anticipate 
downgrades in the next quarter, but do not do so in responding to expected rating 
upgrades.79 Furthermore, ‘bad’ issuers take actions on financing adjustment one 
quarter earlier than ‘good’ issuers.  
Secondly, the evidence shows that issuers respond differently when they face 
changes in various credit ratings, for instance, they vary when facing the changes in 
long-term credit ratings and short-term credit ratings. In response to changes in 
long-term credit rating, ‘good’ issuers moderately increase equity issue by 0.894% 
(as the percentage of total asset in the last period) while ‘bad’ issuers significantly 
increase debt issue by 2.406%. Firms issue extra debt before a downgrade on long-
term credit rating, consistent with the Hypothesis 3.2 that issuers take advantage of 
the relatively cheaper debt before downgrade. However, firms behave oppositely 
when they face a change in short-term credit rating. Issuers facing downgrade in 
short-term credit rating intend to save the rating by decreasing long-term debt one 
                                                          
79 The evidence shows that financial and utility firms do not change their financing mix accordingly. It is 
consistent with the notion that the capital structure of financial firms is substantially influenced by regulators. 
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quarter before DCRCs, but firms do not take actions in financing before an upgrade 
in short-term credit ratings. 
Thirdly, issuers’ financing adjustments also depend on their static rating level 
before rating changes announced. The responses of firms to DCRCs vary across 
rating categories. In general, speculative-grade issuers show greater responses than 
investment-grade firms on adjusting net debt issuance, which typically have a wider 
information gap between outsiders and themselves. Facing forthcoming upgrades 
on long-term credit ratings, investment-grade issuers reduce long-term debt, while 
speculative-grade issuers increase equity issuance, consistent with the notion that 
speculative-grade issuers are keen to signal good information prior to the release of 
rating upgrade. Both investment-grade and speculative-grade issuers increase debt 
issuance before a downgrade on long-term credit ratings.  
Overall, the findings of the chapter suggests that firms make financing 
decisions before the anticipated rating changes in order to benefit from the 
information asymmetry derived by DCRCs.  
Having found DCRCs’ effects on issuer’s capital structure adjustments, the 
second empirical chapter, Chapter IV, mainly extends Chapter III in two aspects. 
Firstly, it confirms the DCRCs’ effects by conducting various checks of robustness. 
The robustness tests show that outliers do not contaminate the results gained from 
ordinary regression methods. Secondly, it shows that the tests incorporating DCRC 
dummies into tests of existing capital structure theories have been conducted and 
they further confirm the DCRC’s material effects on insiders. The test evidence 
shows that DCRC related hypotheses could be incorporated into the existing capital 
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structure theories, particularly the theories which are based on strong assumption of 
information asymmetry. DCRC thus cannot be easily nested into the Trade-off 
Theory, which lies in the tax benefit hypothesis. The added explanatory power on 
financing strategy driven by DCRCs is shown when DCRC dummies are 
incorporated into the tests of the Pecking Order Theory and the Market Timing 
Theory. 
Based on the affirmed DCRC effect and its added value to the existing 
literature, the third empirical chapter, Chapter V, tests the changes in issuer’s firm 
performance due to DCRC caused financing adjustments through simultaneous 
equation systems. The data sample again includes all non-missing observations 
from quarterly Compustat North data from Q1 1985 to Q4 2010 and the Standard & 
Poor’s ratings data. The tests in the chapter focus on the nonfinancial firms.  
The primary finding of the third empirical chapter is that issuers do improve 
their firm performance through financing adjustments before DCRCs. In particular, 
the test results indicate that ROA in the quarter of DCRC increases by 0.0239% for 
‘bad’ issuers who anticipate future rating downgrade and increase net debt issuance 
by 1.250% before downgrade news is announced. EPS in the quarter of DCRC 
increases by 1.805% for ‘bad’ issuers who increase net debt issuance by 1.245% 
before downgrade. Tobin’s Q in the quarter of DCRC decreases but only at a subtle 
level. However, ‘bad’ issuers gain the increase of Tobin’s Q one quarter after 
DCRC through debt financing while ‘good’ issuers gain this benefit through their 
equity financing. 
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The results robustly support the hypotheses that information gap between 
issuers and outsiders driven by DCRCs contains value and affects issuers’ financing 
strategy in many aspects. Firstly, the evidence shows that firms adjust debt and 
equity issuances one-period before rating changes. This is consistent with the 
results in the previous chapters. More specifically, ‘good’ issuers do not 
significantly adjust net debt issuance while ‘bad’ issuers significantly increase net 
debt issuance. Secondly, debt financing before DCRCs always seems to bring some 
temporary improvement in ROA and EPS. Yet, its influences on Tobin’s Q transfer 
from negative to positive. Thirdly, equity financing generally does not bring 
significant improvement on ROA and EPS, but on Tobin’s Q. Fourthly, long-term 
debt financing brings improvements on ROA and Tobin’s Q and short-term debt 
brings negative changes in these two measures, whilst short-term debt bring 
positive changes in EPS for issuers.   
6.1.2 Contributions and Implications of the Findings 
This thesis addresses inherent factors in the financial market related to the 
information transmission mechanism, which is given by credit ratings. The findings 
of this thesis can facilitate market insiders to balance the relationship between 
gaining cheaper financing and keeping satisfactory rating grades. It also sheds light 
on regulating the financial market, credit rating industry and rating agencies by 
serving policy makers to better understand the motivation of fund seekers before 
their rating changes take place as well as the financing behaviours employed by 
market insiders when they own superior information. In addition to the 
contributions made to corporation organizations which seek external financing 
opportunities, the market outsiders can also boost their benefits or avoid loss by 
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improving their understanding on market insiders. The four main contributions are 
outlined below. 
Firstly, the new concept of ‘delays in credit rating changes’ is well defined and 
the dummies described the delays of rating changes are used as a proxy of 
information asymmetry in the tests of this thesis. This allows the quantification of 
the length of time gap between issuers’ processes of private information about 
future rating changes and the rating changes announced on the public financial 
market, and thus the efficiency on testing DCRC’s influence on capital structures. 
This research develops the awareness of significant impacts of DCRCs on the 
market.  
Secondly, to my best knowledge, the effects of changes in different types of 
credit ratings have not been studied in previous literature. Instead of focusing on the 
long-term credit rating only, Chapter III in this study investigates the effects from 
four types of ratings. It found that issuers behave differently when they face 
changes in different individual rating indicators due to the ratings’ different 
characteristics and functions. Issuers thus have to choose between keeping the 
rating and getting cheaper finance. An significant difference between issuers’ 
reaction when facing long-term credit rating and short-term credit rating is that 
issuers choose to get cheaper finance before long-term rating downgrades but 
choose to keep the rating before short-term rating downgrades. 
Thirdly, this study incorporates DCRC into the existing capital structure theory. 
DCRC has added values when imbedded into tests examining existing capital 
structure theories. The results are explained most naturally by the theories which 
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consider the influences of information asymmetry, which further confirms the 
influences of the information asymmetry on fund seekers’ financing behaviour.  
Fourthly, further efforts made on testing the firm performance measures help to 
better understand the genuine impacts of DCRCs on issuers’ financial conditions. 
The investors, if understand issuers’ financing adjustment strategy well and 
accurately anticipate the changes of firm performance, could avoid confusing 
signals made by insiders and thus stay away from serious investment mistakes.  
The implications of the study results could be employed by both academia and 
practitioners. Regarding the theoretical perspectives, the DCRC’s significant impact 
is confirmed by being nested into some existing capital structure theories. It 
especially partially fits into the Pecking Order Theory which is based on the 
assumption of information asymmetry and the Market Timing Theory which is 
based on the assumption that market players are motivated to time the market and 
possess the capability to time the market accurately with their private information. 
Financial researchers, examining the information asymmetry and capital structure 
theories, form another group of beneficiaries of this thesis. In particular, it further 
confirms Myers (2001)’s view that there is no reason to expect one universal capital 
structure theory due to various and complex developed financial market 
environments.  
Regarding the practical perspective, market insiders could learn from the 
evidential results that whether and when to utilise delayed rating changes and how 
to adjust financing before rating changes to gain some cheaper external funding as 
well as not bring negative impact on their credit ratings. The explicit results give 
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detailed suggestions through testing the effects of delay in long-term and short-term 
credit rating changes, the strategy when facing delayed upgrades and downgrades, 
the different approaches adjusting debt and equity issuances when issuers are in 
investment-grade and speculative-grade rating groups. In addition, the issuers’ 
behaviour shown in this study sheds light on the regulation body’s policy on the 
credit rating industry. Policy makers and advisors, who have to learn the market 
insiders’ behaviours in a deeper level to draft regulations accordingly, can gain 
knowledge through this research. 
6.2 Limitations and Areas for Future Research 
Motivated by the increasing significant and profound influences of credit ratings on 
the financial market, this thesis studies the link between credit ratings and firms’ 
financing plans. Despite rapidly increasing interest and effort, the existing study has 
been limited in a few aspects due to some measuring issues.  
Effects of information asymmetry between market insiders and outsiders, in 
particular the difference of expectations on delayed rating changes between the 
fund seekers and other market players, on the adjustment of financing strategy are 
examined. This information content is regarded as favourable information utilised 
by issuers. This reaction is based on the premise that issuers receive their 
information earlier than outsiders. However, no suitable indicator has been 
introduced to measure the precise timing when issuers could have the information 
and knowledge to accurately forecast their future rating changes. Instead, issuers’ 
realisation time is made mandatory in one or two quarters prior to the 
announcement in rating changes due to the difficulty of confirming indicators.  
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In addition, this study does not explicitly discuss DCRC’s influence when 
outsiders could forecast the rating changes since the result based on data shows that 
outsiders could hardly catch the precise timing of rating changes even if they could 
forecast the static credit ratings according to publicly available firms’ financial 
reports and rating agencies’ rating criteria.  
To summarise, this study concentrates on DCRC’s role as an information 
asymmetry driven factor. The discussion focuses on choices of debt-equity 
issuances before DCRCs and firm performance improvements due to DCRCs. This 
thesis closes by highlighting four potential avenues for future research.  
Firstly, tests in this study do not involve adjustments of rating’s CreditWatch 
and Outlook as indicators of information asymmetry due to the limited access to 
relative historical data. An interesting future research direction could be to adapt 
these two rating related indicators into research80. Since CreditWatch and Outlook 
can disclose the information to the market outsiders and help them to understand the 
trend of future rating change, the information value of rating changes may be 
decreased by the two measures. Furthermore, since the endorsement value of rating 
will be tightly tied to the real rating change rather than the changes in CreditWatch 
or Outlook, there is a possibility to separately test information value and 
endorsement value. For instance, given a plausible assumption that information 
value has been fully disclosed by CreditWatch and Outlook and ratings only 
contains endorsement value after changes in CreditWatch or Outlook and before 
real rating change announced, the test is likely to discover the effects of 
                                                          
80 The paper ‘Credit Watch and Capital Structure’ presented at the FMA annual meeting 2011 in Denver, U.S. 
has found that issuers increase debt issuance when the CreditWatch is negative, however, the paper does not 
examine the effects of delays in credit rating changes and does not find the rational explanation of the paper’s 
findings. 
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endorsement value, though this is still not a perfect way of testing the two types of 
values.  
Secondly, a large body of theoretical research has recognized debt 
heterogeneity (e.g., Diamond (1991, 1993), Park (2000), Bolton and Freixas (2000), 
and DeMarzo and Fishman (2007)). Rauf and Sufi (2009) further argue that debt 
heterogeneity is a first-order aspect of firm capital structure and find that debt 
structure varies across the credit-quality distribution. Nevertheless, this study only 
considered debt maturity and separately tested the functions of short-term debt and 
long-term debt to show that issuers seek for cheaper external funding. Debt is 
considered uniform and its heterogeneity is not counted in most studies. Since the 
division of debts is by their maturity rather than by risk scales 81 , issuers’ 
considerations on the volatility of debts are ignored in the research. Further research 
on debt types when investigate DCRC’s effects may help to understand more 
detailed behaviours and the relative motivations behind them. 
Thirdly, the transmission between credit rating changes and firm performance 
is not merely a one-way mechanism, but a two-way system. As discussed in this 
study, the transmission starts from DCRC and ends at firm performance. However, 
managers consider firm performance when they make financing plan. Rating 
agencies would consider issuer firms’ key performance indicators and capital 
structure when they rate the issuers. This transmission from firm performance to 
DCRC is also conceivable and documented in literature. This study solely focuses 
on the effects of delays in rating changes on the firm performance indicators. It 
does not formally test the two-way causality between capital structure and firm 
                                                          
81  Despite of debt maturity sometimes related to risk, it cannot fully describe the debt heterogeneity. 
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performance (in the last empirical chapter, Chapter V), and this leaves the question 
open. Designed tests can be carried out in a framework which allows interactions 
among these elements.  
Last but not least, this study investigates the consequence of financing 
adjustments by testing firm performance improvements but not the market reaction. 
A follow up study would be the market reaction to a change in financing for a firm 
that previously had a financing adjustment prior to a rating change. For example, 
issuing extra debt would signal a future rating change and be met by a negative 
stock market reaction. Conversely, issuing more equity may signal an upgrade with 
a positive stock market reaction. Tests after a ‘quiet’ period could be conducted to 
better understand the issuers’ behaviour. If rating data of Moody’s and Fitch is 
available, interactive behaviours among issuers and rating agencies could be further 
investigated. The uncovered areas propose a direction for further research. 
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Appendix 1 (Continued) Sample summary statistics of the balanced dataset 
The sample is drawn from quarterly Compustat data, excluding financial firms and utility firms and firm-quarters with 
negative equity values during the period Q1 1985 - Q4 2010. The statistics is based on the estimation samples of tests. 
Panel A lists summary statistics of dependant variables and control variables in the tests. - is defined as long-term 
debt issuance minus long-term debt reduction plus changes in current debt and normalized by firms’ total assets. 5 
is defined as sale of common and preferred stock minus purchases of common and preferred stock and normalized by 
firm’s total assets. 8 is the defined as - minus 5. Other control variable definitions are Leverage: ratio of the 
sum of short-term debt (Sd) and long-term debt (Ld) to the sum of short-term debt, long-term debt, and stockholders' 
equity. Size: logarithm of sales. Price: logarithm of the close price of the quarter. Liquidity: ratio of cash and cash 
equivalent divided (normalized) by total assets. Profit: ratio of EBITDA to total assets. Dividends: ratio of 
dividends to total assets. Earnings: ratio of retained earnings to total assets. Growth: total debt book value plus 
quarterly close price multiply outstanding common stock shares and normalized by total assets. Tangibility: ratio of 
property plant and equipment (Net) to total assets. NDTS: ratio of deferred taxes and investment tax credit to total 
assets. Panel B lists firm characteristics by financing types. The four types are defined as: Debt only financing firms are 
those with positive- but non-positive 5; Equity only financing firms are those with positive 5  but non-
positive -; Dual financing means both - and 5 are positive and Internal financing is assumed if no issuance 
is made, which means both - and 5 are both non-positive. 
Variables  N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum -  81,381 0.004 0.000 0.084 -1.414 11.164 5  81,381 0.011 0.000 0.137 -3.753 9.741 8  81,381 -0.007 0.000 0.161 -9.741 11.164 9-  81,381 0.001 0.000 0.047 -1.414 2.612 :-  81,381 0.003 0.000 0.074 -1.813 11.164 
Leverage  81,381 0.216 0.135 0.240 0.000 0.998 
Size  81,381 3.369 3.287 2.450 -6.908 11.730 
Price  81,381 1.980 2.224 1.535 -6.908 11.523 
Liquidity  81,381 0.200 0.108 0.224 -0.023 1.000 
Profit  81,381 0.011 0.025 0.119 -6.882 13.207 
Dividends  81,381 0.003 0.000 0.022 -0.220 3.700 
Earnings  81,381 -0.543 0.165 3.699 -330.363 2.319 
Growth  81,381 1.829 1.168 3.712 0.003 499.018 
Tangibility  81,381 0.254 0.189 0.225 0.000 0.998 
NDTS  81,381 0.018 0.000 0.033 -0.013 0.368 
The image part with relationship ID rId98 was not found in the  
file.
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Appendix 2 (Continued) Sample summary statistics of the balanced dataset (excluding outliers) 
The sample is drawn from quarterly Compustat data, excluding financial firms and utility firms and firm-quarters with 
negative equity values during the period Q1 1985 - Q4 2010. The statistics is based on the estimation samples of tests. 
Panel A lists summary statistics of dependant variables and control variables in the tests. - is defined as long-term 
debt issuance minus long-term debt reduction plus changes in current debt and normalized by firms’ total assets. 5 
is defined as sale of common and preferred stock minus purchases of common and preferred stock and normalized by 
firm’s total assets. 8 is the defined as - minus 5. Other control variable definitions are Leverage: ratio of the 
sum of short-term debt (Sd) and long-term debt (Ld) to the sum of short-term debt, long-term debt, and stockholders' 
equity. Size: logarithm of sales. Price: logarithm of the close price of the quarter. Liquidity: ratio of cash and cash 
equivalent divided (normalized) by total assets. Profit: ratio of EBITDA to total assets. Dividends: ratio of 
dividends to total assets. Earnings: ratio of retained earnings to total assets. Growth: total debt book value plus 
quarterly close price multiply outstanding common stock shares and normalized by total assets. Tangibility: ratio of 
property plant and equipment (Net) to total assets. NDTS: ratio of deferred taxes and investment tax credit to total 
assets. Panel B lists firm characteristics by financing types. The four types are defined as: Debt only financing firms are 
those with positive- but non-positive 5; Equity only financing firms are those with positive 5  but non-
positive -; Dual financing means both - and 5 are positive and Internal financing is assumed if no issuance 
is made, which means both - and 5 are both non-positive. 
Variables  N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum -  75,687 0.003 0.000 0.061 -0.907 2.677 5  75,687 -0.001 0.000 0.045 -0.612 3.048 8  75,687 0.004 0.000 0.077 -3.048 2.612 9-  75,687 0.000 0.000 0.041 -0.908 2.612 :-  75,687 0.002 0.000 0.047 -0.502 2.681 
Leverage  75,687 0.217 0.171 0.220 0.000 0.992 
Size  75,687 4.423 4.348 2.085 -5.809 11.730 
Price  75,687 2.742 2.890 1.070 -4.962 11.505 
Liquidity  75,687 0.163 0.086 0.184 0.000 0.982 
Profit  75,687 0.042 0.039 0.030 0.000 0.503 
Dividends  75,687 0.004 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.863 
Earnings  75,687 0.378 0.343 0.243 0.000 2.541 
Growth  75,687 1.599 1.194 1.396 0.019 52.319 
Tangibility  75,687 0.279 0.227 0.213 0.000 0.986 
NDTS  75,687 0.024 0.01 0.036 -0.013 0.317 
The image part with relationship ID rId101 was not found in the  
file.
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Appendix 5 Pecking order model tests  
Values of estimated coefficients and their t-statistic of Equation (4.8b). The numbers in brackets underneath 
coefficient estimates are t-statistic. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, the 5% and the 1% 
level, respectively. 
Panel A Pecking order effects nesting DCRC by years 
1985-1990 1990-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 
Intercept  
0.0049*** 0.0010*** 0.0096*** 0.0028*** 0.0045* 
  
(9.92) (3.43) (21.27) (8.72) (1.66) 
BC  -0.0062 -0.0048* 0.0035 -0.0094*** -0.0043 
  
(-1.53) (-1.87) (0.85) (-2.38) (-0.14) 
BC  0.0144*** 0.0076*** 0.0160*** 0.0028 0.0989*** 
  
(4.92) (2.89) (4.05) (1.04) (3.99) 
37iN)  0.2089*** 0.1062*** 0.0088*** 0.0316*** 0.0050*** 
  
(45.47) (28.17) (8.04) (28.81) (9.67) 
Adj R-square  
0.0845 0.0223 0.0014 0.0135 0.0013 
N  
22,755 35,161 55,262 61,110 80,767 
 
Panel B Pecking order effects by rating change types 
¡r¢'(*  * No rating changes =1 ¡r£'(*  * 
Intercept  
0.0069*** 0.0050*** 0.0415*** 
  
(3.54) (13.82) (13.83) 
37iN)  0.0001 0.0002*** 0.4419*** 
  
(0.10) (2.30) (10.52) 
Adj R-square  
-0.0004 0.0000 0.0276 
N  
2,754 275,326 3,870 
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